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In 1984 and 1986, the criminal forfeiture provisions of the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,' known as the
RICO Act, were amended to improve procedures for implementing
the forfeiture provisions of the Act and to clarify the broad scope
the statute was always intended to have.2 This penalty statute, 18
U.S.C. 1963, as amended, will be of ever-increasing importance in
the prosecution of traditional white collar crimes such as fraud and
political corruption. The reason is obvious. One of the the most
severe penalties which can be inflicted on white collar criminals is to
take from them the proceeds of their illegal activity and businesses
which provided the economic base for their crimes. 3 Mandatory
separation of the convicted felon from the business which he cor-
rupted and from the "ill-gotten gains" of his illegal activities is the
primary purpose of the RICO forfeiture provisions.4 In addition,
strong measures in the white collar crime area are intended to deter
others who may determine that the risk normally inherent upon con-
* Copyright reserved, 1989, Karla R. Spaulding.
** Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Drug Trafficking Section, M.D. Florida,
Tampa Division;J.D., Northwestern University School of Law 1980; B.A., Western Mich-
igan University 1975. This article was published by Ms. Spaulding in her private capac-
ity. No official support or endorsement by the Department of Justice or any other
agency of the United States Government is intended or should be inferred.
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1986).
2 S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 21 (1983).
3 For example, compare basic prison sentances for drug dealers with those for
"racketeers." Under title 21 of the United States Code, a five-year (60 months) mini-
mum mandatory period of incarceration is imposed for mere possession of as little as
five grams of substances containing cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. § 844. Under the federal
sentencing guidelines effective for offenses committed after November 1, 1987, an indi-
vidual convicted of racketeering would serve, based on the base level offense category,
between 30 and 37 months in jail.
4 The RICO Act "attacks the problem by providing a means of wholesale removal of
organized crime from our organizations, prevention of their return and, where possible,
forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains." 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970).
197
KARLA R. SPA ULDING
viction of a white collar crime is well worth the monetary gain possi-
ble from these criminal activities. 5 Consequently, Congress adopted
a broad "'hit them where they hurt'" philosophy when it enacted
the RICO Act forfeiture provisions.
6
Initially the RICO Act forfeiture provisions were seldom in-
voked following their enactment in 1970. 7 However, clarification of
the broad scope of the provisions by the 1984 and 1986 amend-
ments to the Act, coupled with the increasing use of it in the white
collar crime area, makes knowledge of the scope and procedures for
use of the forfeiture provisions vital to lawyers involved in federal
criminal cases today. Case law is developing in many aspects of for-
feiture law including the rights of innocent third parties, pretrial re-
straining orders and forfeitability of attorney's fees. The following
is an examination of the legislative and legal history of the RICO
forfeiture provisions; a review of the law to date; a discussion of is-
sues regarding the constitutionality of the forfeiture provisions; and
procedures for charging and implementing criminal forfeiture
under RICO.
1. THE HISTORY OF RICO ACT FORFEITURE PROVISIONS
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE RICO ACT
Case law interpreting the RICO forfeiture provisions has
turned time and again to a review of the legislative history of the
statute for guidance as to the scope and meaning of the statute.
8
Accordingly, it is appropriate to understand the legislative history
underlying section 1963 before analyzing the interpretation of the
statute by the courts.
Under the English common law, "in many cases of felonies, the party
forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown... [as] a part, or at least
a consequence, of the judgment or conviction." It is plain from this
statement that no right to the goods and chattels of the felon could be
acquired by the crown by the mere commission of the offense; but the
5 "If corporate officers are fined, imprisoned and divested of their interests in the
enterprise, their successors are unlikely to imitate their misconduct." United States v.
Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1980)(footnote omitted.)
6 United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 957 n.17 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
7 Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings on H.R. 2646, H.R. 2910, H.R. 4110 and H.R. 5371
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.
1 (1981, 1982).
8 E.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d
779, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); United States v. Marubeni
Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d
796, 811-12 (5th Cir), cert.denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. 1332, 1340-42 (D.Colo. 1985).
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right attached only by the conviction of the offender. 9
This type of forfeiture, termed in personam, was abolished in the
United States by the First Congress in 1790.10 The Act of April 20,
1790, as amended, provided that "[n]o conviction or judgment shall
work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate.""
A second type of common law forfeiture, termed in rem, arose
from the concept of "deodand."' 12 "At common law the value of an
inanimate object directly or indirectly causing the accidental death
of a King's subject was forfeited to the Crown as a deodand."' 3 Af-
ter the deodand was abolished in 1846,14 English law continued to
provide "for statutory forfeitures of offending objects used in viola-
tion of the customs and revenue laws .... Statutory forfeitures were
most often enforced under the in rem procedure .. ".."15 In the
United States, the 1790 law forbidding forfeiture of estate did not
affect the in rem forfeitures provided for by statute. Statutory forfei-
ture was used to seize property used in violation of the law, such as
ships used for smuggling and slave-running. 16 Since 1790, however,
"the Federal Government has applied the ameliorative policy... of
providing administrative remissions and mitigations of statutory for-
feitures in most cases where the violations are incurred 'without
willful negligence' or an intent to commit the offense."' 17
The forfeiture provision proposed by the Ninety-First Congress
as part of the RICO Act was the first in personam forfeiture for viola-
tion of a criminal statute since 1790.18 The legislation was part of a
9 The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
10 Act of April 20, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 (1790). The only exception to the Act
of April 20, 1790 before 1970 was "the Confiscation Act passed by the Radical Republi-
can Congress in 1862 which authorized President Lincoln to forfeit the property of Con-
federate sympathizers." United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387 (W.D.
Mich. 1987).
11 Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S.30 before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 407 (1969)
[hereinafter Measures Relating to Organized Crime Hearings].
12 "Deodand (L.Lat. Deo dandum, a thing to be given to God.) In English Law, any
personal chattel which was the immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable crea-
ture, and which was forfeited to the crown to be applied to pious uses, and distributed in
alms by the high almoner." Black's Law Dictionary 392 (5th ed. 1979).
13 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974)(foot-
note omitted.)
14 Id. at 681 n.19.
15 Id. at 682.
16 Id. at 683.
17 Id. at 689-90 n.27 (citation omitted.)
18 See Measures Relating to Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 11, at 407 (Deputy Attor-
ney General Richard G. Kleindienst)(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (repealed November 1,
1986)). "Corruption of blood" refers to early English law under which "the complete
forfeiture of all real and personal property followed as a consequence of conviction of a
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number of bills aimed at curbing the criminal activity of organized
crime, specifically the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra families. The first
bill proposed in this area was the Organized Crime Control Act in-
troduced as Senate Bill S. 30 by Senator John L. McClellan on
March 11, 1969.19 The Bill contained the predecessor provisions of
the formal immunity statute.20 Senator McClellan also introduced a
second Bill, S. 1861, to be considered in conjunction with S. 30.21
S. 1861, entitled the Corrupt Organizations Act of 1969, was the
forerunner of the RICO Act enacted in 1970.22 Section 1963 of S.
1861 set forth the proposed criminal forfeiture provision.
23
In his remarks regarding S. 1861, Senator McClellan cited testi-
mony before the subcommittee regarding infiltration of legitimate
business by "racketeers." 24 He further noted:
Criminals use racketeering methods in legitimate fields of endeavor.
They corrupt others, instead of becoming legitimized. The only way in
which this cancer can be removed from our economy is by direct at-
tack, by forceable removal and prevention of return.
This bill uses the most direct route to accomplish this result. If
an organization is acquired or run by the proscribed racketeering
felony or treason." United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 830 (1980). "In addition, when convicted of treason or a felony, the defend-
ant's 'blood was corrupted' so that nothing could pass by inheritance through his line."
Id.
19 115 CONG. REC. 5872 (1969).
20 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1986).
21 Measures Relating to Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 11, at 61.
22 115 CONG. REC. 9566 (1969).
23 § 1963. Criminal penalties
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this Chapter shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and
shall forfeit to the United States all interest in the enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including but not limited to, the accept-
ance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with property subject to for-
feiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize
the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General designated by the Attorney
General, to seize all property declared forfeited under this section upon such terms
and conditions as the court shall deem proper. All provisions of law relating to the
disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or
mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of
claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures
shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the pro-
visions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other
person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs laws shall be
performed under this Chapter by the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney
General designated by the Attorney General.
Id. at 9569.
24 Id. at 9567.
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method, then the persons involved are removed from the
organization.
25
Specifically regarding the forfeiture provisions of S. 1861, Sen-
ator McClellan stated:
Section 1963 provides that any violation of section 1962 provable be-
yond a reasonable doubt will result in a forfeiture of the violators' in-
terest in the organization to the United States. This is a powerful
weapon, which will, I hope, effectively remove the organized crime ele-
ment from a particular field of activity, as well as remove the illegal
profit potential which makes certain fields so attractive today. Prece-
dent for forfeitures, of course, runs deep in our common law heritage.
It thus calls on the past to meet the problems of today.
2 6
S. 1861 also contained civil remedies allowing for orders di-
recting the defendant to divest his direct or indirect interests in an
enterprise, prohibiting him from engaging in the same type of busi-
ness or activity as the enterprise engaged in or ordering dissolution
of the enterprise. 27 As to the civil divestiture power, Senator Mc-
Clellan observed:
If Dupont and other related companies can be forced to rid themselves
of General Motors ownership, almost without regard for the economic
consequences, [United States v. DuPont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326-27
(1961)], then it most surely follows that the removal of criminal ele-
ments from the organizations of our society by divestiture is justified
.... The criminal surely can lose his right to own a business or other
enterprise as easily as can the essentially honest, but potentially too
powerful businessman.
28
During the continuation of the hearings on S. 30 and related
bills before the Senate subcommittee,2 9 S. 1861 was specifically ad-
dressed. At first, the Justice Department called S. 1861 "so innova-
tive" that it would need more time to explore all its ramifications.3 0
Nevertheless, Attorney General John Mitchell recognized that
strong measures were necessary to fight organized crime:
McClellan: .. . But you say the fact that you may finally arrest and
convict the top man in a family does not destroy the family. Someone
else just moves up to take his place.
Mitchell: That is correct, sir.
McClellan: And they continue to operate.
Mitchell: That is correct, sir.
McClellan: And your thought is that we have to find some way to at-
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 9569.
28 Id. at 9567-68.
29 Measures Relating to Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 11, at 404.
30 Id. at 388.
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tack the source of the revenues that constitute the attraction to them
to continue their activities?
Mitchell: Yes, sir. To remove the illegal activity, the business or
whatever the source of those funds is.A'
Subsequently, the Justice Department sent a letter to the sub-
committee setting forth the Department's view on S. 1861, specifi-
cally commenting on the proposed forfeiture provisions.3 2 The
letter distinguished between in rem forfeitures and the in personam
forfeiture proposed in section 1963 of S. 1861. The Department of
Justice noted that the civil forfeiture provisions contained in section
1964 of S. 1861 would be "the principal utility of S. 1861." 3 As to
criminal forfeiture, the Department observed:
It is felt that this revival of the concept of forfeiture as a criminal pen-
alty, limited as it is in Section 1963(a) to one's interest in the enter-
prise which is the subject of the specific offense involved here, and not
extending to any other property of the convicted offender, is a matter
of Congressional wisdom, rather than of Constitutional power.
3 4
31 Id. at 116.
32 Id. at 406-08.
33 Id. at 407.
34 Id. The majority of the text of the letter is set forth below:
Section 1963 contains criminal penalties for violations of Section 1962. These
include, in addition to a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not
more than 20 years, or both, forfeiture of all interest in the enterprise. The concept
of forfeiture as a criminal penalty which is embodied in this provision differs from
other presently existing forfeiture provisions under Federal statutes where the pro-
ceeding is in rem against the property and the thing which is declared unlawful
under the statute, or which is used for an unlawful purpose, or in connection with
the prohibited property or transaction, is considered the offender, and the forfei-
ture is no part of the punishment for the criminal offense. Examples of such forfei-
ture provisions are those contained in the customs, narcotics and revenue laws.
Such statutes have been uniformly upheld against the objection that they violate
due process on the grounds that they are wholly preventive and remedial and are
designed to aid the enforement of the particular laws in question and to restrain
violations thereof. In upholding such a statute in Goldsmith-Grant Company v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921), the Supreme Court held at 511: "But whether the rea-
son for Section 3450 be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the punitive and
remedial jurisdition of this Country to be now displaced."
Under the criminal forfeiture provision of Section 1963, however, the proceed-
ing is in personam against the defendant who is the party to be punished upon convic-
tion of violation of any provision of the Section, not only by fine and/or
imprisonment, but also by forfeiture of all interest in the enterprise. The concept is
derived from the practice well known in the early law where upon conviction of
treason and certain other felonies the party forfeited his goods and chattels to the
crown. The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 25 U.S. 1 (1827), opinion of Mr. Justice Story at
14. According to Blackstone, the only valid reason for this type of forfeiture is that
since all property is derived from society, any member of society who violates the
fundamental contract of his association by transgressing society's laws forfeits his
right to that property, and the state may justly resume that portion of the property
which the laws have previously assigned him. Commentaries, Ch. 8, 299-300. XVI.
While there is some indication that this concept of criminal forfeiture was in
usage in the colonies, the First Congress by Act of April 20, 1790, abolished forfei-
ture of estate and corruption of blood, including in cases of treason. That statute,
as revised, is found in 18 U.S.C. 3563 which states: "No conviction or judgment
202 [Vol. 80
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The only opposition to the provisions of S. 1861 expressed to
the subcommittee were those of Lawrence Spieser representing the
ACLU. Mr. Spieser's concern was that "[ilike many Sections of S.
30, which we have previously discussed in detail, the substantive
sections of S. 1861, would be applicable in areas far removed from
that which we traditionally define as 'organized crime'."35 Mr.
shall work corruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate." From that date to the
present, therefore, no Federal statute has provided for a penalty of forfeiture as a
punishment for violation of a criminal statute of the United States. Section 1963(a),
therefore, would repeal 18 U.S.C. 3563 by implication.
It is felt that this revival of the concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty, lim-
ited as it is in Section 1963(a) to one's interest in the enterprise which is the subject
of the specific offense involved here, and not extending to any other property of the
convicted offender, is a matter of Congressional wisdom rather than of Constitu-
tional power. See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter at 441, holding that whether proscribed conduct is to be visited
by a criminal prosecution or by other remedies is a matter of legislative choice.
While the criminal penalties provided in Section 1963 will doubtless have a
deterrent effect on racketeer infiltration of legitimate business enterprises, the prin-
cipal utility of S. 1861 may well be found to exist in its civil remedies provisions-
injunction, divestiture and dissolution-contained in section 1964, supported as
they are by the broad discovery and procedural devices contained in Sections 1965
through 1968. We have no objection to these provisions, and note that they are
substantially identical to existing provisions of the antitrust laws. There is ample
precedent for application of these civil remedies to the conduct sought to be pro-
hibited by this bill in decisions of the Supreme Court upholding similar civil reme-
dies in antitrust cases. The remedy of divestiture of interest was upheld in the
landmark decision in United States v. DuPont and Company, 366 U.S. 316, 326-27
(1961). Prohibition against engaging in certain types of legitimate activities was
approved in such cases as United States v. Swift and Company, 286 U.S. 106 (1932), and
Deveau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). Authority for dissolution may be found in
International Boxing Club of New York v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959). See also the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Utah Public Service Commission v. El Paso
Natural Gas Company, [394 U.S. 1009 (1969)] decided June 16, 1969, a Clayton Act
case where the Court decreed complete divestiture "without delay", emphasizing at
p. 7 of the slip opinion that "the pinch on private interests is not relevant to fash-
ioning an antitrust decree, as public interest is our sole concern."
These time tested remedies, particularly when used in conjunction with the civil
investigative demand contained in Section 1968, should enable the Government to
intervene in many situations which are not susceptible to proof of a criminal viola-
tion. Thus, in contrast to a criminal proceeding, the civil procedure under which
Section 1964 actions are governed, with its lesser standard of proof, non-injury id-
judication process, amendment of pleadings, etc., will provide a valuable new
method of attacking the evil aimed at in this bill. The relief offered by these equita-
ble remedies would also seem to have a greater potential than that of the penal
sanctions for actually removing the criminal figure from a particular organization
and enjoining him from engaging in similar activity. Finally, these remedies are
flexible, allowing of several alternate courses of action for dealing with a particular
type of predatory activity, and they may also be effectively monitored by the Court
to insure that its decrees are not violated.
With the amendments which I have suggested, then, the Department favors the
enactment of this bill and believes that it can make a substantial contribution to the
Government's program for eliminating the serious threat which organized crime's
entry into legitimate business poses to the proper functioning of the American eco-
nomic system.
Id. at 406-08.
35 Id. at 475.
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Spieser's only comment on the proposed forfeiture provision came
during his discussion of hypothetical situations in which he feared
misuse of the Act. He postulated:
The corner grocer accepts money for food from individuals
known to be involved with a criminal syndicate who patronized his
store. He knows that money is derived from illegal activities. Must he
refuse to sell his wares, or inquire specifically as to where his customer
got the money, on pain of subjecting himself to forfeiture or fine or
imprisonment when he subsequently invests that money.
Punishment for aiding and abetting involves a stake in the venture
under United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2nd Cir. 1939), aff'd, 311
U.S. 205 (1940). Here the same result is reached without regard to
any interest or stake on the part of the grocer. The same may be said
for the doctor who treats the suspect individual or anyone else who
provides him with services.
Moreover there are difficulties with both the prohibition and pen-
alty provided even in the context of what is classicly termed organized
crime. It is certainly clear that not all income which can be defined as
derived "directly or indirectly" from a pattern of racketeering activity
should be subject to forfeiture and that anyone knowingly receiving
such income should be subjected to penalties provided without regard
to the circumstances of his receipt thereof.
36
In his discussion of potential overreaching under the forfeiture
provision, he addressed the question of forfeiture of attorney's fees:
For example, if a lawyer is retained to defend an individual charged
with an organized crime offense, and is paid in cash for his services,
surely he has reason to know that the money with which he is paid may
be or has been directly or indirectly derived from racketeering activity.
Indeed, he may know this to a certainty just as he may know that his
client is guilty. Nevertheless under our law, even the guilty are enti-
tled to an adequate defense. Yet this legislation would require this
lawyer or any lawyer either to refuse to undertake the defense or ac-
cept the fee on pain of forfeiture and criminal indictment. Whatever
the ethical considerations involved in whether a lawyer undertakes a
given case, it is not the proper role of the Congress to legislate what
amounts to a virtual denial of the right to counsel of one's choice to
any one engaged in organized crime activity or reduce him to the situ-
ation where he has no choice save to rely on appointed counsel.
3 7
Despite Mr. Spieser's hypotheticals, no limiting language was added
to S. 1861 to restrict its application solely to "organized crime," 38
or to limit the breadth of the forfeiture provisions.
By November 17, 1969, S. 1981 as well as six other bills had
36 Id. at 476.
37 Id.
38 "It is true that there is no organized crime definition in many parts of the bill.
This is, in part, because it is probably impossible precisely and definitively to define
organized crime." 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970)(statement of Rep. Poff).
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been consolidated into S. 30.39 On December 18, 1969, the Senate
issued its report on S. 30.40 The report recommended approval of
the bill, as amended.41 The committee stated:
It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-
gathering process, by establishing new penal provisions, and by pro-
viding enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime.
42
The report noted that S. 30, of which S. 1861 was now Title IX,
had been circulated for comment to various groups and individuals
before being reported in its final form.43 As reported, the criminal
forfeiture provision of S. 1861 modified the language originally pro-
posed. Initially, section 1963 had provided for forfeiture of "all in-
terest in the enterprise." As revised, "any interest in, security of,
claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording
a source of influence over, any enterprise" was subject to forfei-
ture.44 A second category of interests not expressly tied to the en-
39 115 CONG. REC. 34,389 (1969).
40 S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
41 Id. at 1.
42 Id. at 2.
43 Id. at 47.
44 See supra note 23. The text of Section 1963 as reported by the Senate is set forth
below:
1963. Criminal penalties.
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both,
and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained
in violation of section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or
property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any
enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or partici-
pated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
(b) In any action brought by the United States under this section, the district
courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or
prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the accept-
ance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other
interest subject to forfeiture under this section, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize
the Attorney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under
this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. If a
property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the
United States, it shall expire, and shall not revert to the convicted person. All provi-
sions of law relating to the.disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale
thereof, or the remission or mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs
laws, and the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in
respect of such forfeitures shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have
been incurred, under the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not
inconsistent with the provsisions hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the col-
lector of customs or any other person with respect to the dispostion of property
under the customs laws shall be performed under this chapter by the Attorney Gen-
eral. The United States shall dispose of all such property as soon as commercially
feasible, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
Id. at 23-24.
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terprise was also included. This category was described as "any
interest ... acquired or maintained in violation of Section 1962 [the
substantive RICO offense]." There is no specific indication in the
legislative history regarding the reason for the changed language in
this provision.
The report contained an extensive discussion of organized
crime, including tables outlining the leadership of the La Cosa Nos-
tra families.45 In the discussion of the specific provisions of S. 30,
the report noted that "title IX has.., as its purpose the elimination
of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legiti-
mate organizations operating in interstate commerce. It seeks to
achieve this objective by the fashioning of new criminal and civil
remedies and investigative procedures."' 46 The report discussed ex-
amples of the extent of organized crime's control of various indus-
tries and the effect of that infiltration. 47 The new remedies provided
by the RICO Act were designed to attack organized crime's sources
of economic power on all fronts. 48 The report stated:
Title IX recognizes that present efforts to dislodge the forces of
organized crime from legitimate fields of endeavor have proven unsuc-
cessful. To remedy this failure, the proposed statute adopts the most
direct route open to accomplish the desired objective. Where an or-
ganization is acquired or run by defined racketeering methods, then
the persons involved can be legally separated from the organization,
either by the criminal law approach of fine, imprisonment and forfei-
ture or through a civil law approach of equitable relief broad enough
to do all that is necessary to free the channels of commerce from all
illicit activity.
Criminal approach
Fine and imprisonment as criminal sanctions are not new. The
use of criminal forfeiture, however, represents an innovative attempt
to call on our common law heritage to meet an essentially modern
problem. In English law, goods and chattels were automatically for-
feited to the Crown upon conviction of felony; lands were forfeited
upon attainder, and this common law rule was carried into the New
World by the colonists. Instances of criminal forfeiture, moreover, are
noted in early American reports. The use of the ancient doctrine of
criminal forfeiture embodied in title IX may be aptly explained by ref-
erence to the Department of Justice comments on the proposed
statute.
49
After quoting extensively from the Justice Department's letter
45 Id. at 36-40.
46 Id. at 76.
47 Id. at 76-78.
48 Id. at 79.
49 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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discussing the forfeiture provisions, 50 the report concluded:
"Through this new approach, it should be possible to remove the
leaders of organized crime from their sources of economic power.
Instead of their positions being filled by successors no different in
kind, the channels of commerce can be freed of racketeering influ-
ence." 51 In its indepth review of each of the provisions of S. 30, the
report added:
Section 1963 provides criminal penalties for the violation of sec-
tion 1962, above. Subsection (a) provides the remedy of criminal for-
feiture. Forfeiture trials are to be governed by the Fed. R. Grim. P.
But see Fed. R. Grim. P. 54(a)(5). The language is designed to accom-
plish a forfeiture of any "interest" of any type in the enterprise ac-
quired by the defendant or in which the defendant has participated in
violation of section 1962. For the purposes of this section, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563, insofar as it is applicable to forfeiture is no longer the law....
A $25,000 fine and imprisonment for not more than 20 years are also
provided.5
2
S. 30 was considered by the full Senate on January 21 through
January 23, 1970. 53 In explaining the forfeiture provisions of Title
IX, Senator McClellan stated: "Title IX . . .would forfeit the ill-
gotten gains of criminals where they enter or operate an organiza-
tion through a pattern of racketeering activity." 54 Co-sponsor of S.
30, Senator Hruska, spoke of Title IX as follows: "Title IX of this
act is designed to remove the influence of organized crime from le-
gitimate business by attacking its property interests and by remov-
ing its members from control of legitimate businesses which have
been acquired or operated by unlawful racketeering methods." 55 S.
30 was passed by the Senate on January 23, 1970.56 No opposition
to the forfeiture provisions of Title IX was expressed in the Senate
debate on S. 30.
S. 30 next proceeded to the House of Representatives, where it
was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.5 7 Hearings were
held on S. 30 from May through August 1970.58 Senator McClellan
50 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
51 S. Rep. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1969).
52 Id. at 160. It is interesting to note that the Senate referred to interests acquired in
an enterprise in this discussion even though the revised language of Section 1963 de-
leted the "in an enterprise" limitation from section 1963(a)(1).
53 116 GONG. REC. 511, 575-607, 972 (1970).
54 Id. at 592.
55 Id. at 602.
56 Id. at 972.
57 Id. at 1103.
58 Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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introduced S. 30 to the House subcommittee. As to the forfeiture
provisions, he stated:
[T]itle IX would provide an effective adjunct to a criminal prose-
cution: it would punish the criminal appropriately by forfeiting to the
government his ill-acquired interests in a legitimate business, and di-
rectly aid the business community by expelling him from the legiti-
mate business he had abused. The government would have to dispose
of the forfeited interest as soon as reasonably possible, and could sell
the property in such a manner as to ensure that the enterprise was not
again infiltrated by the convict or his criminal associates. Since the
convict would not be compensated for the forfeited interest, the forfei-
ture would be a criminal one, and could be applied only if the individ-
ual's guilt were proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial. 59
Attorney General Mitchell also presented the views of the Jus-
tice Department on S. 30 to the House subcommittee. 60 As to the
forfeiture penalties, the Attorney General stated: "We think that the
revival of the concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty, limited as it
is herein to an offender's interest which is the subject of the criminal
offense, is a matter subject only to Congressional discretion, not
constitutional limitation." 61
Others also expressed approval of the proposed law. Senator
Steiger applauded the forfeiture provisions of Title IX, noting:
Criminal forfeiture, which was used extensively in England and to
a limited degree in the colonies but has found virtually no application
in the United States, would punish a criminal found to have violated
title IX appropriately by forfeiting his ill-acquired business interests,
and it would directly aid the business community by expelling the
racketeer from the legitimate business he had abused.
62
Charles Rogovin, Administrator of the U.S. Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, wrote, "Title IX will allow the courts ac-
tually to extract corrupt influences from legitimate commerce, and
to ensure that they do not return. '63
Not everyone spoke positively concerning the forfeiture provi-
sions before the House, however. Sheldon Elsen, chairman of the
Committee on Federal Legislation, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, called the criminal remedies of Title IX "illu-
sory." 64 The report of the committee on federal legislation of the
New York County Lawyers' Association was more vocal in its dislike
59 Id. at 107.
60 Id. at 151.
61 Id. at 171.
62 Id. at 519.
63 Id. at 687.
64 Id. at 370.
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of the forfeiture provisions:65
The substantial question raised is whether the 91st Congress of
1970 is prepared to reverse the 1st Congress of 1790 which abolished
all forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood-even in cases involv-
ing treason. "No conviction or judgment shall work corruption of
blood or any forfeiture of estate." 18 U.S.C. 3563. Quite simply, what
is sought in Section 1963 is a proceeding inpersonam against the racket-
eer's estate, not a proceeding in rem against the thing which has been
declared unlawful or which has been used for an unlawful purpose.
This is an unwarranted departure from existing law.
6 6
The Association also expressed concern about the provision's
impact on third parties. For example:
The Chase Bank lends an officer of a large off-shore mutual fund a
substantial sum of money and receives as collateral blocks of marketa-
ble securities. Thereafter, it is learned that the off-shore fund is guilty
of two acts of fraud in the sale of securities, and as a controlling per-
son, the officer is personally liable. The United States obtains forfei-
ture of the controlling person's assets insofar as they can be vaguely
related to the securities fraud. At that point, the bank is at the govern-
ment's mercy whether it gets paid or becomes an unsecured creditor
of the "racketeer.
' 6 7
The Association further argued that the language requiring the At-
torney General to make "due provision for the rights of innocent
persons" was probably unconstitutionally vague.6 8
Finally, Lawrence Spieser of the ACLU continued his opposi-
tion to Title IX. He speculated that:
Title IX must be read as applying to an individual who in the
1930's "participated," but not as a principal, in an offense "involving"
some sort of "bankruptcy fraud," and, entirely on his own, thirty-five
years later, participated as a principal in a minor mail fraud. Title IX
would appear to subject such a person to a possible 20 year sentence,
$25,000 fine, and forfeiture of any interstate business interest he may
have acquired to any degree, even "indirectly," with the proceeds of the
mail fraud-all of this in addition to the penalties provided by law for
the underlying offenses. While such a case may not necessarily arise, it
is the duty of the draftsman to provide limitations in the law itself, and
not leave the matter to the possible benevolence or abuse of a
prosecutor.
6 9
The House Committee on the Judiciary issued its report on S.
30 on September 30, 1970.70 It recommended approval of S. 30 as




69 Id. at 499.
70 H. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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amended. The amendments did not alter the language of the forfei-
ture provision of Title IX. The House report described the penalty
provisions of Title IX as providing for punishment "by forfeiture to
the United States of all property and interests, as broadly described,
which are related to the violations."
71
Representatives Conyers, Mikva and Ryan filed a dissent to the
House report. They expressed concern about the far-reaching po-
tential for forfeiture of interests "indirectly" acquired through rack-
eteering. 72 In their view, innocent third parties who might have an
interest in property subject to forfeiture were inadequately pro-
tected.73 Finally, they noted that "the potential scope for depriva-
tion of property by criminal forfeiture constitutes a threat to
legitimate business far beyond what should be the ken of a bill
aimed at organized crime."
74
71 Id. at 57.
72 Id. at 187-88. Specifically, the Congressman noted:
Section 1962 opens the door to 20 years in prison, a $25,000 fine, and forfei-
ture of property, all because a man won $1,000 on two separate instances in a gam-
bling game. It does so by prohibiting the use or investment of funds either directly
or indirectly. The so-called racketeer need not directly use this $1,000 to buy a
business in order to run afoul of the title. The mere fact that this $1,000 enabled
him to utilize another, legally obtained $1,000 to buy the business, rather than nec-
essary food and clothing, brings him within the ambit of "indirect" use.
The erection of the penalty of forfeiture represents similar over-reaching, made
that much more severe by the "indirect use" bootstrap which can lift the prosecu-
tion into a conviction. The convicted offender is to be compelled to forfeit all inter-
est, direct or indirect, in any enterprise which he has obtained, controls, or in which
he participates, by use of funds derived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" or
collection of an "unlawful debt."
Id.
73 Id. at 188. Examples of unprotected third parties were given in the dissent's
report.
Moreover, not only does criminal forfeiture unduly penalize the man who may
simply have engaged in two separate poker games and thereby subjected himself to
accusation for having engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." It also leaves
far too uncertain the rights of entirely blameless citizens and organizations. A mi-
nor legislative bow in their direction is made in section 1963(c), which states that
"The United States shall dispose of all such property (which has been forfeited to it)
as soon as commercially feasible, making due provision for the rights of innocent
persons." But the seizure and sale by the Government of property which was used
as collateral by the offender for a legitimate loan may well leave an unsecured credi-
tor out of luck, or sale by the Government of a forfeited business on a stagnant
market may well undercut innocent competitors or customers.
74 Id. The Congressman also commented on the Department of Justice's letter in
support of the forfeiture provision.
Even the Justice Department's comment on this measure establishing criminal for-
feiture-a measure which overturns an act of the same Congress which proposed to
the States for ratification the Bill of Rights-is pallid endorsement, compared to its
espousal of numerous other repressive features of this bill. By letter of August 11,
1969, from Richard Kleindienst, Deputy Attorney General, to the Honorable John
L. McClellan, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures, Commit-
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The full House debated S. 30 as amended in early October,
1970.7 5 In presenting the bill to the House, Representative Cellar
noted that Title IX "also authorizes forfeiture of any interest which
has been attained in violation of the criminal provision."' 76 During
the debates, Representative Poff addressed the minority view com-
plaints set forth in the House report:
The use of the ancient doctrine of criminal forfeiture embodied in
tide IX, therefore, will deal not only with individuals, but also with the
economic base through which those individuals constitute such a seri-
ous threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an at-
tack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the
attack must take place on all available fronts.
77
Representatives Mikva and Ryan nevertheless continued to assert
their opposition to the forfeiture provision.
78
Now, it would be nice to get the syndicates out of legitimate busi-
ness and to get organized crime away from the fruits of legitimate en-
terprises; but we should not do it in a way in which we throw out all of
these deep-seated traditions about protection of private property and
about limiting the penalty to what it says in the statute books without
any forfeiture of property or corruption of blood.
79
The Bill was approved by the House on October 7, 1970.80
The Senate agreed to the House amendments on October 13,
1970.81 The Bill was signed into law as Public Law 91-452 by the
President on October 15, 1970.82
B. EARLY FORFErTURE CASES
Between the enactment of the law in 1970 and the commence-
ment of new hearings regarding criminal forfeiture provisions in
tee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, the Justice Department's position was stated
thusly:
It is felt that this revival of the concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty, limited as
it is in section 1963(a) to one's interest in the enterprise which is the subject of the
specific offense involved here, and not extending to any other property of the con-
victed offender, is a matter of congressional wisdom rather than a constitutional
power.
We perceive little "wisdom" in reviving criminal forfeiture after its 180-year dor-
mancy, particularly when it is couched in the loose language of title IX. We seem to
fight corruption of business with corruption of blood, which is neither wise nor
constitutional.
75 116 CONG. REC. 35,191-217, 35,287-364 (1970).
76 Id. at 35,196 (statement of Rep. Cellar).
77 Id. at 35,193 (statement of Rep. Poff).
78 Id. at 35,205-08.
79 Id. at 35,205 (Rep. Mikva).
80 Id. at 35,364.
81 Id. at 36,296, 36,415.
82 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
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September 1981, only twenty-eight forfeiture cases were reported,
twenty-two under the RICO forfeiture provisions and six under the
virtually identical continuing criminal enterprise or CCE forfeiture
provisions, 21 U.S.C. 848.83 Between the beginning of the 1981
hearings and the issuance of the Senate report in support of the
forerunner to the 1984 forfeiture amendments on September 14,
1983, eleven additional RICO forfeiture cases and four additional
CCE forfeiture cases were reported.8 4 Many of these cases dealt
with procedural application of forfeiture laws. The cases included
discussion of: adequate notice under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
83 United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Peacock, 654
F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated in part, 686 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982) (Unit B), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 965 (1983); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 943 (1982); United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1006 (1982); United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
857 (1981); United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); United States v. McNary, 620 F.2d 621 (7th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States
v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v.
Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v.
Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); United
States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d
975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810 (1978); United States v.Jeffers,
532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 432 U.S. 137
(1977); United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974);
United States v. Romano, 523 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1981); United States v. Loften,
518 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd mem., 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987); United States
v. Computer Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 1181
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp
134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bello, 470 F.
Supp. 783 (S.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. Scharf, 436 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mo. 1977),
aft'd, 568 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa.
1977); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp 1308 (D.Del. 1976); United States v.
Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed mem., 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Amato,
367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
84 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005
(1984); United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828
(1983); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 85 (1983);
United States v. Sheeran, 699 F.2d 112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United
States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 959
(1983); United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 468
U.S. 1206 (1984); United States v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1982)(Unit B); United
States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982); United States
v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982); United States. v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488
(E.D. Mich. 1983); United States v. Harvey, 560 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd sub.
nom. United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854
(1986); United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
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cedure 7(c);35 bifurcated trials and special verdicts forms;8 6 and how
to construe the different categories of forfeited property set forth in
Section 1963.87 Additionally, basic constitutional challenges were
made to the new statutes.8 8
The issues arising in the case law which troubled the legislators
who worked on the RICO amendments fell into four categories: 1)
how to construe subsection 1963(a)(1) dealing with interests ac-
quired and maintained in violation of section 1962; 2) the standards
for implementation of the restraining order provisions of sections
1963 and 848; 3) protection of the rights of third parties; and 4)
dissipation, transfer or concealment of forfeitable assets by defend-
ants. Each of these categories arose from a separate set of cases.
1. Subsection 1963(a)(1)
In 1979, district courts in the Central District of California8 9
and in the Northern District of Georgia90 held that the language of
subsection 1963(a) (1) must be limited to interests acquired or main-
tained in an enterprise and thus the forfeiture provisions of section
1963 did not "extend to fruits or profits generated from the enter-
prise."9 1 The California decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit
85 United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); United
States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lofton, 518 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd mem., 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308
(D.Del. 1976).
86 United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980);
United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Hu-
ber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Lof-
ton, 518 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd mem., 819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987); United
States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D.Md. 1976).
87 United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980);
United States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 439 U.S. 810
(1978); United States v. Romano, 523 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1981); United States v.
Computer Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134
(N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Pa. 1977); United
States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D.Md. 1976), aff'd in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.
1979).
88 United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Huber, 603
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); United States v. Amato, 367 F.
Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
89 United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., Cr. No. 78-1060 HP (C.D. Cal., March 30,
1979)(cited in United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979)).
90 United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
91 Id. at 142.
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in 1980 in the case of United States v. Marubeni America Corporation.92
In Marubeni, the defendants were convicted in a white collar crime
case of obtaining large supply contracts through bribes and kick-
backs in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1963(c). The government sought
forfeiture of "amounts paid or payable for performance of a con-
tract procured through a pattern of racketeering activity" 93 under
the interests acquired or maintained language of subsection
1963(a)(1). The Marubeni court held that the term "interest" as
used in subsection 1963(a)(1) must be interpreted in the same fash-
ion as "interest" was used in section 1962. Because "interest" in
section 1962 was expressly limited to an interest "in an enterprise,"
the court reasoned that subsection 1963 (a)(1) must be similarly lim-
ited by implication.
94
Relying on the district court opinion in Marubeni, the Georgia
court in United States v. Thevis case similarly limited subsection
1963(a)(1) to interests in an enterprise. It held that "[t]hough Con-
gress recognized that income and profits could be generated by a
pattern of racketeering activity, it chose to require forfeiture only of
the interest in, and not the income of a Section 1962 enterprise." 9 5
The Thevis court did, however, read interest in an enterprise to in-
clude property the defendant contributed to the enterprise, here an
association-in-fa ct, and the defendant's interest in the undistributed
profits of the enterprise.
96
Many subsequent cases followed this restrictive reading of sub-
section 1963(a)(1) although some of these courts disagreed with the
analysis of earlier decisions. 9 7 During the course of the legislative
hearings on this issue, the Fifth Circuit, sitting in an en banc review
of a panel decision in United States v. Martino, broke with the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Marubeni.
9 8
Martino involved an illegal association-in-fact of individuals who
92 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
93 Id. at 764.
94 Id. at 766.
95 Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 142.
96 Id. at 143.
97 United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 464 U.S.
979 (1983); United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
828 (1983); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
959 (1983); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated in part, 686
F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982)(Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965 (1983); United States Martino,
648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981), modified, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc), aff'd sub
nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Romano, 523 F.
Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fa. 1981).




engaged in an arson scheme to collect insurance proceeds. The
government sought forfeiture of the insurance money as interests
acquired in violation of section 1962. The Martino court distin-
guished Thevis and Marubeni, stating "[t]hat the enterprise concept is
the overriding concept in RICO... does not necessarily mean that
the enterprise concept is also a limitation on the type of property
interest subject to forfeiture under 1963(a)(1)." 9 9 After a review of
the legislative history of the 1970 Act, the Martino court held:
RICO is a powerful and flexible weapon designed to break eco-
nomic power of organized crime and hence to undermine its ability to
disrupt and drain the national economy. We acknowledge that its
breadth supplies a potential for great abuse. The harshness of the
statute's impact, however, cannot debate the proper construction of its
provisions. Congress was aware of the far-reaching measures it was
enacting to deal with the unprecedented problem of organized crime.
The plain language of the statute, the remedial and deterrent pur-
poses, and the legislative history all compel the conclusion that Sec-
tion 1963(a)(1) encompasses forfeiture of the income or proceeds of
racketeering activity.100
The Supreme Court eventually resolved the issue of whether profits
and proceeds of racketeering activity could be forfeited under sub-
section 1963(a)(1) in its decision in Russello v. United States,10 which
affirmed the en banc decision in Martino. The legislative history of
the 1984 amendments indicates, however, that even without the
Russello holding, Congress intended to correct what it perceived as




Discussions on implementation of the restraining order provi-
sions of section 1963 were triggered by the Ninth Circuit in its opin-
ion in United States v. Crozier.103 Prior to Crozier, the district courts
had split on the standard to be met to warrant the court's issuance
of a restraining order. In United States v. Mandel,10 4 the court re-
quired the government to make the four-part showing necessary for
issuance of a preliminary injunction in civil cases as set forth in Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 65.105 In United States v. Bello, 06 how-
99 Id. at 955 n.15.
100 Id. at 961.
101 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
102 See infra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
103 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984).
104 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
105 Id. at 682.
In determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue in a civil case, a court
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ever, the court found that the indictment itself provided probable
cause to believe that the defendant had committed a violation of
section 1962. Therefore, the Bello court apparently required only
that the government show that the assets sought to be restrained
would be subject to forfeiture to warrant issuance of the restraining
order.10
7
The courts also dealt with the question of what type of hearing,
if any, the defendant was entitled to before and following entry of a
restraining order. In United States v. Scalzitti,108 the court, apparently
without a hearing, entered a restraining order under subsection
1963(b) against the defendant's business. When the defendant chal-
lenged the order on due process grounds, the court rejected the
challenge stating that "the restraining order serves only to maintain
the status quo and thus is neither illegal nor unconstitutional." 10 9 In
United States v. Long,"l0 the court granted the government a tempo-
rary restraining order exparte. Before a permanent restraining order
could issue, however, the court required the government to estab-
lish that it was likely to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant had violated the CCE statute and that the proper-
ties or profits sought to be restrained would be subject to forfeiture.
"[T]hese determinations must be made on the basis of a full hear-
ing; the government cannot rely on indictments alone.""'1 Simi-
larly, in United States v. Veon, 1 12 the court held in a CCE case that it
was proper to issue a restraining order of limited duration without a
hearing but that an adversary hearing must follow "concerning the
propriety of continuing the restraining order until trial."
' 13
Both issues came to a head in the Crozier case. In Crozier, the
Ninth Circuit followed the Mandel court's decision in holding that
the district court "must apply the standards of Rule 65 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure" in determining whether a restraining
usually considers four factors: (1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that he
is likely to prevail on the merits at trial? (2) Has irreparable harm in the absence of
relief been shown? (3) Would the issuance of the injunction substantially harm
other parties interested in the proceedings? and (4) Where does the public interest
lie?
Id.
106 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
107 Id. at 724.
108 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
109 Id. at 1015.
110 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
''1 Id. at 915.
112 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
113 Id. at 243. The court also held that the rules of evidence would be applicable at
hearings regarding the issuance of restraining orders. Id. at 249.
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order should issue.' 1 4 It also agreed with the Long and Veon conclu-
sions that "an immediate hearing [is required] whenever a tempo-
rary restraining order has been granted ex parte." 15 Further, the
Crozier court rejected the argument that the hearing following issu-
ance of the restraining order should be limited to whether the prop-
erty sought to be restrained would be subject to forfeiture should
the government prevail on the merits of its case at trial rather than
the broader issue under Rule 65 of whether the government was
likely to prevail on the merits of its case at trial. In this regard, the
court stated that "[A] grand jury determination is not an adequate
substitute for an adversary proceeding."'1 16 The Crozier holding was
subsequently reiterated in the Ninth Circuit decision in United States
v. Spilotro.117
Variations on the Crozier holding followed, but no court in these
early cases rejected the Crozier conclusion that due process required
a post-indictment restraining order hearing in CCE and RICO
cases. For example, in United States v. Harvey," 8 an ex parte re-
straining order was issued upon the affidavit of the prosecutor. The
Harvey court questioned whether the restraining order was a "tak-
ing" sufficient to trigger a due process hearing but held that "it is
considered the better practice to grant a hearing after entry of the ex
parte order." 1 9 The court held that the government must make a
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it is likely to con-
vince ajury beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant vio-
lated the CCE statute and that the property sought to be restrained
is forfeitable. 120 The rules of evidence would not apply at this hear-
ing according to the Harvey court.12 1
In United States v. Beckham, 122 however, the court rejected the
civil injunction standard used in Crozier. Instead, it held that the
government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
property sought to be restrained would be forfeitable under the
statute, that the property was involved in a RICO violation, and that
the government had reason to believe that the defendant was likely
114 United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded,
468 U.S. 1206 (1984).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
118 560 F. Supp. 1040, 1083 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'dsub nom. United States v. Van Horn,
789 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986).
119 Id. at 1086.
120 Id. at 1088.
121 Id.
122 562 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
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to make the property inaccessible. 123 In focusing on the role of the
property, rather than whether the defendant committed the offense,
the Beckham court hoped to avoid "a mini 'jury' trial on the issue of
[the] defendant's guilt."
1 2 4
3. Third Party Interests
Protection of the rights of third parties also became an issue.
Under the 1970 Act, third parties affected by a forfeiture order had
to petition the Department of Justice for remission or mitigation of
the forfeiture. The statute did not expressly provide for judicial re-
view of the administrative decision. The issue became a matter of
concern in the case of United States v. Mandel.' 25 In the criminal trial
of defendant Mandel and others, the jury determined that 240,765
shares of stock, held in the name of Irving Schwartz, were actually
owned by one of Mandel's co-defendants and were subject to forfei-
ture. 126 Based upon this jury verdict, in 1981 the court ordered the
stock forfeited. 127 Schwartz, who was not a party in the criminal
case, contested the forfeiture by both filing a petition for remission
or mitigation of forfeiture with the Attorney General and filing a
civil action seeking a declaratory judgment that the stock belonged
to him. 128 In 1983, his declaratory judgment case was finally set for
trial. Meanwhile, Congress considered how to deal in a more effi-
cient fashion with future third party claims.
4. Dissipation of Proceeds
Finally, prosecutors' complaints about defendants concealing
forfeited assets to avoid execution of a forfeiture judgment were ad-
dressed. Cases which prompted these considerations included
United States v. Long, 129 in which the defendant transferred assets to
his attorney pre-indictment.-
C. THE 1984 AND 1986 AMENDMENTS TO THE RICO ACT
1. Proposals and Hearings in 1981 and 1982
Congress began considering the issues raised by these early for-
feiture cases in hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of
123 Id. at 490.
124 Id.
125 505 F. Supp. 189 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd and remanded mem., 705 F.2d 455 (4th Cir.
1983).
126 Id. at 190.
127 Id.
128 Schwartz v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Md. 1984).
129 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
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the House Committee on the Judiciary in September, 1981.130
Although these hearings focused upon cases involving controlled
substances under the RICO and CCE statutes, commentators urged
broader application of the proposed forfeiture provisions.' 3 '
Congress designed H. R. 4110,132 one of the bills under consid-
eration by the subcommittee, to "make clear that forfeiture under
the RICO Act Statutes reaches all profits and proceeds of illegal ac-
tivity covered by the RICO statute regardless of the form in which
they are held, and whether such assets are held directly or indirectly
by the violator."' 133 Representative Zeferetti, sponsor of H.R. 4110,
further differentiated the terms "profits" and "proceeds" as used in
the CCE statute as follows:
The difficulty with the [CCE] statute as presently structured is that the
concept of "profits" may not include the costs of operating a narcotics
enterprise and hence only the net profits instead of the gross proceeds
from trafficking may be forfeitable .... Forfeiture will obviously be
more effective when it encompasses all proceeds rather than merely
profits. 1
3 4
H.R. 4110 was also designed to deal with the issue of assets
transferred prior to conviction to avoid forfeiture. "[H.R. 4110]
would allow the forfeiture of any assets a trafficker has in his posses-
130 Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings on H.R. 2646, H.R. 4110, and H.R. 5371 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1981,
1982) [hereinafter Forfeiture in Drug Cases Hearings].
131 Id. at 217 (statement of Irvin B. Nathan).
132 H.R. 4110 proposed adding the following language to 18 U.S.C. § 1963:
(b) In addition to any other penalties prescribed by this section, whoever violates
any provision of section 1962 shall forfeit to the United States (1) any profits and
proceeds, regardless of the form in which held, that are acquied, derived, used, or
maintained in violation of section 1962, and (2) any profits and proceeds, regardless
of the form in which held, that are acquired, indirectly or directly, as a result of a
violation of section 1962.
(c) Assets forfeitable under this section include those interests, proceeds, or prof-
its owned by an individual convicted of violating section 1962 and acquired by him,
indirectly or directly, through the use of an illegitimate enterprise or illicit associa-
tion, or through a combination of individuals.
(d) To the extent that assets, interests, profits, and proceeds forfeitable under this
section-
(1) cannot be located;
(2) have been transferred, sold to, or deposited with third parties; or
(3) have been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the United States,
the court, upon conviction of the individual charged, may direct forfeiture of
such other assets of the defendant as may be available, limited in value to those
assets that would otherwise be forfeited under subsections (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion. Upon petition of the defendant, the court may authorize redemption of assets
forfeited under this subsection, provided the assets described in subsections (a) and
(b) are surrendered or otherwise remitted by such defendant to the jurisdiction of
the court.
Forfeiture in Drug Cases Hearings, supra note 130 at 9.
133 Id. to 26 (statement of Rep. Leo C. Zeferetti).
134 Id.
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sion that are not otherwise subject to forfeiture to the extent that
illicit assets identified for forfeiture are unreachable."'
13 5
The Government Accounting Office concurred in the need for
amendments to the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions. 136 In its
statement to the subcommittee, it noted issues raised by the case
law: whether profits are forfeitable; what is forfeitable from an en-
terprise which constitutes an "association in fact;" whether tracing
funds is required; and whether assets transferred prior to conviction
are subject to forfeiture. 13 7 GAO informed the subcommittee that
these problems, along with the "lack of leadership by the Depart-
ment of Justice" in the forfeiture area, had resulted in few forfeit-
ures since the enactment of the forfeiture statutes ten years
earlier.1
3 8
After the initial round of hearings, H.R. 5371139 was intro-
duced, incorporating elements of the bills previously referred to the
subcommittee. 140 Also proposed was S. 2320,141 a bill drafted by
135 Id. at 26-27.
136 Id. at 32.
'37 Id.
138 Id. at 35.
139 The text of HR. 5371 was not included in the hearing transcript.
140 Forfeiture in Drug Cases Hearings, supra note 130 at 155.
141 The text of S. 2320 was as follows:
"§ 1963. Criminal penaites
"(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter-
"(1) shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than
twenty years, or both; and
"(2) shall forfeit to the United States any property, irrespective of any provi-
sion of State law-
"(A) constituting, or derived from, any interest in or contribution to an
enterprise he has acquired, maintained, established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962 of this
chapter;
"(B) constituting a means by which he has exerted influence or control
over any enterprise he has acquired, maintained, established, operated, con-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the acquistion, maintenance, establish-
ment, operation, conduct or control of, in violation of section 1962 of this
chapter; and
"(C) constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which he obtained, di-
rectly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in vio-
lation of section 1962 of this chapter.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in addition to any
other sentence imposed pursuant to this section, that he forfeit to the United States
all property described in paragraph (2).
"(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes-
"(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in
land; and
"(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges,
interests, claims, and securities including, but not limited to-
"(A) any position, office, appointment, tenure, commission, or employ-
ment contract of any kind which the incumbent acquired or maintained in viola-
tion of section 1962 of this chapter, through which the incumbent conducted,
220 [Vol. 80
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the Department ofJustice. In a letter proposing S. 2320 to the Sen-
ate, Assistant Attorney General Robert McConnell stated that S.
or participated in or facilitated the conduct of, the affairs of an enterprise in
violation of section 1962 of this chapter, or which afforded the incumbent a
source of influence or control over the affairs of an enterprise which was exer-
cised in violation of section 1962 of this chapter;
"(B) any compensation, right or benefit derived from a position, office,
appointment, tenure, commission, or employment contract described in sub-
paragraph (A) which the incumbent obtained, directly or indirectly, through a
pattern of racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection in violation of sec-
tion 1962 of this chapter, or which accrued to the incumbent during the period
that he controlled, influenced, conducted, or participated in or facilitated the
conduct of, the affairs of the enterprise in violation of section, 1962 of this chap-
ter; and
"(C) any amount payable or paid under any contract for goods or services
which was awarded or performed through a pattern of racketeering activity or
unlawful debt collection.
"(c) All right, tide, and interest in property described in subsection (a)(2) vests
in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under
this section. Any such property that is held in the name of, or possessed by, a per-
son other than the defendant may be subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and
thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United States: Provided, That the Attor-
ney General shall not direct disposition of any such property if the person estab-
lishes to the Attorney General by evidence contained in a petition pursuant to
subsection (h) that-
"(1) he was a bona fide purchaser of the property for value; and
"(2) he was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was of the
type described in subsection (a)(2).
"(d) If any of the property described in subsection (a)(2)-
"(1) cannot be located,
"(2) has been transferred to, sold to, or deposited with, a third party,
"(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
"(4) has been substantially diminished in value by any act or omission of the
defendant, or
"(5) has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided
without difficulty,
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to the
value of any property described in paragraphs (1) through (5).
"(e)(1) Upon application of the United States, the court may, after a hearing
with respect to which any adverse parties have been given reasonable notice and
opportunity to participate, enter a restraining order or injunction, require the exe-
cution of a satisfactory performance bond, to take any other action to preserve the
availability of property described in subsection (a)(2) for forfeiture under this
section-
"(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter and alleging that the property with respect to which
the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture
under this section; or
"(B) prior to the filing of such an indictment or information, if the court
determines-
"(i) that there is probable cause to believe that the property with respect
to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to
forfeiture under this section and that the property is in the possession or con-
trol of the party against whom the order is to be entered, and
"(ii) that the party against whom the order is to be entered has failed to
demonstrate that the entry of the requested order would result in substantial
and irreparable harm or injury to him that outweighs the need to preserve the
availability of the property through the entry of the requested order:
Provided, however, That an order entered pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be effec-
tive for not more than ninety days, unless extended by the court for good cause
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2320 was drafted to address the forfeitability of proceeds from rack-
shown or unless an indictment or information described in subparagraph (A) has
been filed.
"(2) Upon application of the United States, a temporary restraining order to
preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a)(2) for forfeiture
under this section may be granted without notice to the adverse party or his attor-
ney if-
"(A) an indictment or information described in paragraph (1)(A) has been
filed or if the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the
property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of convic-
tion, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that the property is in the
possession or control of the party against whom the order is to be entered; and
"(B) the court determines that the nature of the property is such that it can
be concealed, disposed of, or placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court before
the adverse party may be heard in opposition.
A temporary order granted without notice to the adverse party shall expire within
such time, not to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless extended for good cause
shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an extension for a
longer period. If a temporary restraining order is granted without notice to the
adverse party, a hearing concerning the entry of an order under paragraph (1) shall
be held at the earliest possible time and prior to the expiration of the temporary
order.
"(f) Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall enter a
judgment of forfeiture of the property to the United States and shall authorize the
Attorney General to seize all property ordered forfeited upon such terms and con-
ditions as the court shall deem proper. No property forfeited pursuant to this sec-
tion may be ordered applied to offset any claims against, or obligations or expenses
of, the defendant. Following the entry of an order declaring the property forfeited,
the court may, upon application of the United States, enter such appropriate re-
straining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory performance
bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take
any other action to protect the interest of the United States in the property ordered
forfeited. Any income accruing to or derived from an enterprise, or an interest in
an enterprise, ordered forfeited under this section may be used to offset ordinary
and necessary expenses to the enterprise which are required by law, or which are
necessary to protect the interests of the United States or third parties.
"(g) Following the seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the
Attorney General shall direct the disposition of the property by sale or any other
commercially feasible means, making due provision for the rights of any innocent
persons. Any property right or interest not exercisable by, or transferable for value
to, the United States shall expire and shall not revert to the defendant, nor shall the
defendant or any person acting in concert with him or on his behalf be eligible to
purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the United States. Upon application
of a person, other than the defendant or a person acting in concert with him or on
his behalf, the court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition of the property
pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise to the forfei-
ture, if the applicant demonstrates that proceeding with the sale or disposition of
the property will result in irreparable injury, harm or loss to him. The proceeds of
any sale or other disposition of property forfeited under this section and any mon-
eys forfeited shall be used to pay all proper expenses for the forfeiture and the sale,
including expenses of seizure, maintenance and custody of the property pending its
disposition, advertising and court costs. The Attorney General shall forward to the
Treasurer of the United States for deposit in the general fund of the United States
Treasury any amounts of such proceeds or moneys remaining after the payment of
such expenses.
"(h) With respect to property ordered forfeited under this section, the Attor-
ney General is authorized to-
"(1) grant petitions for mitigation, or remission of forfeiture, restore for-
feited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other action to
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eteering activities prohibited in Martino.142 He stated that S. 2320:
would address this problem by providing specifically that the proceeds
of racketeering activity are subject to an order of criminal forfeiture.
Other types of property now clearly subject to forfeiture under 18
protect the rights of innocent persons which is in the interest ofjustice and which
is not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter;
"(2) compromise claims arising under this chapter;
"(3) award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a
forfeiture under this section;
"(4) direct the disposition by the United States of all property ordered for-
feited under this section by public sale or any other commercially feasible means,
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons; and
"(5) take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain prop-
erty ordered forfeited under this section pending its disposition.
"(i) The Attorney General shall within one hundred and eighty days of the en-
actment of this Act promulgate regulations with respect to-
"(1) making reasonable effects to provide notice to persons who may have an
interest in property ordered forfeited under this section;
"(2) granting petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture;
"(3) the restitution of property to victims of an offense petitioning for remis-
sion or mitigation of forfeiture under this chapter;
"(4) the disposition by the United States of forfeited property by public sale
or other commercially feasible means;
"(5) the maintenance and safekeeping of any property forfeited under this
section pending its disposition; and
"(6) the compromise of claims arising under this chapter.
Pending the promulgation of such regulations, all provisions of law relating to the
disposition of property, or the proceeds from the sale thereof, or the remission or
mitigation of forfeitures for violation of the customs laws, and the compromise of
claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such forfeitures
shall apply to forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred, under the pro-
vision of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions
hereof. Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other
person with respect to the disposition of property under the customs law shall be
performed under this chapter by the Attorney General.
"(j) Except as provided in this section, no party claiming an interest in prop-
erty subject to forfeiture under this section may-
"(1) intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving the forfeiture
of such property under this section; or
"(2) commence an action at law or equity against the United States concern-
ing the validity of his alleged interest in the property, prior to or during the trial
or appeal of the criminal case, or during the period in which any petition for
remission or mitigation of forfeiture is pending before the Attorney General.
"(k) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to enter
orders as provided in this section without regard to the location of any property
which may be subject to forfeiture under this section or which has been ordered
forfeited under this section.
"(1) In order to facilitate the identification or location of property declared for-
feited and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for remission or mitigation of
forfeiture, after the entry of an order declaring property forfeited to the United
States the court may, upon application of the United States, order that the testi-
mony of any witness relating to the property forfeited be taken by deposition and
that any designated book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material
not privileged be produced at the same time and place, in the same manner as pro-
vided for the taking of depositions under rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.".
DEA Oversight and Budget Authorization Hearing before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97 Cong., 2d Sess. 57-69 (1982).
142 128 CoNG. RECORD. 6216-18 (1982)(letter from Assist. Atty. Gen. McConnell).
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U.S.C. 1963 are also described, with great specificity, in proposed sub-
section 1963(a)(2), and proposed subsection 1963(b) emphasizes that
both real property and tangible and intangible personal property are
subject to forfeiture, and that, in appropriate cases, forfeitable prop-
erty may also include offices, positions, appointments, as well as
amounts paid under contracts awarded or performed through racke-
teering activity. 1
4 3
In continuing hearings on amendment of the forfeiture provision,
Deputy Associate Attorney General Jeffrey Harris also commented
on S. 2320:
The major changes in RICO forfeiture provisions that are incor-
porated in our proposal address two problem areas. The first is our
present inability to obtain the forfeiture of proceeds of racketeering
because of court decisions that have held that such proceeds do not
constitute a forfeitable interest under the RICO statute since they are
not interests in an enterprise. These decisions have severely inhibited
realization of the intended purpose of the RICO criminal forfeiture
provisions, which was to separate racketeers from their sources of eco-
nomic power. To address this problem, our proposal amends the
RICO statute to provide specifically for the criminal forfeiture of the
proceeds of racketeering activity. H.R. 5371 has a similar provision,
although we have some reservations about the way in which it is
drafted. '
4 4
Mr. Harris pointed out that S. 2320 contained provisions to
deal with the "problem of defendants defeating forfeiture by trans-
ferring, removing, and concealing their forfeitable property so that
it may no longer be reached by the Government at the time of con-
viction."' 14 5 These provisions included codification of the "recog-
nized principle that the U.S. interest in property relates back to the
time of the acts [giving] rise to the forfeiture, and that thus, subse-
quent transfers of the property are considered void in the context of
a criminal forfeiture action;"14 6 expansion of the court's restraining
order power to the pre-indictment stage;14 7 and a provision permit-
ting the court "to order the defendant to forfeit substitute assets
when particular property subject to forfeiture is no longer available
at the time of conviction because it has been transferred, concealed,
placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or commingled with
143 Id. at 6216.




147 Id. at 157. Mr. Harris noted that H.R. 5371 would also allow the government to
seek pre-indictment restraining orders. However, the government expressed concern
that the preliminary injunction standard used in the civil context might be unworkable in
the criminal setting. Id.
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other property." 148
As to the forfeitability of proceeds, Mr. Harris specifically cited
the Martino case, which was then awaiting the Fifth Circuit's en banc
decision.149 Harris noted that regardless of the outcome in Martino,
"it is our view that the purpose of the RICO forfeiture statute-to
deprive racketeers of their sources of economic power' 50 -cannot
be fully realized if the profits gained through racketeering activity
are beyond the reach of the statute."' 15
S. 2320 also addressed measures to deal with concealment of
ownership and transfers of property to circumvent forfeiture. First,
the relation back doctrine, known as the "taint" theory in civil for-
feiture proceedings, was codified to discourage sham transfers of
property to defeat forfeitures. 152 Second, S. 2320 proposed ex-
panding the court's restraining order authority to the pre-indict-
ment stage "if the government can present sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause to believe that a RICO violation has been
committed and that the property for which the order is sought is
subject to forfeiture as a result."'15 This order could initially be
entered ex parte but thereafter "the affected parties would . . . be
given notice and an opportunity to contest the order in the context
of an adversary hearing."' 54 Finally, in those instances where the
defendant was successful in concealing or removing his assets, the
statute provided for forfeiture of substitute assets. "[T]his proposal
would prevent a defendant from escaping the economic impact of a
forfeiture order by disposing of his property prior to conviction."'
155
S. 2320 also provided that the Attorney General develop regu-
lations to deal with disposal of forfeited property. It retained, as
under the 1970 laws, "the responsibility of the Attorney General to
protect the rights of innocent persons and to grant, in appropriate
148 Id.
149 Id. at 165.
150 In his earlier references to Congressional purpose Harris noted that forfeiture was
aimed at the need "to remove the wealth generated by, and used to maintain, racketeer-
ing and drug trafficking." Id. at 160 (statement of Deputy Assoc. Atty. Gen. Harris). It
was also designed "to deprive racketeers of the property acquired and controlled
through patterns of serious criminal activity," id. at 161, and finally to forfeit the "prop-
erty... [racketeers and drug traffickers] have amassed through, or used to facilitate, the
commission of these crimes." Id. at 162.
151 Id. at 165-66. It should be noted that in this discussion, Mr. Harris used the words
"profits" and "proceeds" interchangeably.
152 Id. at 167 (citing United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981))(transfer to
defendant's attorney six months prior to indictment).
153 Id. at 168.
154 Id. at 169.
155 Id. at 170.
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cases, petitions of innocent parties for remission or mitigation of
forfeiture, and to provide for the return of forfeited property that
was obtained from victims of a RICO offense."' 156 This was in oppo-
sition to H.R. 5371 which provided third parties with a remedy
before the court, which remedy, Harris pointed out, resulted in de-
lays in Mandel.1
57
Harris also engaged in a question and answer session with the
committee. He indicated that a bona fide purchaser for value of
property ultimately subject to forfeiture would be protected by the
administrative remedy of S. 2320 or the judicial remedy in H.R.
5371. "In that case in which an asset was transferred to a bona fide
purchaser, we believe the Government ought to have the right to go
after other assets of an equivalent value," including assets acquired
legitimately.15 8 Harris emphasized the need for criminal versus civil
forfeiture.
[T]he courts and the Government should not be put to [the] ex-
pense of a separate civil lawsuit, and the philosophy ... is that cer-
tainty and swiftness of punishment is the principal deterrent in crime
and it is far preferable to have that jury walk in the room with the
relative speed that Federal criminal trials take place and say not only
are you guilty and you may be going to jail, but all of the fruits of your
illegal labors are gone.' 59
Harris also addressed the forfeitability of corporate assets. Ac-
cording to Harris, in the case of a bank involved in money launder-
ing, if the officers of the corporation or others acting in the
"corporate form" were involved, the assets of the bank, not includ-
ing depositor's accounts held in a fiduciary capacity, could be for-
feited.' 60 In such an instance, the bank's shareholders would have
to petition for remission. Harris argued that this was reasonable in
that "some of the stockholders in south Florida banks and other fi-
nancial institutions engaged in this sort of business might take a lit-
tle more interest in the way that their board of directors conduct
their banking business than they do now."' 161 Such forfeiture would,
of course, be limited to situations where the "bank as an institution
[was] a defendant in the criminal action."' 62
156 Id. at 171.
157 Id. at 180.
158 Id. at 183.
159 Id. at 182.
160 Id. at 184-85.
161 Id. at 185.
162 Id. Mr. Harris and his associate Ms. Warlow, also pointed out the seizure warrant
provision of the Bill, which was designed to prevent pretrial transfer of assets. Id. at
180. They also noted that unlike the CCE statute, under RICO land legitimately ac-
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A private attorney, William W. Taylor, III,16 3 advocated re-
straint in regard to the expansion of forfeiture provisions especially
as "[i]t is being applied to prosecutions of business and economic
crime with increasing frequency. ' 164 He cited the cases of Maru-
beni,165 United States v. Weiss,166 Uni Oil,167 United States v. Computer
Science Corporation 168 and Mandel 169 as examples of the extension of
RICO into white collar crime. Taylor posited that the taint concept
would severely curtail a corporation's ability to function in the mar-
ket place prior to conviction because it might be called upon to
prove each transaction was legitimate. 170 Congressmen, however,
pointed out that buyers might be bona fide purchasers and thus not
subject to forfeiture.
Taylor also expressed concerns about the sweep of the pro-
ceeds concept in white collar crime. "The decisions in Marubeni,
Martino and Thevis have no doubt prompted concerns that racketeers
are continuing to get away with ill-gotten gains and were not being
hit in the pocketbook as hard as if they were compelled to disgorge
profits or proceeds."'' 1 However:
[p]articularly in RICO cases involving legitimate businesses, profits
are the joint product of legitimate and illegitimate activity. Unravel-
ling the trail of dollars can well be as complex and difficult as in some
antitrust and securities matters .... The hearings which are going to
occur to trace and unravel profits from a complex commercial venture,
when part of the proceeds are legitimate and part illegitimate, are go-
ing to provide a fertile field for litigation and tie up prosecutors,
agents, judges and defense attorneys in a way which a simple sentenc-
ing proceeding would never do. 17
2
Trying to decide what property was "tainted" in the commercial
arena could "disrupt commerce," Taylor suggested. 173 Further,
quired which was thereafter used as a storage place for drugs would not be forfeitable.
Id. at 177.
163 Mr. Taylor authored one of the earliest articles on criminal forfeiture. Taylor,
Forfeiture Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 - RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 379
(1980).
164 Fooreiture in Drug Cases Hearings, supra note 130 at 200 (statement of William W.
Taylor, III).
165 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
166 579 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y 1983), affd, 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1985).
167 646 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982).
168 511 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1105 (1983).
169 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
170 Fooreiture in Drug Cases Hearings, supra note 130 at 201 (statement of William W.
Taylor, III).
171 Id. at 209.
172 Id. at 210, 215.
173 Id. at 204.
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"[florfeiture... is a greater threat to the white collar criminal than
it is to the underworld figure. In the underworld there is always
going to be secrecy, money going out of the country and coming
back into the country. In the white collar area it is not nearly so
difficult to get at."
174
Taylor also commented on a discussion draft of S. 2320 which
provided for "forfeiture of proceeds or profits derived from any in-
terest, security, claim or rights" in narcotics and enterprises en-
gaged in illegal activities.1 75 He noted that the language of S. 2320
was designed to achieve the results of H.R. 4110 "without overturn-
ing the result of Marubeni America Corp. with respect to legitimate
businesses."' 176 Taylor questioned "why racketeers who corrupt le-
gitimate businesses are entitled to keep their profits when those who
band together for wholly illegal activity may not. Furthermore, the
language does not guarantee the result. When is an enterprise en-
gaged in illegal activity? Arguably, a legitimate enterprise is en-
gaged in illegal activity when its officers use bribery or extortion to
obtain a contract."'
17 7
Finally, Irvin B. Nathan, former Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, addressed the proposed changes. Nathan felt that concerns
about overreaching forfeiture in the white collar area were unwar-
ranted. "Investigators do not have the time and resources to make
the detailed asset analysis which are required to secure a successful
forfeiture."' 178 Nathan expressed concern that there were inade-
quate protections for innocent third parties. He advocated a proce-
dure immediately following the issuance of a restraining order for:
[T]he defendant and for other parties to come before the court to state
a claim in the property and have the court adjudicate the question of
which has the superior right and whether irreparable injury is going to
be caused and whether there are less drastic means available to pre-
serve the assets for later use.
179
As to forfeiture of proceeds in the white collar crime area, Na-
than noted that proceeds of illegal activities are tainted funds
whether the illegal activity involved arson, extortion, drugs or brib-
174 Id.
175 Id. at 211-12.
176 Id. at 212.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 216 (statement of I. Nathan.) Nathan also acknowledged, however, that
"some investigations of assets can be conducted simultaneously and synergistically with
investigations of criminal activity. Financial investigations may in fact be a potent source
of evidence of guilt or for sentencing." Id. at 223.
179 Id. at 218.
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ery in the business world. 180 Further, he argued that forfeiture
should not turn on whether or not the enterprise appears to be a
legitimate business. 8 As an example, Nathan used the Marubeni
factual situation in which "an American company [paid] a series of
bribes to public officials for government contracts and thereby
[reaped] substantial profits."' 82 He concluded that "[t]here is no
conceivable justification for permitting the so-called 'legitimate' en-
terprise to keep the fruits of its violations of RICO, which may be in
the millions of dollars, while limiting its possible exposure to a fine
of only $25,000."183 Such a distinction would, he argued, create
"considerable confusion and potential disrespect for the law.., by
skew[ing] the criminal justice system for a certain kind of offense
and not for other equally serious types of offenses which may have
even more devastating long-term effects on our society."' 84
Nathan also suggested that Congress amend the RICO statute
to permit the government to establish the existence of forfeitable
assets by use of a net worth theory in which the likely source of the
forfeitable assets is shown to be the racketeering activity.' 85 As to
pre-indictment seizures, Nathan advocated the four-part preliminary
injunction standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 6 In
addition, Nathan advocated against exparte restraining orders absent
a showing of attempted "concealment, disposition or dissipation of
the property in question."' 87 Nathan noted in his question and an-
swer session that by definition defendants and all third parties are
180 Id. at 226-27.
181 Id. at 226-27. Nathan observed, moreover, that distinguishing a legitimate from
an illegitimate business is not always easy.
Nor should it matter, in my judgment, whether the enterprise is essentially a
legitimate or an illegitimate one. In the first place, the distinction is often hard to
discern or prove. For example, a duly chartered corporation may simply be a front
for wholly illegal activities. Conversely, a company which engages in a variety of
legitimate activities may as one sideline engage in racketeering activities, such as
selling stolen property or issuing worthless securities. Second, the Supreme Court
has recently made clear in the Turkette case [United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524
(1981)] that the RICO statute is designed to cover "any" enterprise, whether lawftil
or unlawful.
Since there is no reason under the existing statute to draw distinctions between
legal and illegal enterprises, Congress should not engender further litigation on
this fine distinction for purposes of forfeiture.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 228. Specifically, Nathan observed: "If we are willing, as I think we should
be, to impose the drastic remedy of forfeiture on drug pushers, we should be just as
willing to impose forfeiture on other types of serious offenders, whether they be arson-
ists for hire, extortionists, fraud artists or corrupt public officials." Id.
185 Id. at 229.
186 Id. at 231-32.
187 Id. at 233.
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innocent because they are presumed innocent. Therefore, the bur-




There is no reason to retain the result in the Marubeni case. If a
corporation engages in bribes in order to secure large profits, the
shareholders should bear the burden for that. They elected that man-
agement and there is no reason that they should reap a windfall and
receive the benefits from the bribes.
They should be deprived of those profits so that they will elect a
management in the future which will be lawful ....
Mr. Hughes. Suppose the president of a company is engaged in
illegal activity, but the proceeds are going into his own pockets?
Mr. Nathan. The only defendant would be the individual and the
proceeds that he has received would be all that would be forfeited and
nothing of the corporate assets would be forfeiteable under that
circumstance. 189
Jeffrey Harris also commented on S. 2320 at the DEA Oversight
and Budget Authorization Hearings before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Security and Terrorism. 9 0 His general comments on the bill
were the same as his previous testimony. He did shed some light on
the application of the taint theory in the proceeds context, however:
Senator Denton. Suppose in the case of the Mafia, they buy a le-
gitimate business or a big building, and only part of it is drug related.
Can you snatch the whole thing away from them if it is fairly clear that
the profit which obtained that building is from drug traffic?
Mr. Harris. You could, but innocent parties would have a right to
have their portion severed out and given to them. Obviously, if it was
an unseverable piece of property, the law would deal with it like it
does, for example, in domestic relation cases. The house would be
sold, and the portion would be returned to the innocent party that
represented their interest; and the rest would be forfeited to the
Government. 191
Harris also noted that the new law would help alleviate the time
consuming and complicated nature of criminal forfeiture. First, the
innocent third party would be required to continue to seek adminis-
trative relief. Second, the substitute asset provision would eliminate
the time lost in the hunt for concealed assets. Third, the ability to
restrain property at an early stage would be beneficial. The bill
"would allow us to go after proceeds and real property. That au-
188 Id. at 237.
189 Id. (statements of I. Nathan and Rep. Win. Hughes).
190 DEA Oversight and Budget Authorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Security and Ter-
rorism of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1982).
191 Id. at 37 (statement of Sen. Denton and J. Harris).
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thority is not now clear, and the bill-would make it clear." 192
S. 2320, with minor modifications, was presented to the Senate
in the form of another bill, S. 2572, the "Violent Crime and Drug
Enforcement Improvements Act of 1982," on May 26, 1982.193 The
purpose of the forfeiture amendments contained in S. 2572 was to
clarify that "property which constitutes, or is derived from, the pro-
ceeds of racketeering activity punishable under 18 U.S.C. 1962 is
subject to an order of criminal forfeiture."' 194 It also included pre-
indictment restraining orders and forfeitability of substitute as-
sets.195 S. 2572 also provided several amendments to the drug for-
feiture laws. Specifically subsection 1963(a)(2) under S. 2572
provided:
for the forfeiture of the profits generated by racketeering activity that
serves as the basis for a RICO prosecution. Several courts have held
that such profits are not currently forfeitable under RICO, and this
limiting interpretation has significantly diminshed the utility of the
statute's criminal forfeiture sanction. The criminal forfeiture provi-
sions of the criminal code reform bill also provided for the forfeiture
of proceeds. See S. Rept. 97-301, page 948.196
Subsection 1963(b), as proposed, emphasized that the term
"property" was to be broadly construed.' 97 Subsection 1963(c)
codified the relation back principle. "This subsection makes it clear,
however, that in the case of a bona fide purchaser for value, the
Attorney General may not proceed with disposition of the property.
Such persons may obtain a return of their property by filing a peti-
tion for remission or mitigation of forfeiture."' 198 Subsection
1963(d), the substitute asset provision, was also part of S. 2572.199
Analysis of the Bill revealed that the proposed drug statute was
"in virtually all respects, identical to the RICO criminal forfeiture
statute as amended." 20 0 The Senate added S. 2572 to H.R. 3963,
"An Act to Amend the contract services for Drug Dependent Fed-
eral Offenders Act of 1978" on September 30, 1982.201
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1982, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary issued Report No. 97-520, entitled The Comprehensive Crimi-
192 Id. at 39 (statement of J. Harris).
193 128 CONG. REC. 11,817, 11972 (1982).
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nal Fofeiture Act of 1982, which recommended passage of S. 2320.202
The Report initially stated that "[p]rofit is the motivation for this
criminal activity, and it is through economic power that it is sus-
tained and grows." 20 3 The Report further noted that in the Ninety-
Sixth Congress, Senator Biden held hearings on narcotics proceeds
as well as this committee's hearings on S. 2320.204 The issues which
these hearings considered were forfeitability of proceeds, use of
pre-indictment restraining orders and the substitute asset provision.
As to proceeds, the report specifically cited the limitations im-
posed in Marubeni, Martino and Thevis.205 Subsections 1963(a)(2)(A)
and (B) under the Bill were essentially the same as case law interpre-
tations of then current subsections 1963(a)(1) and (2): "[I]nterests
in enterprises acquired or conducted in violation of the RICO stat-
ute and interests through which enterprises are influenced or con-
trolled. ' 20 6 The Bill's description of these two types of property
was somewhat more detailed than those in the 1970 law, however,
to avoid problems of limiting construction which courts might graft
onto the statute.
2 07
202 S. REP. No. 520, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
203 Id. at 1.
204 Id. at 2.
205 Id. at 6-7.
206 Id. at 7.
207 For example, subparagraph (A) included not only interests in, but also contribu-
tions to, enterprises to make it clear that property which the defendant contributes
to an enterprise conducted in violation of the RICO statute is subject to forfeiture,
regardless of whether it gives rise to a legally cognizable interest, such as a partner-
ship or equity interest, in the enterprise itself. This provision would be particularly
helpful in cases involving criminal enterprises or groups "associated in fact," where
contributed property would not give rise to such an interest.
Subparagraph (C) was the new provision specifying the forfeiture of proceeds
of racketeering activity. To come within the scope of this provision, the pro perty
must constitute, or be derived from, proceeds the defendant obtained through the
racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection involved in the RICO violation.
Thus, for example, if only a part of a corporation's affairs were conducted through a
pattern of racketeering activity, the gain produced through this activity would be
subject to forfeiture under subparagraph (C), but the legitimately produced profits
of the corporation would not.
In subparagraph (C), the term "proceeds" has been used in lieu of the term
"profits" in order to alleviate the unreasonable burden on the government of prov-
ing net profits. It should not be necessary for the prosecutor to prove what the
defendant's overhead expenses were.
Subsection (B) of the bill, amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963, simply emphasizes that
property subject to criminal forfeiture under the RICO statute may be either real
property or tangible or intangible personal property. The types of property de-
scribed in subparagraph (A), (B) and (C) are examples of kinds of personal property
that may, in a RICO case, be subject to forfeiture and fall generally into the catago-
ries of positions or offices used or acquired in the offense, any compensation or
benefit derived from such a position or office, and the proceeds of contracts
awarded or performed through racketeering.
In essence, the purpose of this subsection is to underscore an intent that the
concept of "property," as used in section 1963, is to be broadly construed. It
should be noted that although the examples of forfeitable property described in
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection (b)(2) parallel the language used in
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Subsection 1963(c) codified the taint theory, specifically citing
Long.208 It noted that "where [a] third party is an innocent bonafide
purchaser of the property for value, ... [that] circumstance should
not, consistent with existing precedent, serve to bar the govern-
ment's forfeiture action, but should generally be the basis for the
granting of the third party's petition for remission or mitigation of
the forfeiture." 2
09
The substitute asset provision was limited to five circumstances
and:
[t]he amount of substitute assets which may be forfeited under this
subsection is limited to the value of property described in subsection
(a) (2) that is unavailable .... The substitute assets provision of this
subsection would come into play when tracing is impossible or diffi-
cult, or where there has been no exchange of properties but rather
removal or concealment of the property.
210
The report noted in a footnote, however, that "[t]here may be little
distinction between tracing and forfeiture of substitute assets . . .
where the forfeited property is a fungible asset such as money." 211
The report rejected the contentions in Scalzitti,212 Bello 21 3 and
Mande1214 that the RICO restraining order provision is inconsistent
with the presumption of innocence:
2 15
The sole purpose of the bill's restraining order provision, like that in
the current RICO and CCE statutes, is to preserve the status quo ....
In the Committee's view, the availability of restraining orders is essen-
tial in the area of criminal forfeiture and pretrial restraining orders for
the purpose of preserving assets does not impinge on the trial concept
of a presumption of innocence.
216
The permissibility of postponing notice and hearing until after
a restraining order is entered was also discussed. Citing Supreme
Court due process cases, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.
2 17
and Fuentes v. Shevin 218 , the Report found that such postponement
proposed section 1963(a), it is section 1963(a) which is to control when the finder of
fact makes a determination of whether particular property is subject to forfeiture.
Id. at 7-8.
208 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
209 S. Rep. No. 520 at 9.
210 Id. at 9.
211 Id. at 9 n.17.
212 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed mem., 556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir.
1977).
213 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
214 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
215 S. Rep. No. 520 at 10 n.19.
216 Id. at 10-11.
217 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
218 407 U.S. 67 (1971).
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would be permissible. 21 9 Before a temporary restraining order
could issue, however, the government would have to establish two
things. "First, either an indictment or information charging a RICO
offense and alleging that the property is subject to criminal forfei-
ture must have been filed, or the court must make its own probable
cause determination to the same effect"; and second, the govern-
ment must show that if notice were given the property could be dis-
posed of, concealed or removed from the jurisdiction of the court
before an adversary hearing could be held.220 The Report further
noted that this temporary order must be followed by a hearing
within the limits of subseciton 1963(e)(1). 221
While the Senate was considering S. 2320, H.R. 7140 was pro-
ceeding through the House. On September 28, 1982, H.R. 7140,
dealing only with forfeitures under Title 21, was passed.222 On Oc-
tober 1, 1982, H.R. 7140 came before the Senate for consideration.
Upon the motion of Senator Baker, the text of H.R. 7140 was re-
placed by the text of S. 2320. The Senate adopted a motion to re-
quest a conference with the House on the two bills. 2 23 The term of
the Ninety-Seventh Congress expired without enactment of any of
these bills.
2. Proposals and Hearings in 1983 Through 1986
In May, 1983, the Senate held hearings on the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1983, Senate Bill S. 829.224 The Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1983 sought far reaching criminal law re-
forms. Part of the proposed Bill was Title IV which was "designed
to enhance the use of forfeiture, and in particular the sanction of
criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in combatting two of
the most serious crime problems facing the country: racketeering
and drug trafficking.- 225 Title IV was based with minor modifica-
tions on the "Senate-passed comprehensive drug enforcement and
violent crime bill of last Congress, S. 2572," which was based on S.
219 S. REP. No. 520 at 11.
220 Id. at 11-12.
221 Id. at 12.
222 128 CONG. REC. H7,664-70 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1982).
223 128 CONG. REC. S13,161-65 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982).
224 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 812 (1983)[hereinafter Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Hearings]. The text of S. 829 can be found at 129 CONG. REc. S.3,077.
Other virtually identical forfeiture bills also under consideration during this time period
were S. 948 and S. 830. See S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983).





Under the proposed RICO forfeiture provision S. 829, Con-
gress clearly would have made proceeds of racketeering activity for-
feitable. This issue was, at the time, pending before the Supreme
Court in Russello.227 It also would have strengthened restraining or-
der powers and allowed for voidance of transfers to avoid forfeiture
and for forfeiture of substitute assets.
The ABA's Section of Criminal Justice expressed great concern
about the potential impact of the new forfeiture provisions in the
area of white collar crime:
Its concern is stimulated by the fact that RICO and its forfeiture
provisions are being applied to a wide range of commercial behavior.
RICO prosecutions are being brought not only against individuals as-
sociated with inherently criminal activity, e.g. narcotics, arson, murder
for hire and loan sharking, but also against persons charged with cor-
porate misbehavior and commerical frauds. In these latter circum-
stances, the economic consequences of illegal activity are usually
intertwined with those of legal activity. The broad sweep of the forfei-
ture provisions and the accompanying provisions for restraining or-
ders raise potentially serious problems of overbreadth,
disproportionality of punishment implicating the eighth amendment,
denial of due process where third parties are concerned, and the inhi-
bition of legitimate commerce.
228
The first concern was that forfeiture of proceeds would not al-
low defendants in white collar crime cases to deduct the costs inci-
dent to obtaining the forfeitable property. For instance, in cases
where RICO would be applied to contracts obtained by fraud or
bribery, "the 'proceeds' would include the defendant's costs in per-
forming the contract. Those costs could be substantial. ' 229 To alle-
viate the "unfairness" of the proceeds forfeiture in white collar
crime cases, several alternatives were suggested such as forfeiting
only "profits" from "those crimes in which the defendant renders a
socially acceptable service, at a cost to himself, but there is criminal-
ity involved." 2
30
The Criminal Justice Section of the ABA also objected to the
"derived from" language in the new forfeiture provision:
If the intent is to make it clear that profits are forfeitable, it seems
to be surplusage. If "derived from" means a more attenuated rela-
tionship, but nevertheless a casual connection, then there should be
concern again about the danger of disproportionate and unintended
226 Id. at 149.
227 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
228 Comprehensive Crime Control Hearing, supra note 224 at 803-04.




forfeitures. If tainted money is invested in a sandwich shop and, by
hard work and ingenuity, the investor parlays his operation into a res-
taurant chain, arguably the final product of all his labors is "derived
from" the tainted money. In short, "derived from" is not a useful con-
cept because it would carry the forfeiture beyond interests in an enter-
prise and profits and proceeds from criminality. We recommend that
Congress focus on the fact that in the case of legitimate businesses, a
piece of property or an investment may be the product of both clean
and tainted money.
2 3 '
The Criminal Justice Section also called for bifurcated guilt and for-
feiture proceedings in which the government "should not be per-
mitted to offer evidence relevant only to forfeiture in the guilt
phase."
232
The Section further argued that the taint theory has never been
part of RICO's in personam forfeitures. It was not, in the section's
view, fair to require third parties to bear the burden of proof that
they are bona fide purchasers for value:
Particularly in cases involving legitimate businesses, profits, proceeds
and property are the joint product of legitimate and illegitimate activ-
ity. Requiring the businessman to unravel the trail of dollars prior to
purchasing securities, real estate or other property is not only unfair,
but it may in fact impose unintended impediments to the free flow of
commerce.
233
The Section also questioned whether the government's right to for-
feiture which rests upon commission of the illegal act means the first
predicate crime or the last one.
23 4
The Criminal Justice Section questioned the substitute assets
provision as it might be applied in the white collar crime forum:
A RICO offense may span many years. Property obtained during it
may increase or decrease in value and businesses may fall on hard
times. In short, this section would result in orders of forfeiture far in
excess of property actually available to the defendant at the time of his
indictment, or it might result in forfeiture so disproportionate to the
amounts attributable to the illegal conduct as to raise eighth amend-
ment considerations.
23 5
As to restraining orders, the ABA reiterated its previous calls
for:
forcing the government to establish more than the return of an indict-
ment in order to obtain a restraining order. Regarding post-indict-
ment restraints on a defendant's property, S. 830 provides for a
hearing with reasonable notice and opportunity for participation by
231 Id. at 807 (Formal statement of the ABA Section of Criminal Justice).
232 Id. at 808.
233 Id. at 809.
234 Id. at 809-10.
235 Id. at 811.
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adverse parties. By negative implication, S. 829 does not. This omis-
sion renders S. 829 fatally defective in constitutional terms.
2 36
In support, the Section cited due process cases such as Fuentes
23 7
and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 2 38 as well as RICO and CCE re-
straining order cases, Crozier,23 9 Spilotro,240 Long 24 1 and Veon. 2 42 The
Section opposed the apparent intent of S. 829 to limit the defend-
ant's opportunity to contest the validity of the restraint on his prop-
erty until the trial itself. This, the Section asserted, was not a due
process hearing "'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.' "243
Despite these objections,-the Senate committee adopted a com-
promise of S. 829 and two very similar bills, S. 948 and S. 830. This
compromise, originally denominated S. 1762, was favorably re-
ported as S. 948 in Senate Report 98-224 on August 4, 1982.244
Much of the basis of Senate Report 98-224 was drawn from
hearings before earlier Congresses. For instance, the report noted
that "[p]rofit is the motivation for this criminal activity, and it is
through economic power that it is sustained and grows." 245 The
Senate described the scope of the new provisions as follows:
For the most part, this bill's forfeiture amendments do not focus on
significant expansion of the scope of property subject to forfeiture.
(Authority to civilly forfeit real property used in drug trafficking and
clarification of the forfeitability of proceeds of racketeering is pro-
vided, however.) Instead, they focus primarily on improving the pro-
cedures applicable in forfeiture cases. The more significant of these
amendments includes measures to prevent pre-conviction transfers of
assets in criminal forfeiture cases [and] allows forfeiture of substitute
236 Id. at 811-12.
237 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
238 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
239 United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 468
U.S. 1206 (1984).
240 United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
241 United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
242 United States v. Veon, 538 F. Supp. 237 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
243 Comprehensive Crime Control Hearings, supra note 224, at 812 (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
244 S. Rep. No. 224, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). S. 948, S.829, and S. 830 were
originally combined in the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, (S. 1762)." Id.
at 13. Subsequently, the text of S. 1762 was substituted for the text of S. 948. Id. Con-
sequently, Senate Report 98-224 deals with a bill denominated S. 948, the body of which
is a compromise of the original S. 948 combined with S. 829 and S. 830. Senate Report
98-225, issued on the same day as Senate Report 98-224, reports on S. 1762 in language
virtually identical to the language in Senate Report 98-224. S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For the sake of minimizing confusion, this compromise bill will
be referred to hereafter as S. 1762.
245 S. Rep. No. 224 at 13.
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assets where transfer or concealment of assets does occur.24 6
The Report noted that RICO forfeiture was too limited in two
important respects. Courts had interpreted the RICO forfeiture
provisions "so as to prevent the criminal forfeiture of a defendant's
ill-gotten profits, even though other of his interests used or ac-
quired in violation of the RICO statute would be forfeitable.- 24
7
Second, the RICO and CCE statutes "fail adequately to address the
phenomenon of defendants defeating forfeiture by removing, trans-
ferring, or concealing their assets prior to conviction." 248
Current law allowed for post-indictment restraining orders but
did not set forth the standard to be applied by the court in issuing
such orders. Cases such as Crozier
have required the government to meet essentially the same stringent
standard that applies to the issuance of temporary restraining orders
in the context of civil litigation and have also held the Federal Rules of
Evidence to apply to hearings concerning restraining orders in crimi-
nal forfeiture cases. In effect, such decisions allow the courts to enter-
tain challenges to the validity of the indictment, and require the
government to prove the merits of the underlying criminal case and
forfeiture counts and put on its witnesses well in advance of trial in
order to obtain an order restraining the defendant's transfer of prop-
erty alleged to be forfeitable in the indictment. Meeting such require-
ments can make obtaining a restraining order-the sole means
available to the government to assure the availability of assets after
conviction-quite difficult. In addition, these requirements may make
pursuing a restraining order inadvisable from the prosecutor's point
of view because of the potential for damaging premature disclosure of
the government's case and trial strategy and forjeopardizing the safety
of witnesses and victims in racketeering and narcotics trafficking cases
who would be required to testify at the restraining order hearing.249
Section 1963(a)(1) and (2), as revised, "carry forward (but in
clearer format) the description of forfeitable property appearing in
current 18 U.S.C. 1963(a)(1) and (2). Paragraph (3) is new, and spe-
cifically provides for the forfeiture of proceeds derived from prohib-
ited racketeering activity or unlawful debt collection. Both direct
and derivative proceeds are forfeitable.
' 250
To be forfeitable under 1963(a)(3), the proceeds must be at-
tributable to the racketeering activity. "For example, if only part of
a corporation's affairs were conducted through a pattern of racke-
teering activity, the gain produced through this activity would be
246 Id. at 15.
247 Id. at 17.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 18.
250 Id. at 21.
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subject to forfeiture but the legitimately produced profits of the cor-
poration would not."' 25 ' Additionally, "proceeds" rather than
"profits" was used to "alleviate the unreasonable burden on the
government of proving net profits. It should not be necessary for
the prosecution to prove what the defendant's overhead expenses
were."' 252 The court in United States v. Jeffers, a CCE case, noted the
" 'extreme difficulty in this conspiratorial, criminal area of finding
hard evidence of net profits.' "253S. 1762 also clarified that section
1963 is mandatory and that "its criminal forfeiture provisions are to
apply irrespective of any contrary provisions in state law."
254
Subsection 1963(b) underscored the concept that the term
"property" is to be broadly construed. Congress had dropped the
list of forfeitable property submitted by the Department ofJustice in
S. 2320 from the statute but adopted it as part of the legislative his-
tory. "The Committee agrees that forfeiture of the right to exercise
or benefit from such interests is fully consistent with the purposes of
the RICO forfeiture sanction."
255
The "relation back" provision of subsection 1963(c) was viewed
as a codification of the taint theory. "The interest of the United
States in the property is to vest at [the time of the acts which give
rise to the forfeiture], and is not necessarily extinguished simply be-
cause the defendant subsequently transfers his interest to an-
other." 256 This provision "should not operate to the detriment of
innocent bonafide purchasers of the defendant's property .... Such
purchasers are entitled to relief under the new ancillary hearing pro-
cedure in section 1963(m) which was adopted by amendment by the
Committee." 2
57
Under this provision, the jury could render a special verdict of
forfeiture with respect to property used or acquired by the defendant
in a manner rendering it subject to the forfeiture, irrespective of the
fact that it may have been transferred to a third party subsequent to
the acts of the defendant giving rise to the forfeiture. Resolution of
claims of third parties asserting that they are innocent bona fide pur-
chasers, claims that will determine whether a transfer is ultimately
voided, may be reserved for the post-trial ancillary hearing. This pro-
251 Id.
252 Id. at 21, 22 (citing United States v.Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 432 U.S. 137 (1977)).
253 S. Rep. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 n.24 (1983)(quoting United States v.




256 Id. at 23.
257 Id.
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cedure provides for more orderly consideration both of the forfeiture
issue and the legitimacy of third party claims. Moreover, even if a
transfer is sustained at the ancillary hearing, the fact that the jury will
have determined that the property would have been forfeitable if it
had remained in the hands of the defendant will allow the court to
order the forfeiture of substitute assets of the defendant as provided in
18 U.S.C. 1963(d), as amended, to assure that the defendant does not
retain the gain received from this pre-conviction transfer.
2 58
Subsection 1963(d) was a new provision providing for forfei-
ture of substitute assets. The Committee noted that "[w]here it is
clear that a forfeitable asset has been sold for value to an innocent
purchaser, the Committee expects that the government would seek
forfeiture of substitute assets of the defendant, as provided in Sec-
tion 1963(d), at the conclusion of trial and avoid the necessity of the
purchaser petitioning for a post-trial hearing. ' 259 Forfeiture of as-
sets of equivalent value was provided for in five instances:
[W]here property found subject to forfeiture under Section 1963(a), as
amended, (1) cannot be located; (2) has been transferred to, sold to,
or deposited with, a third party; (3) has been placed beyond the juris-
diction of the court; (4) has been substantially diminished in value by
any act or omission of the defendant; or (5) has been commingled with
other property that cannot be divided without difficulty.
260
Provision (2) must be read in conjunction with 1963(c) which allows
the voiding of certain transfers to third parties. "The bill does not
permit the government to obtain forfeiture both of the transferred
property and of substitute assets. Instead, it permits the govern-
ment to reach substitute assets where the property cannot be
reached once transferred or where such action is a preferable alter-
native to seizure of property sold to an innocent purchaser.
' '26 '
Provision (3) was directed toward "combatting the problem of use
of offshore banks as safe havens for crime-related assets. ' 26 2 Fi-
nally, provision (4) "will be of utility where a defendant substantially
depletes a forfeitable asset in anticipation of its being ordered for-
feited. It is phrased, however, so that it will not apply where the
value of the property has been subject to minimal or ordinary
depreciation."
2 63
The restraining order power of the court was set forth in sub-
section 1963(e). 26 4 It expanded authority to enter restraining or-
258 Id. at 23.
259 Id. at 23 n.29.
260 Id. at 24.
261 Id. at 24 n.30.
262 Id. at 24 n.31.
263 Id. at 24 n.32.
264 Id. at 24-25.
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ders to certain pre-indictment situations. The Committee also set
forth the standard for post-indictment restraining orders. After in-
dictment, a restraining order may issue based solely on the probable
cause finding made by the grand jury provided that the indictment
charges a RICO violation and alleges "that the property with re-
spect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction,
be subject to forfeiture under [section 1963].' "265 Thus, a hearing
prior to entry of the restraining order was not authorized. After is-
suance of a restraining order, the court was authorized to conduct a
hearing to modify the order or to vacate the order as to "property
restrained [which] was not among the property named in the indict-
ment." 266 The Committee was adamant that such a hearing should
not consider the question of whether the government was likely to
prevail on the merits of the RICO charge at trial. "For the purpose
of issuing a restraining order, the probable cause established in the
indictment or information is to be determinative of any issue re-
garding the merits of the government's case on which the forfeiture
is to be based." 267
Prior to indictment a restraining order could issue:
[I]f, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the court deter-
mines that "there is a substantial probability that the United States will
prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will
result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction
of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture," and also
determines "that the need to preserve the availability of the property
265 Id. at 25. The Committe was very specific about this issue.
Paragraph (1)(a) provides that a restraining order may issue "upon the filing of
an indictment or information charging a violation of section 1962 of this chapter
[18 U.S.C. 1962] and alleging that the property with respect -to which the order is
sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this sec-
tion." Thus, the probable cause established in the indictment or information is, in
itself, to be a sufficient basis for issuance of a restraining order. While the court
may consider factors bearing on the reasonableness of the order sought, it is not to
"look behind" the indictment or require the government to produce additional evi-
dence regarding the merits of the case as a prerequisite to issuing a post-indictment
restraining order. Since a warrant for the arrest of the defendant may issue upon
the filing of an indictiment or information, and so the indictment or information is
sufficient to support a restraint on the defendant's liberty, it is clear that the same
basis is sufficient to support a restraint on the defendant's ability to transfer or re-
move property alleged to be subject to criminal forfeiture in the indictment.
In contrast to the pre-indictment restraining order authority set out in para-
graph (1)(B), the post-indictment restraining order provision does not require prior
notice and opportunity for a hearing. The indictment or information itself gives
notice of the government's intent to seek forfeiture of the property. Moreover, the
necessity of quickly obtaining a restraining order after indictment in the criminal
forfeiture context presents exigencies not present when restraining orders are
sought in the ordinary civil context.
266 Id.
267 Id. The Committee "stressed that at such a hearing the court is not to entertain
challenges to the validity of the indictment."
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through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on
any party against whom the order is to be entered.
26 8
The committee stressed, however, "that this stringent standard ap-
plies only in this context; it is not to be extended to restraining or-
ders sought after indictment.
' 26 9
Subsection 1963(e)(2) also provided for pre-indictment re-
straining orders to issue, on a temporary basis, without prior notice:
In order to obtain such an ex parte order the government must
establish probable cause to believe that the property is subject to for-
feiture and that provision of notice would jeopardize the availability of
the property. Certain types of property, particularly highly liquid as-
sets forfeitable as proceeds of drug trafficking or cash producing rack-
eteering schemes, may be easily moved, concealed or disposed of even
in the relatively short period of time that may elapse between the giv-
ing of notice and the holding of an adversary hearing concerning the
entry of a restraining order. In such cases, there may be a compelling
need for a temporary ex parte order.
270
The Committee rejected the arguments in Scalzitti,2 71 Bello, 2 7 2 and
Mandel,2 73 that the restraining order provisions impinged on the de-
fendant's presumption of innocence at trial. 274 Finally, subsection
1963(e) (3) provided that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply
at a hearing concerning a restraining order.
2 75
The forfeiture statute additionally incorporated other miscella-
neous provisions. Subsection 1963(f) allowed for the appointment
of receivers or trustees following a jury verdict of forfeiture and per-
mitted use of income to offset the ordinary and necessary expense of
the enterprise in order to preserve the value of the assets until their
disposal.2 76 Subsection 1963(g) specifically prohibited re-acquisi-
tion by the defendant of property he had forfeited. 27 7 Administra-
tive remission or mitigation of the forfeiture was set forth in
subsection 1963(n). 278 Subsection 19630) prohibited third parties
from intervening in the criminal case by filing a simultaneous civil
suit. Rather, third parties were required to follow the ancillary hear-
268 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (e)(1)(B)).
269 Id. at 25-26.
270 Id. at 26.
271 United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1975), appeal dismissed mem.,
556 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977).
272 United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
273 United States v. Mandel, 408 F. Supp. 679 (D. Md. 1976).
274 Comprehensive Crime Control Hearing, supra, note 224 at 27.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 27-28.




ing procedure set forth in Section 1963(m).279
Congress provided third parties who assert a legal rather than
an equitable basis for relief from forfeiture a judicial avenue for re-
lief in subsection 1963(m). 28 0 "Thus, if a third party can demon-
strate that his interest in the forfeited property is exclusive of or
superior to the interest of the defendant, the third party's claim ren-
ders that portion of the order of forfeiture reaching his interest in-
valid." 28 1 The procedure for providing notice to third parties who
may claim an interest in the forfeited property was set forth in sub-
section 1963(m). 282 Under this provision, the third party bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence either that at
the time the illegal acts were committed he had a legal interest in
the property superior to that of the defendant or that he was "a
bona fide purchase[r] for value and had no reason to believe that the
property was subject to forfeiture." 283 After adjudicating any third-
party claims, clear title to any property not released to third parties
would pass to the United States.
If the third party loses under subsection 1963(m), he or she
may still seek equitable relief from the Attorney General. The At-
torney General petition, however, shall not be subject to judicial
review.
S. 1762 was discussed as part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act by the Senate on February 2, 1984.284 The Senate ap-
proved the Comprehensive Crime Control Act on that day.2 8 5 The
279 Id. at 29.
280 Id. at 4.
281 Id. at 30.
282 Id. at 31. The Committee described the procedures as follows:
Under the new ancillary hearing procedure, the government, following the entry of
an order of forfeiture is to publish notice of the order of forfeiture and its intent to
dispose of the property. Direct written notice to interested third parties may serve
as a substitute for published notice. Within thirty days after publication of notice or
receipt of direct notice, any third party asserting a legal interest in the property
ordered forfeited may petition the court (the court having heard the criminal case)
for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest. This hearing is to be
held before the court alone.
If possible, the hearing is to be held within thirty days of the filing of the peti-
tion, and the court may hold a consolidated hearing to resolve all or several peti-
tions arising out of a single case. At the hearing, both the petitioner and the United
States may present evidence and witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses who ap-
pear. In addition to evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the court may
consider relevant portions of the record of the criminal case. This will allow the
court to quickly dispense with claims that have already been considered at trial, as
for example, where the jury has already determined that the third party held the
property only as a nominee of the defendant or that a transfer to the third party was
a sham transaction.
283 Id.
284 130 CONG. REC. S758 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984)(statement of Sen. Laxalt).
285 Id. at S759.
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House passed the Act without debate on September 25, 1984.286
Inexplicably, certain provisions of the forfeiture bill, most notably
the substitute assets section, were omitted from the law as passed.
The substitute assets provision was restored, however, in a technical
amendments bill passed in 1986.287
II. SCOPE OF FORFEITURE
The present RICO forfeiture statute has three basic categories
of forfeitable property: (a)(1) interests acquired or maintained
through racketeering; (a) (2) interests in or providing a source of in-
fluence over the racketeering enterprise; and (a)(3) proceeds of
racketeering activity. The breadth of each of these provisions is dis-
cussed below.
A. "TAINT"-SUBSECTIONS 1963(A) (1) AND 1963(A) (2) (A)
Subsection 1963(a)(1) provides for forfeiture of "[i]nterests ac-
quired and maintained in violation of section 1962." As previously
discussed 288 , courts initially interpreted this provision as limited to
interests acquired "in an enterprise." That limitation was expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Russello v. United States.28 9 By com-
parison, subsection 1963(a)(2)(A) is expressly limited to interest "in
an enterprise." This subsection provides for forfeiture of "any in-
terest in ... any enterprise which the person has established, oper-
ated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in
violation of section 1962."290
Prior to Russello, many debates arose regarding whether the
predecessor provisions to the present subsections 1963(a)(1) and
1963(a)(2)(A) were redundant in that courts read both as limited to
interests in an enterprise. 29' This redundancy question was initially
286 Id. Cong. Rec. H10,131 (daily ed. September 25, 1984). The Act became Pub. L.
No. 98-473. The effective date of the Act was October 12, 1984.
287 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1153(a)(1986). The substi-
tute assets provision was orginally designated subsection 1963(d). When it was omitted
in 1984, subsequent subsections were renumbered. Thus, for instance, the provision for
third party petitions became 1963(1) rather than 1963(m). In 1986, the substitute asset
provision was added to subsection 1963 as subsection 1963(n), however. Accordingly,
at present no subsection 1963(m) exists.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 89-102.
289 464 U.S. 16 (1983). Nevertheless, courts and counsel improperly continue to ap-
ply "in an enterprise" limitations to subsection 1963(a)(1) forfeitures based, in part, on
reliance upon pre-Russello case law. See, e.g., United States v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 190,
198-99 (N.D. 111. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir.
1987).
290 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)(2)(A).
291 Compare United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980), and
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erroneously resolved in cases holding that subsection 1963(a)(1)
was "directed towards the forfeiture of a minority interest in an en-
terprise controlled by others." 292 The Supreme Court in Russello
corrected this misinterpretation. It stated that:
[s]ubsection (a)(1) reaches "any interest," whether or not in an enter-
prise, provided it was "acquired . . . in violation of section 1962."
Subsection (a)(2), on the other hand, is restricted to an interest in an
enterprise, but that interest itself need not have been illegally ac-
quired. Thus, there are things forfeitable under one, but not the
other, of each of the subsections.
293
The distinction between the two subsections turns on the need
to prove "taint." Under subsection 1963(a)(2)(A) a defendant's en-
tire interest in the enterprise named in the RICO charge is forfeita-
ble irrespective of whether he actually used all of his holdings in the
enterprise to facilitate the illegal conduct. So, for example, in United
States v. Anderson,294 the defendant's entire interest in the enterprise,
Lee & M, Inc., d/b/a/ Gentleman's Quarters, d/b/a She Club, was
forfeited even though the defendant argued that the basement of
the She Club "was rented to other businesses as storage area, and
not used as a part of the [racketeering activity]." 295 The Eleventh
Circuit correctly observed that "[a] defendant's conviction under
the RICO statute subjects all his interests in the enterprise to forfei-
ture 'regardless of whether those assets were themselves 'tainted' by
use in connection with the racketeering activity.' "296 Similarly, in
United States v. Roberts,297 the government sought forfeiture of a
Packard automobile purchased with funds of the enterprise corpora-
tion pursuant to a plea agreement. The court rejected forfeiture
pursuant to subsection 1963(a)(1) because the bulk of the money
used to purchase the car was paid before the corporation began en-
gaging in the illegal activity. However, the court found that to the
extent that the defendant purchased the Packard with enterprise
funds, "a jury would have been justified in finding that it [was] the
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), with United States v. Martino,
681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc), aff'dsub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16 (1985).
292 United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 143 n. 14 (N.D. Ga. 1979); accord United
States v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 190, 198-99 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated and re-
manded in part, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
293 Russello, 464 U.S. at 24.
294 782 F.2d 908 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
295 Id. at 917.
296 Id. at 918 (quoting United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1359 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984))(emphasis in original); accord United States v. Hess,
691 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1982)(forfeiture of defendant's entire interest in enterprise
corporation.).
297 749 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985).
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property of the enterprise. ' 298 As such, the car was held to be for-
feitable "under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a)(2), as an asset of an enterprise
conducted in violation of the racketeering provisions of the Act."
2 99
By comparison, where the defendant uses racketeering funds to
acquire assets which are not part of the charged enterprise, or uses
such assets to facilitate the racketeering activity, these non-enter-
prise assets can be forfeited under subsection 1963(a)(1) because
they are "tainted" by their use in the illegal activity. Thus, in United
States v. Boffa,300 the court ordered forfeiture of the defendants' in-
terests in corporations which were not part of the association-in-fact
enterprise. In Boffa, the racketeering activity involved manipulation
of leasing contracts to subvert collective bargaining agreements and
rights guaranteed by labor laws. The corporations controlled by the
individual members of the enterprise were used as a "corporate
'shell game,' "301 allowing the defendants to move leasing contracts
among the various corporations without disclosing that each corpo-
ration was in reality controlled by the defendants. Thus, the de-
fendants' interests in the corporations were tainted by use of the
corporations in the illegal activity. Although the court did not dis-
cuss the taint issue, it nevertheless correctly held that the defend-
ants must "forfeit to the United States their interests in the
corporations associated with the enterprise.- 30 2
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Horak,30 3 acknowledged
the "taint"/"no taint" distinction between subsections (a)(1) and
(a) (2):
Section (a) (1) focuses on the racketeering activity and divests the con-
victed defendant of all interests "acquired or maintained" by that ac-
tivity. It is apparently irrelevant whether such interests are part of the
charged enterprise. Section (a)(2), on the other hand, . . . focuses on
the enterprise, not the specific racketeering activity, and divests the con-
victed defendant of all interests in the enterprise. It would therefore
seem irrelevant (at least in terms of the structure of the statute)
whether (a) (2) interests were directly related to the racketeering activ-
ity of which the defendant was convicted. 304
In Horak, the government sought to forfeit the defendant's interest
298 Id. at 410.
299 Id.
300 513 F. Supp 444 (D. Del. 1980)(pretrial hearings); 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983).
301 Boffa, 513 F. Supp. at 456 n.ll.
302 Boffa, 688 F.2d at 925; accord United States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 962 n.35 (5th
Cir. 1982)(en banc), aff'd, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)(forfeiture of two non-enterprise corpora-
tions under subsection 1963(a)(2) because both "were active in the enterprise").
303 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
304 Id. at 1243 (emphasis in original).
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in his job, pension and profit sharing plan, salary, bonuses, and
shares of stock in the enterprise. The district court ordered forfei-
ture of defendant's pension and profit sharing plan, salary and bo-
nuses under section (a)(1) because the defendant's racketeering
activities "enhanced" these interests.30 5 The Seventh Circuit re-
manded for a taint finding. It phrased the taint test as requiring the
district court to determine "what portion of [defendant's] interests
would not have been acquired or maintained 'but for' his racketeer-
ing activities." 3
0 6
In practice, the "taint"/"no taint" distinction has often eluded
both attorneys and courts. Occasionally, courts have held that no
"taint" showing is required under subsection 1963(a)(1) merely be-
cause the interest to be forfeited is part of the charged enterprise.
In United States v. Cauble,30 7 the enterprise was a partnership, Cauble
Enterprises. The government showed that assets of Cauble Enter-
prises were used in conducting illegal racketeering activity, in this
case drug trafficking. Accordingly, the defendant's entire interest in
the enterprise was subject to forfeiture under subsection
1963(a)(2) (A). The defendant's interest in Cauble Enterprises was
also forfeitable to the extent Cauble Enterprises had been used to
facilitate drug trafficking under the "taint" concept of subsection
1963 (a) (1). The Fifth Circuit reached the right result-forfeiture of
defendant's entire interest in the enterprise-but in the process in-
termingled subsection 1963(a)(1) and subsection 1963(a)(2)(A)
analyses. The Cauble court held that RICO forfeiture "deprives that
defendant of all of the assets that allow him to maintain an interest in
a RICO enterprise, regardless whether those assets are themselves
'tainted' by use in connection with the racketeering activity." 308
"Interests maintained," like "interests acquired," is a subsection
1963(a)(1) concept. Yet, because the interests sought to be for-
feited were enterprise assets, the court did not make a taint determi-
nation. The result, forfeiture of all of the defendant's interest in the
enterprise, was correct under subsection 1963(a)(2)(A), but the ra-
tionale using subsection 1963(a)(1) language was faulty. 30 9
305 633 F. Supp at 200.
306 833 F.2d at 1243 (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit did not preclude forfei-
ture of these interests as interests in the enterprise, without a taint determination, under
subsection 1963(a)(2). However, the court expressed some possible eighth amendment
concerns if forfeiture of all interests the government sought was ordered under subsec-
tion 1963(a)(2). See discussion of the constitutionality of forfeiture provisions infra text
accompanying notes 522-51.
307 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
308 Id. at 1349 (emphasis added).
309 The special interrogatories submitted to the jury in Cauble referred to both subsec-
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In other instances, prosecutors have created a self-imposed
burden of showing taint by seeking forfeiture of enterprise assets
solely under subsection 1963(a)(1). In United States v. Zang,310 the
defendants "fraudulently miscertified" lower grade crude oil, which
was price controlled, as higher grade oil "resulting in an illegal
profit of nearly 7.5 million dollars." 3 11 The RICO charge was in-
vesting income acquired through a pattern of racketeering activity in
an enterprise, Dalco Investments, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1962(a). "The government sought forfeiture
of the [defendants'] respective interests in Dalco Investments, in-
cluding its sole asset, the Dalco Building, pursuant to
§ 1963(a)(1)." 312 Because subsection 1963(a)(1) was the only for-
feiture provision relied upon, the Zang court correctly concluded
that only the interest in Dalco Investments acquired by tainted funds
was subject to forfeiture. 3 13 As to the Dalco Building, the govern-
ment was required to show what portion of the building was "ac-
quired by racketeering funds. ' 314 If the prosecution had also
sought forfeiture pursuant to subsection 1963(a)(2)(A), however,
this "taint" showing would have been obviated. The court would
have required the defendants to forfeit their entire interest in the
Dalco Building, irrespective of what portion of the enterprise and
the building were acquired with tainted funds.
3 15
B. INTERESTS MAINTAINED--SUBSECTION 1963(A)(1)
The RICO Act does not define the term "maintained" as used
in subsection 1963(a)(1). The legislative history also sheds little
light on the interpretation of this provision. Throughout the legis-
lative history, subsection 1963(a)(1) is generally referred to by its
tion 1963(a)(1), interests maintained, and subsection 1963(a)(2), interests affording a
source of influence over the enterprise. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1346 n.90.
310 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983).
311 Id. at 1189.
312 Id. at 1193. The Zang court incorrectly limited subsection 1963(a)(I) to interests
in an enterprise. This error does not affect the accuracy of the court's "taint" reasoning,
however.
313 Id. at 1195.
314 Id. When dealing with forfeiture of corporate or other business entity interests, it
is important to distinguish whether the defendant's interests in a corporation are for-
feited or whether the corporation's assets are themselve forfeited. See, e.g., United States
v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820 (D. Nev. 1986); Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings on H.R.
2646, H. R. 2910, H. R. 4110 and H.R. 5371 before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 184-85 (1982).
315 In United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y 1984), the court allowed
the government to change its theory regarding forfeitability post-indictment. The better




statutory language "acquired or maintained." However, in Senator
McClellan's explanation of the first RICO Act bill, S. 1861, he re-
ferred to forfeiture of an organization "acquired or run by defined
racketeering methods .... -316 Similarly, Senator McClellan's co-
sponsor of the RICO Act, Senator Hruska, described the aim of the
forfeiture Bill as directed at "businesses which have been acquired
or operated by unlawful racketeering methods." 31 7 This lack of a
clear definition for the term "maintained" may explain the paucity
of case law addressing this clause. 318 Of the six reported cases deal-
ing with the "maintained" theory, five do not attempt to interpret
the maintained provision.
319
Recently, however, the district court in United States v. Horak did
address the "maintained" provision. Defendant Horak operated the
enterprise, Waste Management Inc., including its subsidiaries and
divisions ("WMI"), using bribery to obtain garbage contracts from a
village in Illinois in violation of section 1962(c).320 The government
sought forfeiture of the defendant's positions in WMI, and his inter-
ests in WMI's profit sharing and pension plans under the "ac-
quired," "maintained" and "source of influence" theories. In
pretrial pleadings, Horak's counsel argued that "acquired and main-
tained" boiled down to "got" or "kept." The defense contended
that the defendant did not "keep," or "maintain," his stock, salary,
bonuses or profit sharing and pension benefits merely because he
increased the company's profitability through racketeering activ-
316 Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals before Subcomm. on Fed-
eral Legislation of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 401 (1970)(empha-
sis added).
317 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970)(emphasis added). The use of "run by" and "operated
by" in these descriptions is the closest to a definition of "maintained" found in the legis-
lative history.
318 Only six reported cases specifically refer to the "maintained" theory. United
States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 797
F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.), va-
cated and remanded, 464 U.S. 979 (1983); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill.
1986), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
319 United States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds and
remanded, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. McManigal, 708 F.2d 276 (7th
Cir.), vacated and remanded, 464 U.S. 979 (1985); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
320 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
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ity.3 2 1 Rather, the defense emphasized that the government had
failed to show that Horak would have "lost" rather than "kept"
these interests if the bribe-obtained contracts had not been awarded
to WMI. 322
The district court rejected this defense argument.3 2 31t stated:
Horak's criminal activity (bribing public officials) enhanced his posi-
tion as manager of HOD disposal, [a division of WMI]. The award of a
garbage contract by the Village to HOD unquestionably increased
HOD's revenue. All of the interests identified by the government de-
pended (in part or whole) upon Horak's performance as manager of
HOD. Thus, Horak "maintained" his job, salaries, bonuses, and pen-
sion and profit sharing plans through his position as manager of HOD
and his racketeering activity in violation of § 1962(c).
3 24
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit narrowed the district court's inter-
pretation of the "maintained" language in keeping with the argu-
ment originally proposed by the defense. 3 25 The court stated:
We do not believe that it is sufficient under section (a)(1) for the court
to determine that Horak's racketeering activities "enhanced" his per-
formance as H.O.D manager, thus affecting the enumerated interests.
Instead, on remand, the court must determine what portion of Horak's
interests would not have been acquired or maintained "but for" his
racketeering activities. That is, in order to win a forfeiture order, the
government must show on remand that Horak's racketeering activities
were a cause in fact of the acquisition or maintenance of these interests
or some portion of them. 326
The circuit court followed with an example of how the defendant
may have "maintained" his job through racketeering:
For example, if the government can prove that Horak would have been
fired in 1981 but for his landing the Fox Lake contract (which he ac-
complished by violating section 1962), the court should order forfei-
ture of his entire salary thereafter and such other emoluments of his
employment as would have been lost by the firing.
3 27
Use of the "interests maintained" provision rather than the
"proceeds" language of section 1963(a)(3) may, in certain circum-
stances, alleviate significant proof problems. Consider the example
321 Brief for the Appellant at 6-10, United States v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill.
1986), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
322 Id.
323 The "maintained" theory as it applies to the stock for which forfeiture was sought
was inexplicably not addressed by the court.
324 Horak, 633 F. Supp. at 200.
325 United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987).
326 Id. at 1243.
327 Id. Recently a district court in United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), applied the "but for" test to determine whether a defendant's salary was forfeita-
ble. The Regan court did not specifically cite the "interest maintained" language or the
Horak decision in its analysis.
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of an alcoholic beverage license obtained through racketeering ac-
tivity, specifically bribery of public officials. The license itself was
acquired through racketeering activity and is subject to forfeiture
under subsection 1962(a)(1). Money received by virtue of alcoholic
beverage sales made by a bar which operates by virtue of the license
would also be forfeitable as "acquired" interests under subsections
1963(a)(1) or (a)(3). More importantly, however, the entire busi-
ness of the bar was "maintained" by the license because "but for"
the alcoholic beverage license the bar could not operate. Therefore,
rather that trying to prove how much income was generated from
alcoholic beverage sales and seeking forfeiture of "interests ac-
quired" or "proceeds," the defendant could be required to forfeit
his or her entire interest in the bar because that interest was "main-
tained" through racketeering activity.328
Other cases provide further examples of uses for the "main-
tained" theory. The court found that shares of stock were "main-
tained" by racketeering activity in United States v. Kravitz.329 The
enterprise was a health care delivery business known as AHP. One
defendant, the sole shareholder of AHP, obtained renewals of
health care contracts through racketeering activity involving bribery.
The jury, in response to special interrogatories, found that the de-
fendant had maintained his interest in his AHP stock by violation of
the racketeering laws and that his position in AHP had afforded him
a source of influence over the enterprise.3 3 0
These facts indicate that AHP was "run by" racketeering activ-
ity. Based upon this finding alone, the Kravitz court ordered the
stock forfeited.331 This was a premature decision. In addition to
the "run by" finding, the "maintained" provision of subsection
1963(a)(1) requires a "taint" determination, especially in light of
the defendant's contention that the racketeering activities "were, at
most, a minor or remote part of AHP's medical practice. ' 332 If the
Kravitz court had applied the Horak court's "but for" definition of
"taint," the court would have required a factual determination to
ascertain the effect of the inability to obtain the contract renewals
328 As will be described in the Procedures section, infra notes 390-437 and accompa-
nying text, forfeiture theories may be charged alternatively. That is, the goverment can
allege both that proceeds of the racketeering activity are forfeitable pursuant to subsec-
tion 1963(a)(3) and that an interest maintained in a business through racketeering is
subject to forfeiture under subsection 1963(a)(1).
329 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984).
330 Id. at 103.
331 Id. at 105 n.4.
332 Id. at 106. In this regard, it should be noted that the "source of influence" finding
by the jury applied to defendant's position in the company not to his stock ownership.
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obtained through racketeering activity. If, contrary to the defend-
ant's contention, the evidence established that AHP would have
gone bankrupt without the contract renewals, all of the stock of
AHP was "maintained" by racketeering activity. Otherwise, only
those assets which the defendant would have lost but for the illegal
activity could have been forfeited under the "maintained" theory.
333
Another example of the "maintained" theory is suggested by
reference in United States v. Godoy 33 4 to the use of coercive tactics and
corruption of local officials to gain an unfair competitive advan-
tage.33 5 Suppose that through a public bribery racketeering scheme
the owner of a business obtained an excavation permit closer to the
construction site of an interstate highway that his non-racketeering
competitors could obtain by legal means. If the proximity of the
excavation site to the project allowed the defendant to underbid his
competitors, who would have had to haul dirt from greater dis-
tances, the contract was "acquired" through racketeering and would
be forfeitable.33 6 However, if the defendant merely fulfilled a le-
gally acquired construction contract by use of dirt from the excava-
tion site, his "contractual right" nevertheless was maintained
through racketeering and would be forfeitable to the extent the gov-
ernment could show "taint." The "taint" question-what portion
of the construction contract was "maintained" by use of one ille-
gally-acquired excavation permit-could turn, among other things,
on proof of the amount of dirt contributed from the site with the
illegally acquired permit as a percentage of the total amount of dirt
required to fulfill the contract.
C. SUBSECTION 1963(A)(2) AND "SOURCE OF INFLUENCE"
Courts have read qualifying language into subsection
1963(a)(2), just as they grafted "in an enterprise" language onto
subsection 1963(a)(1) prior to Russello.337 Originally, subsection
1963(a)(2) provided for forfeiture of "any interest in, security of,
claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording
a source of influence over, any enterprise which [the defendant] has
established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the
333 Of course, the entire taint question would have been eliminated if the government
had sought forfeiture of the defendant's interest in the enterpirse, AHP, under subsec-
tion 1963(a)(2)(A-C).
334 678 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
335 Id. at 89.
336 This is similar to the factual situation involved in United States v. Marubeni Am.
Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
337 See supra text accompanying notes 90-102.
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conduct of, in violation of section 1962."338 Despite the punctua-
tion of the provision, some courts read "source of influence" to ap-
ply to each type of property interest named in subsection
1963(a)(2), that is, to interests, securities, claims, and property or
contractual rights.
33 9
The 1984 amendments to the RICO Act were designed to give
subsection 1963(a)(2) a "clearer format," 340 by expressly creating
subdivisions of subsection 1963(a)(2). These subdivisions, sepa-
rated by semicolons, leave no doubt that the "source of influence"
condition applies only to "property or contractual rights." The sub-
section, as revised, provides for forfeiture of: "(2) any-(A) interest
in; (B) security of; (C) claim against; or (D) property or contractual
right of any kind affording a source of influence over; any enterprise
which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted,
or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962.
' '341
Applying "source of influence" to qualify only property or con-
tractual rights is entirely appropriate. The first three categories of
subsection 1963(a)(2) all relate to enterprise assets-interest in an
enterprise, security of an enterprise, and claims against an enter-
prise. Thus, the nexus between the illegal activity and forfeitable
property is provided by the fact that only assets of the illegal enter-
prise are forfeited.3 42 For non-enterprise assets, the government
must show some other nexus. In subsection 1963(a)(1), the nexus is
"taint." In subsection 1963(a)(2)(D), the nexus is "source of
influence."
34 3
"Properties that are owned by a RICO participant and used by
him to further the affairs of a RICO enterprise afford the
338 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1970).
339 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005
(1984); United States v. Martino, 684 F.2d 367, 409 (5th Cir. 1981)(pages 407 through
409 of the opinion were included in the advance sheets but deleted prior to final publi-
cation of the opinion); United States v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Il. 1986), aff'd in
part, vacated and remanded in part, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Veliotis,
586 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y 1984). But see United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134,
143 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
340 S. Rep. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983).
341 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2) (1986).
342 In other words, the requisite "nexus" between the illegal conduct and the prop-
erty sought to be forfeited is built into the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 474
F. Supp. 117, 126 (N.D. Ga. 1979)(sufficient nexus between enterprise and corporate
defendants that were alleged to be members of the illegal enterprise.).
343 Thus, the district court's concern in Horak, that "Congress could require the for-
feiture of assets which have no connection to the underlying racketeering activity" is
unfounded. Horak, 633 F. Supp. at 199.
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owner/participant a source of influence over the enterprise." 344 In
United States v. Zielie, the court held stash houses and money-count-
ing houses which had contributed to the association-in-fact mari-
juana distribution enterprise forfeitable under subsection
1963(a)(2).
Companies which provided funds for arson and fraud ventures
gave the defendant which owned them a source of influence over
the association-in-fact enterprise in United States v. Martino.3 45 As-
sets of a corporate defendant have also been deemed forfeitable
under the source of influence provision "[i]f the government carries
its burden and shows that each of [the defendant's] assets were con-
tributed to or utilized by the association [-in-fact enterprise] to for-
ward its goals."' 346 Similarly, "the retention of voting rights in
securities of the enterprise or a management contract between the
defendant and the enterprise would be subject to forfeiture under
[section 1963 (a)(2)] if utilized to afford a continuing source of influ-
ence over the § 1962 enterprise. ' 34 7 "[C]ontract rights which af-
ford one defendant a source of influence over another defendant
may also afford a source of influence over the association-enterprise
of which they are both members."
348
By virtue of its connection to the enterprise, property which
falls within the "source of influence" rubric must also be considered
"tainted." 349 In United States v. McKeithen, forfeiture of three parcels
of real property was sought in a continuing criminal enterprise case.
One of the parcels contained two buildings, only one of which had
been used by the narcotics enterprise. In response to a special in-
terrogatory, the jury found that only 43% of this parcel of land af-
forded the defendant a source of influence over the enterprise.
Upon a motion by the government, the district court ignored the
jury's factual finding and ordered forfeiture of the entire piece of
property. 350 The Second Circuit reversed this decision. The court
stated, "we are persuaded that the statutory language 'any... prop-
erty ... affording a source of influence over' a criminal enterprise,
21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1982), means, at least in the context of realty
344 United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1459 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1189 (1985).
345 United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 409 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
943 (1982).
346 United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 145 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
347 Id. at 144.
348 Id. at 145.
349 See, e.g., United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aft'd, 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986).
350 822 F.2d at 312.
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subject to forfeiture, that specific portion of a defendant's property
affording a source of influence over the enterprise. In other words,
'to forfeit property a connection must be shown with that which
offends.' "351
The court in United States v. Ragonese352 also considered the taint
issue in connection with "sources of influence" forfeitures. In that
case, the government argued for forfeiture of a defendant's interest
in the Cypress Villas Apartments and R.J. Louis & Company be-
cause this property afforded the defendant a source of influence
over the association-in-fact enterprise. The court made factual find-
ings353 that the defendant had attempted to prohibit drug dealing at
the apartments. It also found that airplanes purchased by R.J. Louis
& Company for legitimate business purposes had been used for
drug trafficking. Based on these findings of facts, the court con-
cluded that Cypress Villas Apartments had not furnished the de-
fendant a source of influence over the enterprise.3 54 Moreover, the
court held that the use of a corporate airplane in drug smuggling
did not "justify forfeiture of [defendant] Ragonese's entire interest
in R.J. Louis Company as it [was] clear that most of his interest in
that entity was not used to further the activities of the enter-
prise." 355 Thus, only the airplane "or its proceeds" 356 were for-
feited. In reaching this decision, the Ragonese court relied on a
subsection 1963 (a) (1) "taint" case, United States v. Zang.
357
D. INTERESTS ACQUIRED AND PROCEEDS-SUBSECTIONS 1963(A)(1)
AND 1963(A)(3)
As detailed in the legislative history discussion, 358 Congress en-
acted subsection 1963(a)(3) in 1984 to override case law interpret-
ing the "acquired or maintained" language of subsection 1963(a)(1)
to preclude forfeiture of "proceeds" of racketeering activity. Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court held that subsection 1963(a)(1) did en-
compass forfeiture of such "proceeds." 359 Thus, subsections
351 Id, 822 F.2d at 315 (quoting United States v. About 151.682 Acres of Land, 99
F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1938)). Subsection 848(a)(2) uses the same language as subsec-
tion 1963(a)(2)(D).
352 607 F. Supp. 649 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd mem., 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986).
353 The parties waived jury consideration of the forfeiture issues. Id. at 650.
354 Id. at 652.
355 Id.
356 See discussion of "tracing" and the substitute asset provisions infra text accompa-
nying notes 361-69.
357 See discussion of taint findings relative to subsection 1963(a)(1) supra text accom-
panying notes 288-315.
358 See supra notes 227-54 and accompanying text.
359 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
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1963(a)(1) and 1963(a)(3) are redundant. Nevertheless, both sub-
sections should be cited in forfeiture pleadings because of the exist-
ence of pre-Russello case law which engrafted "in an enterprise"
limitations on subsection 1963(a)(1) forfeitures.3
60
1. Tracing and Joint and Several Liability
Two issues have arisen regarding "proceeds" forfeitures. The
first involved whether fungible forfeitable proceeds, such as money,
had to be traced or whether the forfeiture order would be in the
nature of a general money judgment against the defendant. Early
case law in the Seventh Circuit held that if, for instance, the defend-
ant had spent forfeitable money at the time the forfeiture verdict
was rendered, nothing remained in the defendant's possession
which could be forfeited. 36' The Eleventh Circuit broke with this
reasoning in its 1985 opinion in United States v. Conner.a62 In Conner,
the defendants were convicted of receiving kickbacks in connection
with a series of real estate transactions. The jury found the defend-
ants guilty of racketeering and ordered the kickback money forfeited
pursuant to subsection 1963(a)(1). The Eleventh Circuit rejected
the defendants' argument that the government must trace the kick-
back money and forfeit only such portion of the money as was in the
defendants' custody or control at the time of conviction. The court
stated:
Since the forfeiture is in personam, it follows the defendant as a part of
the penalty and thus it does not require that the government trace it,
even though the forfeiture is not due until after conviction. Money is a
fungible item. It matters not that the government received the identi-
cal money which the defendants received as long as the amount that was
received in violation of the racketeering statute is known.3 63
Subsequently, other courts followed the Conner court's reason-
ing, including the Seventh Circuit which reversed its earlier opin-
ions. 364 In reversing its prior decisions, the Seventh Circuit relied
360 See supra text accompanying notes 89-102.
361 United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled, 773 F.2d 802
(7th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. McManigal,
708 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 464 U.S. 979 (1985).
362 752 F.2d 566 (11th Cir. 1985).
363 Id. at 576 (emphasis in original).
364 United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 711
(1988); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3265 (1987); United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930
(1986); United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. Navarro Ordas, 770 F.2d 959 (1 1th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Benevento, 663 F. Supp. 1115
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on the "relation back doctrine."36 5 That doctrine, codified in 1984
in subsection 1963(c), provides that "[a]ll right, title, and interest in
[forfeitable] property... vests in the United States upon the com-
mission of the act giving rise to forfeiture."3 66 Thus, according to
the Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Ginsburg:367
while the government's interest in the profits or proceeds of racketeer-
ing activity does not attach until conviction, its interest vests at the time
of the act that constitutes the section 1962 violation and cannot subse-
quently be defeated, as far as section 1963(a)(1) is concerned, if the
defendant dissipates or transfers away the proceeds subject to
forfeiture. 368
The substitute assets provision enacted in 1986 rendered the trac-
ing issue moot by specifically providing that other assets could be
forfeited in place of forfeitable property dissipated, transferred or
concealed by the defendant. 36 9
A sub-category of the tracing issue also arose. It involved joint
and several liability of co-defendants for forfeitable assets. The dis-
trict court in United States v. Benevento 370 has best explained the joint
and several liability theory in the criminal context. In Benevento, one
defendant collected money from the sale of heroin and then paid it
to co-conspirators working in the enterprise. The defendant argued
that only his proportional share of the profit from the sale of the
heroin was forfeitable from him. The court rejected this theory:
The phrase "any property constituting.., any proceeds obtained, di-
rectly or indirectly, as the result of [such narcotics law violation]"
under its clear meaning is not limited to property acquired solely or
wholly by the defendant but encompasses property derived by the de-
fendant indirectly from those who acted in concert with him in further-
ing the criminal enterprise and produced the property derived from
the violation. Once it is established that the defendant received the
proceeds sought to be forfeited it matters not whether his actions pro-
duced the entire property or a portion thereof.... Any person claim-
ing a legitimate interest in the illicit proceeds is free to assert his claim.
But the sweep of the statute is broad enough to impose joint and sev-
eral liability upon those who engaged in and furthered the criminal
enterprise that produced the funds subject to forfeiture.
371
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 836 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Romano, 523 F.
Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
365 United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d at 803.
366 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1988).
367 773 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
368 Id. at 801 (emphasis in original).
369 18 U.S.C. § 1963(n) (1988).
370 663 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aft'd, 836 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1988).
371 Id. at 1118. This is certainly no more egregious a holding than the Pinkerton rule
which makes a defendant liable for substantive crimes committed by his co-conspirators.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
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The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United
States v. Caporale.372 In Caporale, kickbacks were paid to union offi-
cials in exchange for the award of insurance contracts for union
members. The kickbacks were funnelled to eight defendants
through various companies. The government sought forfeiture of
kickback money in reliance, in part, on a joint and several liability
theory because it could not prove how the kickback money had been
allocated between four of the defendants. The court upheld use of
joint and several liability in this context, noting:
[if] the government were required to determine the precise allocation
of racketeering proceeds between two offenders before the court
could impose forfeiture, the effectiveness of the remedy would be im-
paired substantially .... There is no question that the monies paid to
the conduit corporations are forfeitable proceeds: joint and several
liabilty in this context is simply a collection device. 373
Therefore, at least to the extent that tracing of forfeitable prop-
erty between defendants is impossible, forfeiture of the total
amount of money or property can be sought from each defendant.
The next issues courts will have to face regarding joint and several
liability are likely to be how many times a sum of money can be for-
feited and who will pay the judgment. For example, in Benevento,
defendant Benevento was ordered to forfeit $1,238,000, of which
the government's evidence at trial established at least $738,000 was
paid by Benevento to co-conspirators Scapula and Altieri.3 74 If the
government brought a subsequent indictment against Scapula and
Altieri, $738,000 would constitute narcotics proceeds which defend-
ant Scapula and Altieri should forfeit. If the United States had col-
lected the full sum of $1,238,000 from Benevento at the time
Scapula and Altieri were convicted, would the government be enti-
tled to a forfeiture verdict and collection of the $738,000 essentially
a second time from Scapula and Altieri? If so, and assuming further
that no proof was available as to the allocation of the $738,000 be-
tween Scapula and Altieri, could the govenrment collect the full
amount from Scapula if Altieri was judgment proof?
In the civil context, the Eleventh Circuit has answered the first
of these questions affirmatively. In the United States v. Four Million,
372 806 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct 3265 (1987).
373 Id. at 1508. The Caporale court also held that forfeiture was warranted after convic-
tion of only a racketeering conspiracy violation. Id. at 1509. It also upheld forfeiture of
money funnelled to a defendant's son-in-law because the evidence established that this
money was really disguised payments to the defendant. Id. at 1506.
374 Benevento, 663 F. Supp. at 1117 ($300,000 and $438,000 advanced payments to co-
conspirators Scapula and Atieri).
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Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars,375 a hypothetical situation
was presented to which the court responded as follows:
A drug dealer has a drug-generated $100 bill. He asks a cohort to
exchange the $100 bill for five $20 bills. According to the govern-
ment's argument, both the $100 bill in the cohort's hands and the five
$20 bills in the dealer's hands are "proceeds" subject to forfeiture.
Although only $100 was drug-generated, $200 are now forfeitable. If
the cohort goes to a second cohort and changes the $100 bill for ten
$10 bills, $300 is now forfeitable-the five $20 bills in the dealer's
hands, the ten $10 bills in the first cohort's hands, and the $100 bill in
the second cohort's hands.
We perceive no problem with the hypothetical .... In our view,
those who knowingly do business with drug dealers do so at their own
risk. [The defendant's] proposed interpretation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a) (6) would completely insulate money-launderers, and others
who knowingly do business with drug dealers, from possible forfeiture
of their ill-gotten gains. We reject such an unduly restrictive interpre-
tation of the statute, and hold that the forfeited money here consti-
tuted the "proceeds" of narcotics transactions.
3 76
Questions ofjoint and several liability are not foreign to white-
collar crime scenarios. The issue of who will pay and in what
amount could arise in a public corruption case in which the evidence
might show that a businessman paid a lawyer known to have connec-
tions to the local "old boy" network $5,000 to "fix" a case, from
which money the lawyer paid a $3,000 bribe to ajudge. In separate
trials of the lawyer and the judge, the $5,000 could be forfeited from
the lawyer if the evidence established he was hired because of his
reputation for the ability to "fix" cases and thus gained his fee indi-
rectly from his illegal activity. The $3,000 could be forfeited from
the judge because it constitutes proceeds of racketeering activity.
Yet, in doing so, the government would have forfeited the same
$3,000 twice.
This example as well as the Benevento facts also provide a basis
for consideration of the second issue in the "proceeds" context:
whether a defendant should forfeit his gross proceeds from illegal
activity or whether he may first deduct his costs of doing business
and thus forfeit only his "profit."
2. Costs of Doing Business
When the "proceeds" language of subsection 1963(a)(3) was
drafted, Congress specifically considered the "profits" versus "pro-
ceeds" issue. The ABA Criminal Justice Section argued that white-
375 762 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
376 Id. at 905.
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collar crime should be treated differently from "real" crime, sug-
gesting that only "profits" rather than "proceeds" be forfeited in
the case of "those crimes in which the defendant renders a socially
acceptable service, at a cost to himself, but there is criminality in-
volved." 3 77 Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Nathan,
however, asserted that "there is no reason under the existing statute
to draw distinction between legal and illegal enterprises.
' 3 78
Congress ultimately chose the term "proceeds" rather than
"profits" to alleviate the unreasonable burden on the government
of proving net profits. 3 79 This choice was premised upon a narcotics
case, United States v. Jeffers,380 in which the court noted the" 'extreme
difficulty in this conspiratorial criminal area of finding hard evidence
of net profits.' "381 Nevertheless, defendants continue to argue that
their "costs of doing business" should be deducted from forfeitable
proceeds, provided the defendant can prove what those costs were.
The only case to date to directly address the costs issue is United
States v. Lizza Industries, Inc. 38 2 In Lizza Industries, the defendants were
found guilty of RICO charges arising out of their participation in a
bid-rigging conspiracy. The parties stipulated to defendants' gross
profits as a result of their criminal acts. The trial court went a step
further, however, and held that "the defendants could deduct direct
costs incurred on each project for which they had been indicted, but
could not deduct general overhead and business expenses that
otherwise would have been incurred in the operation of their busi-
ness." 38 3 On appeal, the defendants argued that overhead expenses
and taxes should also have been deducted from the forfeitable
amount. 3 84 The United States did not appeal the direct costs
deduction.
The Second Circuit noted that the deduction of direct costs in-
curred in performing the illegally-acquired contracts was "consis-
tent with the purposes of the RICO statute." 3835 It rejected any
further deductions, however:
Concededly, this method of calculation leaves open a possibilty that
377 Comprehensive Crime Control Hearings, supra note 224, at 806.
378 Forfeiture in Drug Cases Hearings, supra note 130 at 226-27 (statement of Deputy As-
sist. Atty. Gen. Nathan).
379 S. Rep. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 n.24 (1983).
380 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 432 U.S.
137 (1977).
381 Id. at 1117 (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d at 1117).
382 775 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986).
383 Id. at 495.




defendants will be forfeiting profits that they would have made outside
of their criminal activities. This should not cause us to scuttle the
method of computing forfeiture. Forfeiture under RICO is a punitive,
not a restitutive, measure. Often proof of overhead expenses and the
like is subject to bookkeeping conjecture and is therefore speculative.
RICO does not require the prosecution to prove or the trial court to
resolve complex computations, so as to ensure that a convicted racket-
eer is not deprived of a single farthing more than his criminal acts
produced. RICO's object is to prevent the practice of racketeering,
not to make the punishment so slight that the economic risk of being
caught is worth the potential gain. Using net profits as the measure for
forfeiture could tip such business decisions in favor of illegal
conduct.
3 8 6
One must question whether the Lizza Industries court would have
so generously awarded the direct cost deduction if faced with the
factual situation presented in Benevento. In the white collar world of
the Lizza Industries case, presumably direct costs involved purchase
or excavation of materials to build the roads pursuant to the ille-
gally-acquired contracts, hourly wages for employees, and equip-
ment rental fees. But in Benevento, the narcotics business also had
inventory costs for purchases of heroin, salaries for heroin distribu-
tors, and transportation expenses for delivery of the product being
sold. Either the court should have permitted the defendant in Bene-
vento to prove up and deduct these direct costs or the court in Lizza
Industries should have required the defendant to absorb the costs of
fulfilling its illegally-acquired contracts. 38 7 While the thought of
giving a drug dealer credit for money used to buy drugs is repug-
nant, it is no less a cost of doing business than the costs involved in
Lizza Industries.
Even in the white collar arena, deduction of direct costs will not
always be palatable. Consider the hypothetical posed above involv-
ing a lawyer who pays a bribe to ajudge to "fix" a case for his client.
If the lawyer is convicted of racketeering based on a series of predi-
cate acts involving bribery, can he be allowed to deduct the bribe
amount from his forfeitable fees because it was a "direct cost" of
performing the service for his client? Surely not. Case law in other
contexts has historically held that "[a] convicted briber forfeits any
386 Id. at 498-99.
387 In a hearing on the 1984 amendments to § 1963, former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Irvin B. Nathan noted: "we are headed for considerable confusion and potential
disrespect for the law if we skew the criminal justice system fora certain kind of offense
and not for other equally serious types of offenses which may have even more devastat-
ing long-term effects on our society." Forfeiture in Drug Cases Heating, supra note 130, at
226-27. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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right he had to bribe money." 388 Yet the Lizza Industries holding
would appear to permit the court to give the lawyer credit for
money expended in the performance of his illegal activites. Placing
the defendant at risk of losing all he has acquired through illegal
acts, irrespective of whether part of the gross profit is spent on wine,
women and song,38 9 illegal drugs, bribe payments, or "legitimate"
business expenses, is more in line with the use of the word "pro-
ceeds" in the statute, the legislative history and the punitive pur-
poses of the forfeiture statute than is the solution reached in Lizza
Industries.
III. PROCEDURES
Following enactment of the RICO Act, the Supreme Court
promulgated procedural rules to be used in the implementation of
the Act's forfeiture provisions. 390 These Rules are 7(c)(2), 31(e)
and 32(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, dealing
with notice, special verdicts and execution of forfeiture orders re-
spectively. Other procedures for restraining orders and protection
of the rights of third parties were incorporated into the Act itself3 9 1
Following is a discussion of each of these procedural devices.
A. NOTICE
Rule 7(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as ini-
tially promulgated in 1972 provided: "Criminal Fofeiture. When an
offense charged may result in a criminal forfeiture, the indictment or
the information shall allege the extent of the interest or property
subject to forfeiture.- 39 2 This rule, along with the changes to Rules
31 and 32, were based upon the common law requirement that a
defendant be given "notice, trial, and a special jury finding on the
factual issues surrounding the declaration of forfeiture which fol-
lowed his criminal conviction." 3 9
3
Because of the mandatory wording of Rule 7(c)(2), however,
the Ninth Circuit in 1975 granted a motion to dismiss an indictment
merely because it did not allege that forfeiture would be sought as
388 United States v. Iovenelli, 403 F.2d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1968); accord Clark v. United
States, 102 U.S. 322 (1880); United States v. Thomas, 75 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1935).
389 See United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986).
390 406 U.S. 979-1000.
391 18 U.S.C. 1963(e), (1) (1988).
392 56 F.R.D. 143 (1972).
393 FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) advisory committe note.
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part of the criminal proceeding. In United States v. Hall,394 the de-
fendant was charged with smuggling merchandise in violation of
custom laws. 395 The criminal charge was a violation of 18 U.S.C.
section 545 which provided that upon conviction the smuggled mer-
chandise would be forfeited to the United States.3 96 However, no
reference to forfeiture was made in the indictment. The district
court held that failure to give notice of forfeiture would not "vitiate
the indictment if the court ruled, in advance, that the Government
would be prohibited from invoking the criminal forfeiture penalty of
18 U.S.C. § 545 in the event that Hall was convicted." 397 The Ninth
Circuit, although agreeing in principle with the district court's deci-
sion, held that the indictment "deprived Hall of the mandatory no-
tice to which he was entitled under Rule 7(c) (2) and the concomitant
opportunity to defend against a forfeiture. ' 398 Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit ordered that the indictment should be dismissed.
The Supreme Court amended Rule 7(c)(2) in 1979 in response
to the Hall decision.399 The rule now forbids a court from ordering
forfeiture if notice is not contained in the indictment, but it does not
make notice an essential element of the charge. Rule 7(c)(2) now
reads as follows: "Criminal Forfeiture. Nojudgment of forfeiture may
be entered in a criminal proceeding unless the indictment or the
information shall allege the extent of the interest or property sub-
ject to forfeiture." 40
0
The next issue which arose regarding Rule 7(c)(2) was the spec-
ificity with which the government must "allege the extent of the in-
terest or property subject to forfeiture." The majority of courts
considering the issue to date have held, consistent with the liberal
pleading requirements of Rule 7 in general, that broad allegations
which track the language of section 1963 are sufficient.401 If such a
394 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975).
395 Id. at 407.
396 Id.
397 Id.
398 Id. at 408.
399 FED. R. CRIM P. 7(c)(2) advisory committe note.
400 Id.
401 United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Amend,
791 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986); United States v. Raimondo,
721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984); United States v. Chagra,
669 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1984); United States v. Grammatikos,
633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Collins, No. 84-20715 (E.D. Mich., Feb.
27, 1987); United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd mem., 819
F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 145 (N.D. Ga.
1979); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 n.17 (D. Del. 1976). Cf.
United States v. Ianniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(failure to use statutory
language held to be insufficient notice; allegation sought forfeiture of "any interest ob-
1989] 263
KARLA R. SPAULDING
general pleading is used, however, most courts will require the gov-
ernment, prior to trial, to identify the specific assets subject to for-
feiture in a bill of particulars. 40 2 A bill of particulars in which the
government delineates its theory of forfeiture proof-for example
"acquired or maintained" versus "source of influence"-would not
be appropriate, however. It has long been accepted that a bill of
particulars should not be used to provide legal theories40 3 nor
should it ordinarily be granted if it would unduly restrict the gov-
ernment in presenting its proof. Forcing the government to state its
theory of proof would unduly hinder its case in light of the decision
in United States v. Veliotis which expressly permitted the government
to change its theory of proof regarding post-indictment
forfeiture. 4
04
There are practical concerns which favor a specific listing of for-
feitable property in the indictment. As discussed hereafter, 40 5 to the
extent that the government presents the grand jury with informa-
tion regarding forfeitability of specifically enumerated assets and, as
part of its deliberations the grand jury finds probable cause to be-
lieve such assets are forfeitable, no separate hearing is required
before a court can issue a pretrial restraining order as to the listed
assets.40 6 Furthermore, a defendant may be precluded from pay-
ment of his attorney's fees from assets specifically identified as for-
feitable in an indictment. 40 7 Even if specific assets are listed,
however, that listing should be premised by the general language of
section 1963 with the specific assets identified at the time of indict-
ment as part of an "including, but not limited to" qualification. 40 8
tained in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1963"), aff'd, 808 F.2d 184
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct 3229 (1987).
402 United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 837
(1984); United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Rogers, 617 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Colo. 1985); cf. United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120
(4th Cir. 1986)(open discovery provides sufficient specificity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930
(1986); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983)(requires sufficient notice
to prepare defense but does not discuss if bill of particulars would be sufficient in this
regard), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1985). But see United States v. Navarro Ordas, 770
F.2d 959 (11 th Cir. 1985)(need not allege what assets will be forfeited if proceeds can-
not be traced to specifically identified asset), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
403 United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
404 586 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
405 See infra notes 520-21 and accompanying text.
406 See infra text accompanying note 519.
407 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (June 22, 1989);
United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (June 22, 1989).
408 E.g., United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (D. Utah 1987), rev'd on
other grounds and remanded, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988). The author proposes the
following forfeiture allegations:
Through the pattern of racketeering activity described in Count ( ) of this Indict-
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In this manner, specific assets identified after indictment should be
forfeitable so long as a supplemental notice of intent to forfeit these
assets is given in a bill of particulars.
B. JURY TRIAL AND BIFURCATION
The advisory notes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
7(c) (2) indicated that at common law factual issues regarding forfei-
ture were decided by ajury.40 9 Likewise, ajury trial is contemplated
by the special verdict requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence
31(e).410 The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Garrett411 has fur-
ther held that ajury trial on the issue of forfeiture is constitutionally
required. The defendant can, of course, waive the right to a jury
trial. 412 The Garrett court required, however, that the defendant
write and sign such a waiver and that it be made a part of the record
of the case. 4
13
Frequently, courts have used a bifurcated proceeding, allowing
the jury to first decide the question of guilt followed, if appropriate,
by a hearing on the issues of forfeiture. 4 14 "Such a bifurcated trial-
ment, which allegations are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference as if set
forth herein, the defendant did acquire, maintain, possess and control certain inter-
ests in property, as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1963(b), and
proceeds, namely:
1. Interests acquired and maintained in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1962;
2. Interests in, securities of and claims against the enterprise, as set forth in Count
( ) herein, which enterprise the defendant established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted and participated in the conduct of in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1962;
3. Property and contractual rights of any kind affording the defendant a source of
influence over the enterprise, as set forth in Count ( ) herein, which enterprise the
defendant established, operated, controlled, conducted and participated in the con-
duct of in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962;
4. Property constituting and derived from any proceeds which the defendant ob-
tained directly or indirectly from the aforementioned racketeering activity in viola-
tion of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962;
The property subject to forfeiture as described above includes, but is not limited to
the following:
All of which property is subject to forfeiture to the United States pursuant to Title
18, United States Code, Section 1963.
409 FED. R. CRIM P. 7(c)(2) advisory committe note.
410 FED. R. CRIM P. 31(e).
411 727 F.2d 1003, 1012 (1lth Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
412 Id.; United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1343 (11 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 928 (1983); United States v. Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649, 650 (S.D. Fla 1985), aff'd
mem., 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986).
413 Garrett, 727 F.2d at 1012.
414 E.g., United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 910 (1 1th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 569 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); United States
v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 289 (W.D. Mich. 1987); United States v. Draine, 637 F.
Supp. 482, 486 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
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using, of course, only one jury-is not only convenient for the judge
and fairer to the defendant. It also prevents the potential penalty of
forfeiture from influencing the jurors' deliberations about guilt or
innocence." 415 No court has held that such bifurcation is constitu-
tionally required, however. Rather, the District of Columbia Circuit,
in United States v. Perholtz specifically held that the Constitution does
not require bifurcated proceeding in RICO forfeiture cases. 4 16 The
Perholtz4 17 approach has the advantage of notifying thejury that they
must decide additional issues along with the guilt of the defendant.
Without notification, jurors will undoubtedly be dismayed to learn
after completing a lengthy trial and deliberations that they are still
faced with more issues to resolve. Further, a unitary proceeding al-
lows "presentation of other related evidence on guilt and punish-
ment at the same time, [ensuring that] protracted proceedings
would not become lengthier, thereby serving the salutary purpose
of promoting the efficient use of judicial resources.
' 41 8
C. SPECIAL VERDICTS
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e) provides: "If the in-
dictment or the information alleges that an interest or property is
subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be returned as
to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if
any."'4 19 In accordance with this rule, courts should requirejuries to
render factual decisions regarding the extent of the defendant's in-
terest in property described in section 1963. Because forfeiture is
mandatory, however, discretion should not be left with the jury to
determine which of the defendant's interests in property described
in section 1963 should actually be forfeited.
420
In United States v. Kravitz, the court presented special interroga-
tories to thejury which required the jury to determine both whether
415 United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984); accord United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1987)(invoking su-
pervisory powers to require bifurcation.).
416 United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A defendant may
waive a bifurcated proceeding by failure to object to non-bifurcation. E.g., United States
v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
417 Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 367.
418 Id. at 368. The burden of proof standard in the forfeiture portion of RICO trials
appears to be reasonable doubt. United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1518, 1521 (E.D.
Va. 1987).
419 FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 1(e).
420 See, e.g. United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 812-14 (5th Cir.)("[T]hejury met
the requirements of rule 31 (e) by determining the extent of L'Hoste's interest or prop-
erty subject to forfeiture, and all that remained for the district court was to order forfei-
ture under section 1963"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
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the defendant held an interest in property as described in section
1963, in this case a company known as American Health Programs,
Inc. ("AHP"), and if so, whether that property should be for-
feited.42' Thejury found that "Kravitz had used his ownership posi-
tion in AHP to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity."
422
Despite this factual finding, the jury found that the defendant
should not forfeit the interest in AHP.4 23 The district court "re-
fused to follow the jury's recommendation and ordered forfeiture of
Kravitz's stock and position in AHP."'424 The Third Circuit affirmed
this ruling.
425
The appellate court concluded "as have all other courts to de-
cide the question, that forfeiture is mandatory. '4 26 Because the jury
made the factual finding "that Kravitz's interest in AHP, both as
stockholder and officeholder, were maintained in violation of the
racketeering laws,"' 4 27 the court held that "not even the district
court has the authority to refrain from ordering forfeiture. ' 4 28 The
court further rejected the defendant's arguments that his right to
jury trial somehow encompassed the right to have the jury consider
the ultimate forfeiture issue, citing United States v. Del Toro,429 a Fifth
Circuit case which held that the "function of [a] jury is to determine
facts and guilt or innocence; [the] function of [a] judge is to impose
sentence."43
0
Other courts, in accordance with Kravitz, have used the special
interrogatory procedure to determine the factual issues precedent
to entry of a forfeiture order by the court.43' These factual issues
421 738 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). The court
submitted the following questions to the jury:
(1) Did the defendant own any shares of stock in American Health Programs?
(2) Did he maintain this interest in violation of the racketeering laws?
(3) Shall such shares of stock be forfeited to the United States? .
(4) Did the defendant hold a position in American Health Programs which gave
him a source of influence over the company?
(5) Did he use the position to conduct the affairs of American Health Programs
through a pattern of racketeering activity?




424 Id. at 104.
425 Id. at 107.
426 Id. at 103. That holding is now codified in section 1963(a), which states: "The
court, in imposing sentence... shall order.. .that the person forfeit to the United States
all property described in this subsection." 18 U.S.C § 1963(a) (1988)(emphasis added).
427 Kravitz, 738 F.2d at 105 n.4.
428 Id. at 106.
429 426 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970).
430 Kravitz, 738 F.2d at 106 (citing Del Toro, 426 F.2d at 184.)
431 But see United States v. Washington, 782 F.2d 807, 822-23 (9th Cir.)(special inter-
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have included the question of which businesses were part of the
charged association-in-fact enterprise, 432 the extent or percentage
of the defendant's ownership of specified businesses and prop-
erty433 and whether defendant's interest in certain assets was ac-
quired through her criminal activity.4 34 It should be noted,
however, that some Circuit Court pattern jury instructions still indi-
cate that the jury should make the decision as to whether assets
should be forfeited.4
35
Parties can waive their rights to a special verdict in forfeiture
cases. 436 Some courts have found such a waiver where the defend-




As discussed in the legislative history section, prior to the 1984
amendments to section 1963, the majority of courts considering the
procedure for entry of a restraining order under subsection 1963(e)
required a full-blown evidentiary hearing. 43s The leading cases, Cro-
zier,
4 3 9 Long,44 0 Spilotro,44 1 and Veon, 44 2 required the government to
comply with the four-part showing for entry of a permanent injunc-
tion set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.4 4 3 This holding
caused great consternation among prosecutors who envisioned
"mini-trials" at these hearings resulting, among other things, in pre-
rogatory presenting ultimate issue of forfeiture to jury was not challenged), vacated on
other grounds and remanded, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986).
432 United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-94 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
927 (1980).
433 United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1346 n.90 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
434 United States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120, 1128 n.8 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
930 (1986). Of course, none of these cases prohibit the jury from finding, as a factual
matter, that certain assets do not fall within section 1963. See, e.g., United States v. Wil-
liams, 809 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 228 (1987).
435 See, e.g., Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 51.3.
436 See, e.g., United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983); United States v. Hess, 691 F.2d 188, 191 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 396 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
437 See Zang, 703 F.2d at 1194-95.
438 See supra text accompanying notes 103-24. The courts approved the issuance ofex
parte restraining orders, but required a prompt notice and hearing thereafter.
439 United States v. Crozier, 674 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 468
U.S. 1206 (1984).
440 United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
441 United States v. Spilotro, 680 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
442 United States v. Veon, 549 F. Supp. 274 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
443 The four-part test is set forth in note 105 supra.
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mature disclosure of their witnesses and prosecutorial theories. 444
The 1984 amendments to section 1963 were designed to specif-
ically address the problems raised by Crozier hearings. In the Senate
report on S. 948, one of the bills which became the 1984 amend-
ment to section 1963, the Senate specifically rejected both the Rule
65 standard for issuance of restraining orders and the notion that
hearings following the issuance of restraining orders should address
the issue of whether the government is likely to prevail on the merits
of the substantive offense at trial.
44 5
Rather, the probable cause established in the indictment or in-
formation is, in itself, to be a sufficient basis for issuance of a re-
straining order. While the court may consider factors bearing on
the reasonableness of the order sought, it is not to 'look behind' the
indictment or require the government to produce additional evi-
dence regarding the merits of the case as a prerequisite to issuing a
post-indictment restraining order 446 Pre-indictment restraining or-
ders, by contrast, require a hearing to determine that " 'there is a
substantial probability that the United States will prevail on the is-
sue of forfeiture.' ,,447 The Senate report "stressed, however, that
this stringent standard applies only in this [pre-indictment] context;
it is not to be extended to restraining orders sought after
indictment."
4 48
Courts considering restraining orders after the 1984 amend-
ments to the Act basically followed two lines of analysis. Some stub-
bornly continued to insist that pretrial restraining order hearings
must be held, and that the standards to govern the hearings would
be those in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.449 Others recog-
nized from the legislative history and the statute itself that Congress
did not intend for a post-indictment, pretrial restraining order hear-
ing to be held. Of these courts, some found that this lack of a hear-
ing rendered the restraining order provisions unconstitutional. 450
Others upheld the constitutionality of the restraining order
444 See United States v. Beckham, 562 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
445 S. Rep. No. 224, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 18 (1983). This portion of the Senate report
is quoted in the text at supra note 249.
446 Id. at 25.
447 Id. (quoting U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1)(b)).
448 Id.
449 See, e.g., United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809
F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Perholtz, 622 F. Supp. 1253, 1256 (D.D.C.
1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1342 (D. Colo. 1985).
450 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 931 (4th Cir. 1987), modifieden banc
sub. nom In Re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th
Cir. 1988), aft'd, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (U.S.June 22, 1989) (No. 87-1729); United States v.




The first case to hold that Rule 65 hearings were still required
after the 1984 amendment was United States v. Rogers,452 decided in
February, 1985. The district court in Rogers engaged in a masterful,
albeit disingenuous, attempt to interpret the legislative history of
subsection 1963(e) in a fashion which would allow the holding of a
full evidentiary hearing in conjunction with the entry of post-indict-
ment restraining orders. The court began by acknowledging that
the statute provided for a less stringent showing for issuance of a
post-indictment restraining order than for a pre-indictment re-
straining order.453 Nevertheless, because the statute also gave the
court discretion in entering a restraining order, the Rogers court
concluded that some evidentiary presentation was necessary to pro-
vide a factual basis for exercising that discretion. 454
The Rogers court next acknowledged that Congress had specifi-
cally precluded a full-blown evidentiary hearing as a prerequisite to
the entry of a post-indictment restraining order.455 To circumvent
this legislative history, the Rogers court seized upon the phrase "re-
straining order or injunction" in subsection 1963(e). 45 6 The court
noted that,
"[i]n interpreting these terms, I apply the commonly understood uses
of the terms traditionally used in equity and the common law." Thus,
as in the context of federal civil suits, the statute provides for the entry
of an ex parte restraining order on the government's showing of the
probability of irreparable loss. 4 57 It is axiomatic that a restraining or-
der is a temporary precursor to an injunction. An injunction, with
longer duration, may be entered only upon good cause demonstrated
in an adversary context.... The probable cause provided by the in-
dictment is sufficient to support the entry of a restraining order on a
temporary basis. The statute, however, requires the government to
make a more detailed presentation of its claim before a judge can exer-
cise his discretion in entering an injunction.458
Contrary to the Rogers court's assertion, the legislative history
of subsection 1963(e) does not indicate that a restraining order is a
451 See, e.g., United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482, 486 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
452 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
453 Id. at 1342-43.
454 Id. at 1343. Specifically, the court stated, "to suggest that a judicial officer should
act blindly without the benefit of some evidentiary presentation is ludicrous. Such
would be a non-judicial function, clearly beyond the authority of Congress to enact." Id.
455 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1343.
456 Id.
457 It is interesting to note that the Rogers court does not state the basis upon which it
concludes that the government must show "the probability of irreparable loss."
458 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1343 (citations omitted).
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"temporary precursor to an injunction." 459 Rather, when a tempo-
rary order was contemplated, Congress expressly called it a "tempo-
rary restraining order" as in subsection 1963(e)(2). Moreover, the
Senate Report on the 1984 amendments to subsection 1963(e) re-
fers to "restraining orders to preserve the availability of forfeitable as-
sets until the conclusion of trial.' '4 6 Finally, the notion that the statute
requires the government to make a "more detailed presentation of
its claim" before a permanent restraining order or injunction can
issue is apparently drawn from the fact that entry of the order lies
within the court's discretion. Because the Rogers court determined a
hearing was necessary to exercise discretion, it read this "detailed
presentation" requirement into the statute.
46'
The Rogers court attempted to bolster its strained reading of
subsection 1963(e) by concluding that Congress intended to adopt
the holdings of Spilotro, Long and other cases in the spirit of Crozier,
because it had not "specified to the contrary. ' 4 62 This rationale
failed to deal with Congress' express criticism of the Crozier line of
cases, as noted previously. 4 63 By its definition of restraining orders
and injunctions, as well as its assumption that the Crozier-type cases
were part of the precedent for subsection 1963(e) as amended, the
court avoided having to decide the more difficult issue of whether
procedural due process required a hearing in conjunction with the
entry of a post-indictment restraining order.
After concluding that a hearing was required, the court consid-
ered what burden of proof should be applied at such hearings. It
concluded:
In the absence of explicit congressional description of the character of
post-indictment hearings, as a matter of statutory construction, the
procedure followed in an analogous context should be applied in pref-
459 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
460 S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1983). This section of legislative his-
tory, as well as other sections quoted in the text, rebut the Rogers court's assertion that
its "interpretation of the statute is consistent with legislative history." Rogers, 602 F.
Supp. at 1343.
461 Another reason for leaving the entry of a restraining order in the court's discretion
would be the situation in which there appears to be little likelihood that the forfeitable
assets would be unavailable at the time of conviction. This reading of the statute is in
keeping with the purpose of the restraining order provision which "is to preserve the
status quo, i.e., to assure the availability of the property pending disposition of the crimi-
nal case." S. REP. No. 224 at 24. Discretion also permits the court to consider questions
such as whether the restraining order is improper because the restrained assets are not
legally forfeitable, see United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), or
whether living expenses should be exempted from the order, see, e.g., United States v.
Madeoy, 652 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1987).
462 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1343.
463 See supra text accompanying notes 249 and 265.
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erence to procedures tailored to different types of problems....
Thus, to justify the entry of an injunction, following termination of a
restraining order, the government must comply with the requirements
of § 1963[(d)](1)(B).
464
The requirements of subsection 1963(d)(1)(B) are those for en-
try of a pre-indictment restraining order, namely that:
(i) [T]here is a substantial probability that the United States will pre-
vail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order will
result in the property being destroyed, removed from the jurisdiction
of the court, or otherwise made unavailable; and
(ii) [T]he need to preserve the availability of the property through
the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship on any party
against whom the order is to be entered.
46 5
Congress emphasized that this "stringent standard applie[d] only in
[the pre-indictment] context; it is not to be extended to restraining orders
after indictment."' 4 66 The Rogers court's attempt to circumvent this
clear prohibition on Rule 65 hearings for post-indictment re-
straining orders by distinguishing a restraining order from an in-
junction provides little reason to view the case favorably when
considering how to implement subsection 1963(e).
4 6 7
The next case to conclude that a Rule 65 hearing remained ap-
plicable to subsection 1963(e) as amended was United States v.
Perholtz.4 68 In Perholtz, a District of Columbia district court con-
cluded that a post-indictment restraining order pursuant to subsec-
tion 1963(e) violated the defendant's fifth amendment due process
rights unless the defendant was given the opportunity for a hearing
within ten days from entry of the order.4 69 The court did not ana-
lyze the applicability of due process concerns to subsection 1963(e).
Further, the court held, as had the Rogers court, that the standards of
subsection 1963(d)(1)(B) would be applicable at hearings concern-
ing post-indictment restraining orders.4 70 This holding was based
solely upon pre-amendment cases as well as Rogers.
47 1
A second line of cases held that the restraining order provisions
464 Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1345.
465 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(1)(B) (1988).
466 S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1983)(emphasis added).
467 Similarly, in United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1986), modified, 809
F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987), the court reached the same conclusion as the Rogers court did,
following the Rogers rationale. For the reasons outlined above, the Thier decision is
unpersuasive.
468 622 F. Supp. 1253 (D.D.C. 1986). United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985), while decided in 1985 was submitted to the court
of appeals before the effective date of the 1984 amendments to subsection 1963(e).





absent a hearing were unconstitutional. The first of these decisions
came in Crozier, the same case which had led the challenge against
the restraining order provisions prior to the 1984 amendments. 472
The original decision in Crozier, holding that a Rule 65 heating was
required, was vacated by the Supreme Court.473 The Supreme
Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of United States
v. $8,850.4
74
United States v. $8,850 involved the issue of "whether the Gov-
ernment's 18-month delay in filing a civil proceeding for forfeiture
of the currency [seized by law enforcement authorities violates] the
claimant's right to due process of law."' 475 The Court held that no
due process violation occurred based on a Barker v. Wingo476 speedy
trial analysis. 477 Noting that procedural due process requires the
"right to a hearing 'at a meaningful time,' " the Supreme Court
stated in United States v. $8,850 that "there is no obvious bright line
dictating when a post-seizure hearing must occur." 478 The Court
analogized the right to a post-seizure hearing to a defendant who,
when released on bail has "his liberty ... subject to the conditions
required by his bail agreement. '479
[T]he Fifth Amendment claim here-which challenges only the length
of time between the seizure and the initiation of the forfeiture trial-
mirrors the concern of undue delay encompassed in the right to a
speedy trial .... The flexible approach of Barker, which "necessarily
compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis,". . . is
thus an appropriate inquiry for determining whether the flexible re-
quirements of due process have been met.480
The Barker v. Wingo test requires a balancing of four factors: 1)
the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) whether a
request for a hearing is made; and 4) whether the defendant has
been prejudiced by the delay.48' In $8,850, the Supreme Court
found the 18-month delay between seizure of the money and filing
472 United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985).
473 United States v. Crozier, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984).
474 461 U.S. 555 (1983).
475 Id. at 556.
476 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
477 $8,850, 461 U.S. at 564.
478 Id. at 562.
479 Id. at 564.
480 Id. at 564-65 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). Further, the Court noted:
[t]he deprivation in Barker-loss of liberty-may well be more grevious than the
deprivation of one's use of property at issue here. Thus, the balance of the inter-
ests, which depends so heavily on the context of the particular situation, may differ
from a situation involving the right to a speedy trial.
Id. at 565 n.14.
481 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
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of the civil forfeiture action "quite significant. ' 482 The reason for
the delay was that the government needed time to investigate fol-
lowing seizure in combination with the fact that a criminal action
seeking forfeiture was pending.48 3 The Court concluded that "the
Government's diligent pursuit of pending administrative and crimi-
nal proceedings indicates strongly that the reasons for its delay in
filing a civil forfeiture procedure were substantial. ' 48 4 The claimant
in $8,850 had not taken steps to get an early judicial hearing nor
had she "shown that the delay affected her ability to defend against
the impropriety of the forfeiture on the merits." 48 5 Based upon
these four factors, the Court held that the 18-month delay in United
States v. $8,850 was reasonable. 48 6
On remand, the Crozier court first acknowledged that no post-
indictment, pretrial restraining order hearing was contemplated af-
ter the 1984 amendment to the restraining order provision of the
CCE statute.48 7 It then referenced a balancing test different than
that used in United States v. $8,850. The Crozier court referred to
balancing "the risk of an erroneous deprivation, the state's interest
in providing specific procedures and the strength of the individual's
interest. '488 Yet, the Crozier court did not use this balancing test
either. Instead, it concluded that the statute was unconstitutional
on its face:
The statutory forfeiture provisions do not satisfy due process. We be-
lieve that the absence of any hearing on the imposition of a restraining
order on a defendant's property, or a hearing for parties with a third
party interest which takes place months or years after a restraining or-
der is issued, cannot be construed as a hearing provided "at a mean-
ingful time." 48 9
To read the statute as constitutional, the Crozier court once again
held that "Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
the restraining order and that the district court erred in denying
without a hearing the motions . . . to dissolve the restraining
order. "490
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit approached the balancing test
analysis for due process in post-indictment restraining orders.
482 $8,850, 461 U.S. at 565.
483 Id. at 561-62.
484 Id. at 568.
485 Id. at 569.
486 Id.
487 United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1985).
488 Id. at 1383.
489 Id. at 1383-84 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
490 Id. at 1384.
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United States v. Harvey491 was a consolidated appeal of three cases,
United States v. Bassett,492  United States v. Caplin & Drysdale
(Reckmeyer) 493 and United States v. Harvey.494 In each of these cases,
the issue of forfeitability of attorney's fees was raised. Only the Har-
vey case, however, involved a post-indictment restraining order.
The Harvey appellate court began by recognizing that "[a]fter indict-
ment... restraining orders may be issued on the basis alone of the
indictment's allegation that the property described would be subject
to forfeiture upon conviction; no special judicial hearing either
before or after entry of the order is required." 495 However, Harvey
completely ignored the Supreme Court's reference to United States v.
$8,850 in its remand of the Crozier case. Instead of doing any kind of
balancing, the Harvey court, like the Crozier decision after the re-
mand, held that "neither the indictment itself nor a criminal trial
held, as here, three months after issuance of an ex parte restraining
order affords the procedural due process guaranteed by the fifth
amendment." 4
96
Finally, two recent cases have found no violation of procedural
due process despite the lack of a pretrial hearing.497 In United States
491 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), modified sub. nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Cap-
lin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988)(en banc), aft'd, 57 U.S.L.W.
4836 (U.S. June 22, 1989) (No. 87-1729).
492 632 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986).
493 631 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814
F.2e1 905 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd en banc sub nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (U.S.June 22,
1989) (No. 87-1729).
494 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 912.
495 Id. at 910.
496 Id. at 928. In 1988, the Seventh Circuit held that, at least where assets to pay
attorney's fees are being restrained, due process requires a post-indictment, pretrial
hearing concerning the issuance of a restraining order. United States v. Moya-Gomez,
860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988).
497 A third case recently held that the only thing required by due process is that the
government "articulate a cogent thesis or theory of its entitlement, thereby affording
defendants sufficient notice of the government's claim to enable them to prepare a de-
fense." United States v. Regan, 699 F. Supp. 36, 38 (.S.D.N.Y. 1988). Despite this state-
ment, however, the court also suggested that if a post restraining order, pretrial hearing
were to be held it would be "the defendants' burden at such hearing to establish the
insufficiency of the indictment and of the government's theory as a matter of law and/or
fact." Id. To be consistent with the language and legislative history of subsection
1963(e), this statement by the Regan court should be read to contemplate only a hearing,
on whether the property restrained is the property subject to forfeiture named in the
indictment, not a hearing on the validity of the indictment. The hearing might also
contemplate the question of whether, assuming the facts as alleged are true, forfeiture
would be legally appropriate under the subsection of 1963 set forth in the indictment.
See, e.g., United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828
(1983); supra text accompanying note 405. But see discussion in the text at supra text
accompanying notes 401 through 404.
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v. Draine,498 the State of Alabama seized $11,400 pursuant to a
search warrant. The United States contended that these funds were
forfeitable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 853 which provides for for-
feiture of narcotics proceeds. 499 Before the United States pro-
ceeded on its claim, it allowed the State of Alabama to proceed with
its civil forfeiture action. After Alabama abandoned its action, the
United States obtained an indictment of Draine followed by the issu-
ance of a protective order authorizing the United States Marshal to
take custody of the funds. 500
The Draine court applied the Barker v. Wingo balancing test to
the due process issue. It first excluded from the period of delay the
time the money was held by local authorities. 50 ' Second, it excluded
delay following the transfer of the money to the United States which
the defendant had occasioned himself, "in that on motions of the
defendant, his criminal trial was first continued from its January 13,
1986 setting and then again continued from its March 10, 1986 set-
ting. Consequently, defendant's criminal trial shall now proceed...
[a] little more than five months following the defendant's federal
indictment .. "502
Regarding the reasons for the remaining period of delay, the
court noted:
The criminal forfeiture provisions were intended to provide prosecu-
tors the option to consolidate the forfeiture action with the criminal
prosecution and thereby avoid being forced to prove the merits of the
underlying criminal case in a separate civil proceeding against the de-
fendant's property well in advance of trial in order to obtain an order
restraining the defendant's transfer of property alleged to be forfeita-
ble in the indictment.
503
The Draine court did not discuss the prejudice, if any, arising from
the restraint. Nonetheless, the court held that requiring the defend-
ant to wait until trial to challenge the restraining order did not vio-
late due process.
50 4
In United States v. Musson,50 5 a post-indictment restraining order
was issued. A pretrial hearing was held at which the defendant chal-
lenged the order's impact on third parties, challenged the failure of
the indictment to describe the nexus between the illegal acts and the
498 637 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
499 Id. at 483.
500 Id. at 484-85.
501 Id. at 484.
502 Id. at 485.
503 Id. at 486.
504 Id.
505 802 F.2d 384, 385 (10th Cir. 1986).
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property in question, and claimed exemptions for certain prop-
erty.50 6 On appeal, the defendants argued that they should also
have been given "an evidentiary hearing ... at which the govern-
ment should be required to demonstrate through factual submis-
sions a reasonable probability that forfeiture will be ultimately
obtained, and that such a restraining order can only be issued after
meeting the requirements of Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." 5
07
The Musson court held that the statute and legislative history
clearly provided that the grand jury's finding of sufficient probable
cause to include forfeiture language in an indictment is all that is
required to support issuance of a restraining order.508
The statute expressly requires that the indictment returned by the
grand jury include an express allegation that the specified property
would be subject to forfeiture in the event of a criminal conviction.
This was done in this instance in the statutory language with little
more .... [I]t must be assumed that there was submitted to the grand
jury evidence to support the determination. 50 9
As to whether procedural due process was violated, the court noted
that the restraining order would merely be "a restraint upon its free
alienation which it must be conceded is far less intrusive than a
physical seizure of the subject property." 510 Based upon this fact
along with the grand jury's finding of probable cause to forfeit the
property in question, the Musson court held that the defendant had
been afforded due process.5 11 Once again, the court did not apply
the Barker v. Wingo balancing test.
Despite the protestations of the Rogers512 court, the issue to be
faced in future cases is not whether the statute requires a pretrial
restraining order hearing-it does not. The issue is whether the
Constitution requires such a hearing when subsection 1963(e) is ap-
plied in any given factual situation. The Supreme Court has pointed
to the Barker v. Wingo test to resolve the issue. 513 The length of de-
lay between issuance of the order and commencement of trial, a nec-
essary determination under factor one of the Barker v. Wingo test,
will be difficult to compute at the time the restraining order is
granted. However, a defendant can certainly raise the delay issue at
506 Id. at 385.
507 Id.




512 United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
513 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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any point prior to trial if he or she feels an unconstitutionally long
period of time has elapsed. Additionally, the period of delay will
likely include delay occasioned by the defendant, such as delay re-
sulting from the filing of pretrial motions. This delay cannot be bal-
anced against the United States.
514
Factor two of the Barker v. Wingo test which examines the reason
for the delay, should take into account the otherwise unauthorized
discovery which the defendant would receive if a pretrial evidentiary
hearing were held. The solicitor general of the United States as-
serted this factor in his petition for writ of certiorari in United States
v. Crozier:
Also pertinent here is the long-established policy of the Congress, em-
bodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to provide only
limited discovery in criminal cases, confined to specific, narrowly de-
fined classes of items enumerated in Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. Illustrative
of this policy is the refusal of Congress in 1974 to adopt a proposed
version of Rule 16 providing for pretrial exchange of witness lists in
criminal cases. In explaining its rejection of this expanded form of
discovery, the Conference Committee stated:
[I]t is not in the interest of the effective adminstration of criminal jus-
tice to require that the government or the defendant be forced to re-
veal the names and addresses of its witnesses before trial.
Discouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed at influ-
encing their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the for-
mulation of this policy.
Factor three of the test requires the defendant to request a pre-
trial hearing. Failure to make the request would not preclude a find-
ing that due process was not afforded, but it would weigh against
such a conclusion. 515
Factor four, actual prejudice, is significant when coupled with
concerns such as the need to use restrained property to pay basic
living expenses. 516 Where no such concern is present, however, in
general the defendant is not deprived of money or property, as is
the case with seizure warrants. The defendant can, therefore, con-
tinue to maintain his or her property and use certain items of the
property, for example living in a residence or driving a car, subject
to forfeiture. Some courts have also alleviated any potential preju-
dice incident to a restraining order by expressly providing in the
order that the defendant can post a performance bond in lieu of
514 E.g., United States v. Draine, 637 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Ala. 1986).
515 See United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. at 569.
516 One court limited actual prejudice in the sixth amendment context to situations in
which the delay "impared his [the defendant's] ability to provide a meaningful defense."
United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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forfeiture. 51 7 Rarely, applying the Barker v. Wingo factors, will any
restraining orders be found to violate procedural due process. 518
One last practical consideration remains. Suppose a grand jury
describes the property subject to forfeiture using only statutory lan-
guage, without reference to any specific item or property. Suppose
further that the United States thereafter seeks an order restraining
the transfer of $100,000 of the defendant's money or a piece of real
estate owned by the defendant, asserting that the money and real
estate are property described in 18 U.S.C. section 1963(a) and, thus,
are within the general description of property subject to forfeiture
as alleged in the indictment. In this hypothetical situation one can-
not assume, as the Musson 519 court did, that the grand jury found
probable cause to believe that the money and the real estate are
property described in subsection 1963(a). In this instance, due pro-
cess seems to require some hearing in which the government would
have to establish a nexus between the specific property it seeks re-
strained and the illegal acts. Such a hearing was contemplated by
Congress:
This provision [18 U.S.C. section 1963(e)] does not exclude, however,
the authority to hold a hearing subsequent to the intial entry of the
order and the court may at that time modify or vacate an order that
was clearly improper (e.g., where information presented at the hearing
shows that the property restrained was not among the property named
in the indicment). However, it is stressed that at such a hearing the
court is not to entertain challenges to the validity of the indictment.5
20
Accordingly, when the government seeks a restraining order, it
behooves the United States attorney to present evidence of the for-
feitability of specific items of property to the grandjury. The grand
jury should thereafter be encouraged to specifically list each item of
property it finds probable cause to believe is forfeitable in the in-
dictment.5 21 Obtaining a restraining order as to such specifically
identified forfeitable property should not require a "nexus"
hearing.
517 This is suggested in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(e)(1).
518 Other "fine-tuning" of restraining orders may also be possible. See, e.g., United
States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Gelb, 826 F.2d 1175 (2d
Cir. 1987).
519 United States v. Musson, 802 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1986).
520 S. REP. No. 224, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983). The Supreme Court declined to
decide the issue of when, if at all, a pretrial hearing is required in connection with a
restraining order. United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S. June 22, 1989)
(No. 88-494). However, the Supreme Court stated in Monsanto that "assets in a defend-
ant's possession may be restrained... based on a finding of probable cause to believe
that the assets are forfeitable." Id.
521 For a paradigm forfeiture allegation, see supra note 408.
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V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FORFEITURE PROVISIONS
The forfeiture provision of the RICO Act has received a
number of constitutional challenges. By and large the courts have
rejected these challenges. The three major areas of challenge have
included violation of the fifth, sixth and eighth amendments to the
Constitution.
A. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
White collar RICO defendants have argued that forfeiture of all
their interests in companies found to be RICO enterprises is so
grossly disproportionate to their criminal acts as to violate the
eighth amendment. 52 2 Others have argued that even forfeitures tied
specifically to certain acts of a crime, such as forfeiture of illegally-
acquired money, also constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 523
No defendant has prevailed to date, although a remand for further
hearing was ordered in United States v. Busher.52 4 However, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits have left the possibility open that at
least subsection 1963(a)(2) forfeitures may violate the eighth
amendment.
5 25
The eighth amendment challenges began with unsuccessful ar-
guments that the RICO Act forfeiture provisions were unconstitu-
tional on their face. 526 A defendant in a medicare fraud RICO case,
United States v. Huber,52 7 then argued that forfeiture of his interests in
enterprise corporations was cruel and unusual punishment. The
Second Circuit found no constitutional violation, noting:
522 See, e.g., United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1983); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Grande,
620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980); United States v. Huber, 603
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
523 United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 711
(1988); United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821
(1985); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174
(1983).
524 817 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987).
525 See United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1251 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987). See also United States v. Pryba, 674 F.
Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987)(forfeiture provision facially constitutional; applied constitu-
tionality must be considered on a case-by-case basis). But see United States v. Stem, 858
F.2d 1249, 1250 (7th Cir. 1988)(forfeiture of condominium based on use of telephone
not grossly disproportionate).
526 United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va. 1987); United States v. Boffa,
513 F. Supp. 444, 464 (D. Del. 1980); United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D.
Ga. 1979).
527 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
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We do not say that no forfeiture sanction may ever be so harsh as to
violate the Eighth Amendment. But at least where the provision for
forfeiture is keyed to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enter-
prise, as it is in RICO, the punishment is at least in some rough way
proportional to the crime.52
8
,The Huber court suggested that subsection 1963(c) gave a court lee-
way to mitigate a forfeiture which might be "draconian (and perhaps
potentially unconstitutional). '529 The notion that a court can ame-
liorate forfeiture was subsequently rejected by cases which held that
forfeiture as provided in section 1963 was mandatory. 530 Following
Huber, each court that considered an eighth amendment challenge
to RICO forfeiture categorically rejected it until 1987. The most
egregious of the factual situtations considered was in United States v.
Kravitz.531 In Kravitz, a dentist, the sole stockholder in AHP corpo-
ration, obtained the renewal of a dental contract between AHP and
the City of Philadelphia police through a $7,000 and a $1,000
bribe.532 He was convicted of violating the RICO Act and ordered
to forfeit all of his shares in AHP. Defendant argued that "forfeiture
constitutes a disproportionate penalty because AHP's contract with
the [police] expired prior to indictment" and that "only a small per
cent of AHP was used to promote racketeering."' 533 The court re-
jected this argument, holding:
In the instant case, the property seized was used to promote Kravitz's
racketeering scheme-as the Huber court suggested, "keyed to the
magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise," ... -and certainly
was as integral to the racketeering schemes as in other cases where
forfeiture was imposed under RICO.
534
In 1987, however, two courts reopened the possibility that pro-
portionality considerations may be appropriate at least in subsection
1963(a)(2) forfeitures, where the government need not show
"taint. '53 5 In United States v. Horak53 6 forfeiture was sought both
under subsection 1963(a)(1) and subsection 1963(a)(2). As to sub-
section 1963 (a) (1) forfeitures, the Horak court noted that "we think
528 Id. at 397.
529 Id.
530 E.g., United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984), cerl. denied, 470 U.S.
1052 (1985). See also United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 n.36 (E.D. Va.
1987)("whether this court has authority to mitigate or adjust thejury's forfeiture verdict
is unclear").
531 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
552 Id. at 103.
533 Id. at 103 n.4 and 106.
534 Id. at 107.
535 United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Busher,
817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).
536 833 F.2d 1235, 1237 (7th Cir. 1987).
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it highly unlikely that criminal forfeiture orders properly entered
under (a) (1) reaching proceeds of racketeering activity could consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment violating the Eighth Amend-
ment. '"537 As to subsection 1963(a)(2) forfeitures, however, the
Horak court was more equivocal. The government sought forfeiture
of all the defendant's stock in an eight million dollar company as a
result of RICO acts involving $12,000 in bribes to obtain a contract
worth $700,000.538 The district court in Horak, which decided the
forfeiture issues without a jury by agreement of the parties, held that
the stock was not forfeitable. 539 The Seventh Circuit rejected the
government's argument that the court's forfeiture order was appeal-
able. In dictum, the appellate court discussed the application of the
eighth amendment to subsection 1963(a)(2) forfeitures. 540 It noted
that the corporation which was named as the enterprise in a super-
seding indictment was the holding company of the corporation
named as the enterprise in the original indictment. By virtue of this
change in the enterprise entity, the prosecution may have increased
the property subject to forfeiture under subsection 1963(a)(2).
541
The court noted:
It is at least arguable that disparities in monetary value or
prosecutorial caprice in the choice of the enterprise could, in some
circumstances, implicate the Eighth Amendment. We are not insensi-
tive to the concern that vast prosecutorial discretion in combination
with potentially enormous forfeiture orders might in some circum-
stances threaten Eighth Amendment rights.
542
The Horak court relied upon an earlier Ninth Circuit decision in
United States v. Busher.543 In Busher, the defendant argued that it was
unconstitutional to order him to forfeit all of his interest in a com-
pany which obtained only three of 14 defense contracts, or
$335,000 of $27 million, illegally. 544 The Busher court held that:
RICO's forfeiture provision affords the trial court no discretion. Once
the jury determines that property was acquired, maintained or oper-
ated in violation of section 1962, it must find forfeitable the defend-
ant's entire interest in that property .... Moreover, the statute gives
the districtjudge no authority to exclude from the forfeiture order any
of the property the jury finds is covered by the liberal language of sec-
537 Id. at 1241 n.4.
538 Id. at 1251.
539 Horak, 633 F. Supp. at 200.
540 Horak, 833 F.2d at 1251.
541 Id.
542 Id.
543 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987).





The court further stated, however, that:
Even though the statute provides no discretion, the district court must
avoid unconstitutional results by fashioning forfeiture orders that stay
within constitutional bounds. We therefore hold that where, as here,
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the forfeiture may be exces-
sive, the district court must make a determination, based upon appro-
priate findings, that the interest ordered forfeited is not so grossly
disproportionate to the offense committed as to violate the eighth
amendment.
5 46
The Busher court ordered a remand to the district court for a
determination regarding eighth amendment concerns. The district
court was ordered to consider: "(1) the harshness of the penalty in
light of the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed for other
offenses in the federal system; and (3) sentences imposed for the
same or similar offenses in other jurisdictions." 54 7 However:
[F]orfeiture is not rendered unconstitutional because it exceeds
the harm to the victims or the benefit to the defendant. After all,
RICO's forfeiture provisions are intended to be punitive. The eighth
amendment prohibits only those forfeitures that, in light of all the rel-
evant circumstances are grossly disproportionate to the offense
committed.
54 8
Despite the earlier recognition that the statute provides no discre-
tion to the court in the area of forfeitures, the Busher court in-
structed that if disproportionality was found on remand the court
must limit the forfeiture to such portion of the interest as it deems
consistent with these principles; or it may condition the forfeiture
upon payment of such sum or relinquishment of such other property
as seems just under the circumstances, or it may limit or eliminate
other punishment it would otherwise impose so as to bring the total
sanction within constitutional boundaries.
54 9
It thus appears that if the government proves "taint" or
"sources of influence" proportionately, a violation of the eighth
amendment will not exist. Where forfeiture of all a defendant's in-
terest in an enterprise is sought, however, eighth amendment argu-
ments may apply. These problems will probably be "limited to the
situation where the convicted defendant owns substantially all of the
stock of a corporation [enterprise], or where the enterprise is a sole
proprietorship. °" 5 5 0 However, if the court finds that the forfeiture is
545 Id.
546 Id. at 1415.
547 Id.
548 Id. (emphasis in original).
549 Id. at 1416.
550 Id. at 1413 n.7.
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so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional, its only remedy avail-
able is to so hold. Contrary to the conclusions of Huber and Busher,
nothing in section 1963 gives a court an avenue to read "condi-
tional" forfeiture into the RICO Act. If a court cannot interpret a
statute to be constitutional as applied, a court must declare it
unconstitutional. 55 l
B. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
Third parties who claim an interest in property ordered for-
feited by a defendant in a criminal case have raised constitutional
arguments concerning denial of procedural due process in violation
of the fifth amendment. Initially, the law provided that the only
remedy for third parties was to petition the Attorney General for
remission or mitigation of the forfeiture. 552 This was not a unique
procedure. Customs laws have long provided for seizure of prop-
erty, for instance a boat carrying marijuana, without a pre-seizure
notice or hearing for the owner.553 The owner's remedy after such a
seizure was to seek remission or mitigation of the forfeiture from
the seizing authorities. The Supreme Court in Calero-Toledo v. Pear-
son Yacht Leasing Co. 554 held that this procedure did not violate the
procedural due process requirements of the fifth amendment.
Nevertheless, in response to criticism of this procedure, the
1984 amendments to RICO provided third parties with a judicial
forum to present their claims. 555 Under subsection 1963(i), third
parties are prohibited from pursuing a claim to property subject to
forfeiture by intervening in the criminal case or by filing a civil suit
prior to a forfeiture order being entered in the criminal case. 556 In
exchange for this forbearance, subsection 1963(1) provides that fol-
lowing an order of forfeiture the United States shall give general
notice of its intent to dispose of the forfeited property and "direct
written notice to any person known to have alleged an interest in the
551 See, e.g., Lowe v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 472 U.S. 181, 212-13
(1985)(White, J., concurring).
552 See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
833 (1980).
553 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
554 Id.
555 With regard to third-party interests, RICO and drug law forfeiture provisions are
the same. United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
556 Case law has held that the restraining order provision of section 1963 cannot bind




property that is the subject of the order of forfeiture."557 Thereaf-
ter, a third party must timely file a petition signed under penalty of
perjury stating specific facts supporting his or her claim against the
property in the form set forth in subsection 1963(l)(3). If the peti-
tion adequately states a claim,558 the court will hold an adversarial
non-jury hearing using the federal rules of evidence to adjudicate
the third party's interest in the forfeitable property.559 The burden
of proof lies with the third party. This party must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he or she has a right, title or
interest in the property superior to the defendant's or which renders
the forfeiture invalid or that he or she was "a bona fide purchaser
for value of the right, tide or interest in the property and was at the
time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture under this section."5 60 If the third
party does not prevail at this hearing, he or she may still petition the
Attorney General for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture on
equitable grounds. 561 No procedural due process challenge has
prevailed as to the adequacy or timeliness of a subsection 1963(l)
hearing.
Judicial circumvention of these third party procedures have
been routinely quashed. For example, the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. L'Hoste56 2 overturned a district court's decision to exempt
marital community property from a forfeiture order. More recently,
the Ninth Circuit overturned an order exempting one house and
one car from forfeiture in United States v. Murillo.56 3 One area in
which lower courts had not resolved the question of exemption,
however, was payment of attorney's fees from forfeitable property.
At least one court held that attorneys, like other third parties, must
present their claims for fees in a petition pursuant to subsection
1963(l), while others exempted attorney's fees from the forfeiture
provisions. 564 On June 22, 1989, the Supreme Court resolved the
issue by holding that attorney's fees are not exempt from forfei-
557 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1) (1986).
558 A hearing can be denied if the third-party petition fails to state a claim. United
States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820, 825 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd mem., 822 F.2d 62 (9th
Cir. 1987).
559 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l),(2),(4),(5) (1988).
560 Id. at § 1963(1)(6).
561 Id. at § 1963(g).
562 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980); accord United States v.
Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1988).
563 709 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1983).
564 E.g., United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 837 (1984). See cases cited in United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1988). ,
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ture.565 Thus, attorneys stand in the same position as other third-
party claimants with regard to claims against assets subject to
forfeiture.
Two additional issues in the third party claim area are also wor-
thy of note. The first is forfeiture of property held in the name of
someone other than the defendant. In United States v. Mandel,
566
241,000 shares of stock in a RICO enterprise corporation were
found to belong to defendant Kovens even though they were held in
the name of a third party, Irving Schwartz. Schwartz was neverthe-
less required to present his claim to the property through third-
party procedures. 567 Similarly, in United States v. Reckmeyer,568 forfei-
ture was sought of a parcel of real estate purchased by the defend-
ant's father based upon his sons' CCE convictions. The father
successfully pursued his claim to the property under the drug forfei-
ture equivalent of subsection 1963(l).569
Where the government has proved that property held by some-
one other than the defendant is a forfeitable interest of the defend-
ant's, it is appropriate to require the nominee owner to pursue his
claim through third party channels. Without this protection, de-
fendants could too easily circumvent forfeiture by the use of straw
purchasers. While the substitute assets provision would allow the
United States to seek the value of this property from a defendant's
non-forfeited assets, this remedy will be insufficient if the defend-
ant's remaining assets do not equal the value of the property held by
the third party.
The next issue faced by the courts was who has standing to as-
sert a claim against forfeited property. The United States has ar-
gued that only third parties with a secured or specifically identifiable
interest in a particular piece of forfeited property have standing to
assert a claim against the property. 570 However, courts have al-
lowed general, unsecured creditors of a defendant to pursue third
party claims against forfeited property, reasoning that trade credi-
565 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (U.S. June 22,
1989); United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S. June 22, 1989).
566 505 F. Supp. 189 (D. Md. 1981).
567 Schwartz pursued his claim prior to the enactment of subsection 1963(). His
plight is a good example of why the subsection 1963(1) procedures are needed.
Schwartz filed both a petition for remission and mitigation of forfeiture and a civil suit
for a declaratory judgment. Schwartz v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 224 (D. Md. 1984).
Pending resolution of his claims, the court stayed execution of the forfeiture. Mandel,
505 F. Supp. at 192. Case law does not report the outcome of Schwartz's claim.
568 628 F. Supp. 616 (E.D. Va. 1986).




tors are bona fide purchasers for value of the property by virtue of
the expenditure of their services. 57' One court has held that claim-
ants in a tort action pending against the defendant, however, do not
have standing to assert a third-party claim against forfeited
assets. 57
2
C. FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
The issue of whether attorney's fees are subject to forfeiture
and, if so, whether such forfeiture is in violation of defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel probably has been the most analyzed
area in RICO forfeiture law.573 The question has arisen both with
regard to pre-trial, post-indictment restraining orders574 and post-
conviction forfeitures. 575 Many courts attempted to sidestep the
constitutional issue with respect to forfeiture of attorney's fees
under section 1963.576 More recently, however, decisions have
noted that this conclusion is not a reasonable interpretation of the
law.577 The question to be addressed, therefore, was whether forfei-
ture of attorney's fees, and restraining orders pending forfeiture,
violated a defendant's qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of
his choice or his fifth amendment rights. 5
78
The Supreme Court held onJune 22, 1989, that attorney's fees
are not exempt from forfeiture or from pretrial restraining or-
ders. 579 A review of the discussions of the lower courts which were
571 United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820, 829 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd mem., 822
F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Reckmeyer, 628 F. Supp. 616, 621-22 (E.D. Va.
1986).
572 United States v. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 820, 824 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd mem., 822
F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1987).
573 See, e.g., articles discussed in United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1490 n.3
(10th Cir. 1988).
574 E.g., United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987), modified sub. nom. In re Forfeiture Hearing as to
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988)(en banc), aff'd U.S.L.W.
(U.S. June 22, 1989) (No. 87-1729); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir.
1986); United States v. Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
575 E.g., United States v. Raimondo, 721 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981).
576 E.g., United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Wis. 1986); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
577 E.g., United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988); In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988)(en banc), aff'd 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (U.S.
June 22, 1989) (No. 87-1729).
578 United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1989) (fifth amendment due
process issue).
579 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (U.S. June 22,
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resolved by these Supreme Court opinions will provide a basis for
understanding these new cases.
The clearest analyses of the sixth amendment constitutional is-
sue prior to the Supreme Court's rulings were presented in United
States v. Monsanto,580 United States v. Nichols,581 United States v. Har-
vey, 58 2 and In Re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered.58 3
Although these courts ultimately reached different results, their rea-
soning processes were similar. Each of these courts held that the
RICO forfeiture provisions did not exempt attorney's fees from for-
feiture. Each court further recognized that the defendant's right to
counsel of choice was only a qualified right which had to be bal-
anced against any countervailing governmental interests. The
courts differed, however, on the outcome of the balancing.
Initially, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Harvey, that
the governmental interests in preserving the availability of forfeita-
ble assets and "stripping racketeers and drug dealers of their 'eco-
nomic power base' upon conviction" were outweighed by "an
accused's right legitimately (i.e. without sham or fraud) to use his
property, even that ultimately proven to be tainted by criminal con-
duct, to employ private counsel to defend him against criminal
charges."5 84 On en banc review, however, this decision was reversed.
The en banc panel, in a case entitled In re Forfeiture Hearing as to
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, held that "there is no established Sixth
Amendment right to pay an attorney with .. .illicit proceeds." 5 5
The Caplin & Drysdale court held that any balancing of a defendant's
right to counsel of his or her choice against governmental interests
is "presumptively a matter of legislative prerogative, '" 58 6 not an is-
sue for the courts. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that "forfeiture
defendants may be required to rely on appointed counsel if they do
not have sufficient uncontested assets to hire a private attomey." 58 7
By contrast, both the Nichols court and the original panel deci-
sion in Monsanto, found the balancing test a proper subject for judi-
cial resolution. Further, both agreed that, at least in some
1989) (No. 87-1729); United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S. June 22,
1989)(No. 88-494).
580 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir. 1988)(en banc), rev'd and
remanded, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S. June 22, 1989) (No. 88, 494).
581 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
582 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
583 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988)(en banc).
584 Harvey, 814 F.2d at 924.
585 Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 640.
586 Id. at 648.
587 Id. at 646.
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circumstances, governmental interests in deterrance, preservation
of assets, and separation of a defendant from his or her ill-gotten
gains, outweighed a defendant's qualified right to counsel of his
choice. 588 These cases differed, however, as to when the balance
weighed in favor of forfeiture. The Tenth Circuit held that "[t]hose
who have access to assets can retain private counsel. Those who
have no access to assets must rely on appointed counsel." 589 ....
The Second Circuit in the panel decision in Monsanto was more
concerned about restraining assets prior to an offer of proof by the
government that the assets would be subject to forfeiture. The
court noted that unlike a bank roberry where the stolen money is
clearly contraband or a "buy-bust" drug deal where the defendant is
caught with drug proceeds in hand, property alleged to be subject to
forfeiture cannot always be clearly and easily identified as
"tainted." 590 The Monsanto court reasoned:
As disinclined as we are to establish an absolute rule exempting prop-
erty earmarked for attorney's fees from forfeiture, we are equally dis-
inclined to postulate an absolute rule allowing the government to
impose indigence and deprive RICO and CCE defendants of the op-
portunity to retain private counsel merely by obtaining an indictment.
Such a rule would give the government "the ultimate tactical advan-
tage of being able to exclude competent counsel as it chooses" simply
by "appending a charge of forfeiture to an indictment under RICO"
or CCE. 5 9 1
To resolve this dilemma, the Monsanto court required a post-indict-
ment pretrial hearing in each instance in which forfeiture of assets
used to pay attorney's fees would be sought.
Requiring an adversarial hearing, at which the government has the
burden to demonstrate the likelihood that the assets are forfeitable,
will provide a procedural check against the government's discretion to
limit CCE and RICO defendants' choice of counsel simply by ob-
taining a forfeiture charge in the indictment. If the government can-
not demonstrate the likelihood that a jury would find the assets to be
the proceeds of crime, the interest of the defendant in using the prop-
erty to retain counsel of choice should prevail.
592
The en banc decision in Monsanto reversed this panel decision. 59
588 Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1505; Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 80-81.
589 Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1508.
590 United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 1400
(2d Cir. 1988)(en banc), rev'd and remanded, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S. June 22, 1989) (No.
88-454).
591 Id. (quoting United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985)).
592 Id. at 84.
593 United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.)(en banc), rev'd and remanded, 57
U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S. June 22, 1989) (No. 88-494).
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In doing so, the court illustrated the divergent reasoning in this area
of the law.
[A] majority of the members of the in banc court, albeit for varying
reasons, agree that the order of the district court denying Monsanto's
motion should be vacated and the case remanded with instructions to
modify the restraining order to permit Monsanto access to restrained
assets to the "extent necessary to pay legitimate (that is, non-sham)
attorney's fees in connection with the criminal charges against him. A
majority of the members of the court also agree that any such fees paid
to Monsanto's defense counsel are exempt from subsequent forfeiture
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
594
A lengthy dissenting opinion presented a detailed rebuttal to each
of the varying rationales of the majority judges. The dissent noted
that the rationales ran the gamut from concluding "that the statute
requires this result," "the sixth amendment requires it," "both the
fifth and sixth amendments require it," and "the panel majority ex-
ceeded its authority by adding a hearing requirement to the statute,
although if the statute called for a hearing it would pass constitu-
tional muster. '
595
The Supreme Court concurred with these lower court decisions
to the extent that it held that attorney's fees are not exempt from
forfeiture. 596 As to the balancing test under the sixth amendment
"qualified" right to counsel, the Supreme Court held that the lower
courts had not given sufficient weight to the governmental interest
in forfeiture. 597 In Caplan & Drysdale, Chartered, the Court listed
three important governmental interests in forfeiture. 1) a pecuniary
interest in funding law-enforcement activities with forfeitable assets;
2) preservation of forfeitable assets to pay restitution to victims of
the crime; and 3) "to lessen the economic power of organized crime
and drug enterprises." 598 These "strong governmental interest[s]
in obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets" is sufficient, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, to override "any Sixth Amendment
interest in permitting criminals to use assets adjudged forfeitable to
pay for their defense." 599
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that under
the "relation back" principle, 600 forfeitable assets do not belong to
594 Id. at 1402.
595 Id. at 1412.
596 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 57 U.S.L.W. 4836 (U.S. June 22,
1989) (No. 87-1729); United States v. Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. 4826 (U.S.June 22, 1989)
(No. 88-494).
597 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4837; Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4830.
598 Id. at 4839.
599 Id. at 4840.
600 See supra text accompanying notes 256 and 368.
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the defendant.60 1 Thus, "[p]ermitting a defendant to use assets for
his private purposes that, under this [forfeiture] provision, will be-
come the property of the United States if a conviction occurs, can-
not be sanctioned." 60 2 Accordingly, the Court held that "[a]
defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's
money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds are
the only way the defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his
choice."
603
Because forfeiture of attorney's fees does not violate the sixth
amendment, pretrial restraining orders freezing funds which might
have been used to pay attorney's fees likewise is not in violation of a
defendant's qualified constitutional right to counsel. 60 4 Nor is the
potential for prosecutorial abuse of the restraining order provision
sufficient to rise to the level of a fifth amendment violation.605 The
Court did not decide, however, what procedural due process rights
a defendant may have to a hearing after issuance of a pretrial re-
straining order.60 6
Despite the breadth of these Supreme Court rulings, federal
prosecutors will still be limited with regard to forfeiture of attor-
ney's fees by Department ofJustice guidelines. 60 7 Those guidelines,
which are not enforceable by defendants, 608 provide that an Assis-
tant United States Attorney cannot seek forfeiture of assets used to
pay attorney's fees unless it can be shown that the attorney had spe-
cific knowledge, other than through confidential communications
with his client, that the asset was subject to forfeiture at the time he
agreed to accept it as payment.
609
VI. CONCLUSION
The RICO forfeiture laws are applicable to, and appropriate in,
white collar criminal prosecutions. To prevail on such forfeitures,
however, careful analysis, drafting and grand jury work is necessary
to insure that forfeiture is sought of appropriate assets under a cor-
rect theory. Both prosecutors and defense attorneys must also be
aware of the constitutional ramifications of forfeiture and the need
601 Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4830.
602 Id.
603 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4838.
604 Monsanto, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4830.
605 Id.
606 Id
607 38 Grim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Oct. 2, 1985) (United States Attorney's Manual
(U.S.A.M.) 9-111.100 -. 630).
608 Id. at 3003 (U.S.A.M. 9-111.400).
609 Id. at 3004 (U.S.A.M. 9-111.500).
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to evaluate third party claims, preservation of assets, and exemp-
tions of assets to pay living expenses. Consequently, RICO forfei-
ture in general and as applied in white collar criminal cases, is a
developing area of law with which all federal criminal practitioners
should be familiar.
